ABSTRACT
As the transnational terrorist outfits Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State (IS) have notable strongholds in South Asia, the author conducted this study to assess the existing condition of AQ and IS in this region and their propaganda campaigns in India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Employing a synchronic approach and content analysis, the author obtained data through targeted selection of topics and news from domestic national newspapers, books, diplomatic websites, analytical websites, online news agencies, official websites of AQ and its official Facebook and Telegram sites, as well as the pages and magazines of AQ and IS from January 2015 to July 2022. The findings show that both AQ and IS aim to persistently execute their goals by staging militant attacks in the region. Despite the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2022, AQ still has eight “inspired groups” in South Asia, while the IS has seven. Through an Islamic apocalyptic narrative known as Gazwatul Hind, AQ and its linked groups are bolstering their strongholds in South Asia in order to attack their stated targets in India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The IS-inspired groups’ geographical closeness poses a significant threat to these areas. The propaganda campaigns of both these terrorist groups also aim to exploit the unstable situation of the Rohingya refugees, and to undermine the loyalties of the population of India and Bangladesh by means of communication materials.
Keywords: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Lone Wolf, Gazwatul Hind, Indian Subcontinent, Code of Conduct, Katiba al-Mahdi fi Bilad al-Arakan.
The reported killing of the second emir of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, on August 31, 2022, in an American drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan is unlikely to stanch the rise of Islamist militancy in South Asia that had accelerated since the declaration of the Islamic State (IS) on July 29, 2014,[1] and the attempt to establish Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) by Ayman al-Zawahiri, on September 3, 2014.[2] Al-Qaeda had not confirmed the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri (at press time).[3] Zawahiri’s demise had previously been wildly exaggerated in news reports. His alleged death was reported as recently as 2020. Al-Qaeda has had plenty of time to think about replacing Zawahiri as a result.
Who will be the next in line? A UN study in July 2022 shed light on Al-Qaeda’s leadership hierarchy. Behind Zawahiri, the senior and long-time Al-Qaeda leader, Saif al-Adel, is in second place.[4] After him in line are Yazid Mebrak, the emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Ahmed Diriye, the leader of Shabaab, which is Al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa; and Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, a top Al-Qaeda leader. Al-Adel has long been a prominent member of Al-Qaeda, and he and other leading terrorist figures are reported to have sought refuge in Iran. He may currently be living in Afghanistan. Maghrebi, a Moroccan native and Zawahiri’s son-in-law, has held a number of important positions within Al-Qaeda. He is a “long time director” of As-Sahab Media, Al-Qaeda’s main media outlet, and the “chief” of the organization’s “External Communications Office,” where he “coordinates activities with” Al Qaeda’s “affiliates,” according to the State Department.[5] Maghrebi also serves as Al Qaeda’s “general manager in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2012,” which is a crucial position given that senior Al-Qaeda figures take refuge in the area.[6]
Changes in the leadership of both Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in 2019 contributed to formulate their non-conventional existence in the sub-continent. After the death of the self-styled caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the second caliph, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, was appointed the successor of Baghdadi on October 31, 2019.[7] On the Al-Qaeda side, although there was a rumor at the time that Ayman al-Zawahiri had died of a heart condition at the end of 2020,[8] Al-Qaeda Central (AQC, the core terrorist organization established by the group’s original top commanders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri) uploaded a video of Ayman al-Zawahiri on their official website (www.gazwah.net) entitled, “The Wound of the Rohingya is the Wound of the Ummah,” on March 24, 2021.
Table 1: Global Terrorism Index of South Asia
|
Country
|
Year-wise rank
|
|||||
|
2015
|
2016
|
2017
|
2018
|
2019
|
2020
|
|
|
Bangladesh
|
25
|
22
|
21
|
25
|
31
|
33
|
|
India
|
6
|
8
|
8
|
7
|
7
|
8
|
|
Pakistan
|
4
|
4
|
5
|
5
|
5
|
7
|
|
Sri Lanka
|
42
|
53
|
68
|
49
|
55
|
20
|
|
Nepal
|
32
|
39
|
44
|
33
|
34
|
27
|
|
Bhutan
|
107
|
119
|
129
|
135
|
137
|
135
|
|
Maldives
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Afghanistan
|
2
|
2
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
Source: Global Terrorism Index of South Asian Regions (2015-2020).[9]
Pakistan and India, as neighbors of Afghanistan, the epicenter of terrorism, rank in single digits because of frequent casualties caused by militants. According to the 2015-2020 GTI (Global Terrorism Index), the two countries are the most affected by terrorism in the region. Further, the South Asia Terrorism Portal shows that the region accounted for at least 71,400 Islamist terrorism-linked fatalities during 2018-2019: 24,766 civilians; 8,218 Special Force (SP) personnel; 38,416 militants (data available through April 28, 2019). The data does not include fatalities in Afghanistan as the SATP database on Afghanistan only commenced on January 1, 2018. Pakistan accounted for 62,535 such fatalities during the same period, followed by India (7,828), Bangladesh (760), and Sri Lanka (277). The fatalities are showing a downward trend, falling to 560 in 2019, from 1,156 in 2018, and down from 1,683 in 2017 due to the commendable counter violent extremism (CVE) intervention in the region.[10]
The transnational and homegrown terror outfits of the member countries of South Asia espouse the ideology of the above-mentioned international terror outfits. The home-grown parties are adamant about establishing an Islamic Khilapha in the region. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of Islamic militancy will help to assess the current trends of Islamic militancy in South Asia.
Justification of the Study
This researcher has conducted an in-depth study of the existing data on Islamic militancy in South Asia to understand the existing gaps in the current status of AQ and IS in the region. The findings of the scientific study, stated below, offer compelling perspectives on the intensity of violent extremism in the region.
To identify the causes of militancy, scholars have determined that the support for violent groups and actors in Kashmir and Afghanistan has developed within the socio-cultural milieu, driven by factors such as corruption, the fractured nature of the insurgency, the broader geo-politics, power dynamics and identity politics,[11] Afghan war returnees,[12] and a deep obsession and fear of Indian aggression and encirclement by the military and intelligence agencies. Support for terror groups has also risen because of a growing affinity between civil and military communities for extreme, conservative, and exclusivist forms of Islam that sometimes tacitly support violence. Despite successful counter-terrorism operations by the Pakistani state against groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, foreign powers and domestic politicians continue to strategically use extremist organizations within Pakistan.[13] Prime factors that perpetuate Islamist militancy in the region are the spill-over effects of the war in Afghanistan (Iqbal & Mehmood, 2013), foreign cases of alleged Muslim suffering,[14] geographical location and cultural construction of native ethnic communities,[15] and family inspiration.[16]
The radicalization process has received expansive scholarly attention. Aggarwal has analyzed the open-source propaganda materials of the Islamic State and Afghan Taliban to assess and discredit the claim of each controlling the other through pious justifications in authorized bulletins and declarations.[17] Iqbal and Mehmood have ascertained that the absence of clearly defined concepts on violent extremism has negatively impacted scientific efforts to develop a systematic understanding of the threat and the political interventions to counteract the phenomenon in its violent and nonviolent manifestations, based on a survey of six public universities in Islamabad.[18] Moreover, Karzai points out that when the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1994, they enforced Draconian measures on the population and banned everything that had to do with modernity and globalization.[19] Mostofa and Doyle argue that online platforms have great impact on Islamic radicalization.[20] Riaz and Parvez[21] identify four factors—social relationships, internet use, personal crises, and external relationships—as most important catalysts for radicalization. Khalil et al emphasize the Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) model to understand the process of radicalization.[22] Irwin addresses the difficulties of responding to homegrown terror networks in terms of disengagement, radicalization, and de-radicalization.[23]
Further, Kruglanski et al analyze the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism on three levels.[24] The individual level takes into account the motivations, development phases, and temperamental dispositions that can promote the willingness to undertake suicidal missions. The group level considers the processes of social influence, the construction of common realities, and the ideological value systems contained therein. Finally, the organizational level looks at the strategic and tactical aspects of the introduction of suicidal terrorism in terms of a means-end analysis. It is suggested that all three levels of analysis contribute to insights into the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism and the ways to deal with it. Riaz and Parvez (2018) discuss the Holy Artisan attack staged on July 1, 2016 by Neo Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (NJMB).[25] They describe how the attack came about after a series of target attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers, by both an AQIS subsidiary and ISIS. Abrahms and Mierau discuss how targeted killings have become a central part of the counter-terrorism strategy.[26] They examine the effects of targeted killings on tactical decision-making by militant groups and identify several potential causal mechanisms to explain the results; they have found strong evidence that targeted killings tend to encourage indiscriminate organizational violence by empowering lower-level members with weaker civilian restraint.
To explore the gender role in militant groups, Fair and Hamza explain that many terrorist groups have women’s wings, women-centric publications, and other outreach programs because they understand the important role that mothers, wives, and sisters play in determining whether male family members take up arms with a terrorist group.[27] Uddin posits that female members are collected from family, kin, online, and offline sources.[28] Women have, indeed, played a multifaceted role in the name of Islam for their individual organizations.
Some researchers believe that the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are a great security threat to South Asia as these groups are constantly expanding and consolidating their strongholds in the region especially in recruitment, monetary resources, territorial control, and armed power.[29] Explaining the character of Islamist militancy, Mostofa and Doyle claim that militant organizations are increasingly recruiting urban youth attending secular educational institutions, both from the upper and middle classes.[30] Riaz and Parvez (2018) have demonstrated that most militants in Bangladesh are young, educated men who come primarily from wealthy families.[31]
Piazza argues that contemporary terrorist movements in Afghanistan are often fueled in part by the country’s voluminous opium trade.[32] Terrorist groups currently active in Afghanistan such as the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizbul Islami, and various Al-Qaeda members funnel profits from drug trafficking into the recruitment of cadres, purchase of weapons and equipment, and bribing officials in the process more and more often. Piazza’s study empirically investigates the relationship between the opium trade and terrorism in Afghanistan by performing a series of negative binomial regression estimates of terrorist attacks and victims in the thirty-four Afghan provinces for the period 1996 to 2008.
Mendelsohn describes the challenges newly appointed terrorist leaders face.[33] He suggests that there are four main priorities all new leaders must accomplish: acceptance by members of the organization, taking control, maintaining organizational coherence and unity, and overcoming counter-terrorism pressures. He found Al-Qaeda still alive, but its size had significantly diminished.
Uddin and Rahman claim that the most vulnerable and forcibly displaced Rohingya people live in thirty-two refugee camps in Bangladesh.[34] By examining the process of religious radicalization in refugee camps, the authors have determined that some organizations have strengthened their skills by using the refugees’ helpless situation as well as the existing social structure. The organizations employing such tactics are foreign humanitarian organizations like Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), Al Khidmat Foundation, and transnational/national terrorist organizations.
Objectives of the Study
The main purpose of the study was to assess the existing state of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in South Asia and their influence on Bangladesh. To achieve the general aim of the study, the researcher carefully examined the following specific questions.
Methodology of the Study
A synchronic approach was employed by analyzing the similarities and differences of language at a given moment by focusing on its structural features and characteristics, and providing phonological, morphological, and syntactic explanations including semantic and pragmatic aspects. The data was collected through targeted selection of subjects and characters from various national and local newspapers, books, magazines, diplomatic websites, official websites of AQ, official Facebook and Telegram sites, and the pages and magazines of AQ and IS. The researcher used Tor Browser to get access to the encrypted websites and social media pages of AQ and IS. The data collection period was from January 2019 to June 2021, and the study was carried out using content analysis methods.[35]
Findings of the Study
AQ in South Asia and its Propaganda Campaigns
AQ takes advantage of the Muslim persecution crisis by framing it as an Islamic eschatological narrative known as Gazwatul Hind (see Figure 1). Ghazwa is an Arabic word meaning battle, and al-Hind generally refers to the Indian subcontinent/South Asian region that roughly includes Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and to some extent the Rakhine State that encompasses western Myanmar (also known as Arakan). The concept of Gazwatul Hind is mainly based on three hadiths (prophetic sayings) related to the Indian subcontinent. The proverbs glorify the status of those who will take part in the battle described as Gazwatul Hind.[36]
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|
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Osama bin Laden created Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) in Afghanistan in 1988 during the late stages of the Soviet-Afghan War, with the purpose of waging worldwide jihad.[37] To continue the struggle against the so-called enemies of Islam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the commander of these terrorist groups who was killed in August 2022, had earlier called on Muslim brothers around the world, particularly Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, to offer their last rock as weapons in aiding the “enslaved Muslims” in Kashmir, in a video titled Don’t Forget Kashmir, released on July 9, 2019.[38] The group, next, spread its imprint beyond Kashmir. On March 13, 2021, the mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda, the As-Sahab Institute for Media Productions, released a video that looks at the situation in Myanmar and discusses the latest coup in 2021. The video contains a voice message from Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who addresses Muslim brothers in Burma and elsewhere. In the video, al-Zawahiri threatens Myanmar, “This criminal Buddhist government, which has been spoiled by the West, will not be deterred, except by violence and by paying the price for its aggression inside and outside Myanmar.” According to al-Zawahiri, the wound of the Rohingyan Muslims is the wound of the Ummah in its entirety. So there is only one way forward: to resist the interests of Myanmar and the criminals of Myanmar wherever they can. Al-Qaeda’s interest in Myanmar sounds like an empty homily and an attempt to attract local Muslims who might otherwise join Al-Qaeda’s rival, the Islamic State.[39]
The modus operandi of AQ and IS in competing for Rohingya allegiance is nothing but to enhance their strongholds in the region. Both these groups continue to increase their strongholds in Afghanistan.[40] In South Asia, AQ has the following affiliates (See Figure 2).
Emarate Islamiya Afghanistan
The present emir of Emarate Islamiya Afghanistan, Shaikhul Hadith Hebatullah Akhunjadah, is assisted by his deputy, Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani. The group’s ruling council is called Quetta Shura (Taliban, 2021).
|
Figure 3. The call of the emir in Bengali titled
|
Figure 4. Leaflet of Jamat Kaydatul Jihad-Khorasan. |
The organization’s structure consists of five commissions or ministries, and a department: Commission for Agriculture, Livestock, Ushar and Zakat; Commission for Financial Affairs; Department for Power Distribution; Commission for Training, Learning, and Higher Education; Commission for the Affairs of Indigent, Orphans, and Disabled; and Commission for Prevention of Civilian Casualties and Complaints. Quetta Shura has keen interest in Bangladesh as well as Kolkata, as its emir had presented “the roadmap to establish peace in Afghanistan to Bengali people” on August 18, 2018 (See Figure 3).
Jamat Kaydatul Jihad-Khorasan
This platform, directly governed by AQC, published a six-page Bengali leaflet in November 2020 entitled “Statement from the General Command: If You Repeat the Crime, We Shall Repeat the Punishment.” In it, the central command of AQC appeals to the general Muslim public to launch an “Economic War” against the tagut (non-believers) by avoiding their services and goods (See Figure 4).
Jama’atul Mujahideen—Subcontinent
Another AQC inspired group, the Jama’atul Mujahideen Subcontinent, was officially introduced on July 4, 2017 by its Emir, Salahuddin Ahmed, alias Salehin, a fugitive leader of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Salehin spoke to his media wing, Sahm Al Hind (see Figure 5), saying, “We are working to ensure that Hindustan also becomes a center for hijrat (migration for religious struggles) and jihad, so that we as people in India can play an important role in establishing the next Khaliphate. We started from Bangladesh, but have since expanded. Jama’atul Mujahideen India is an example. Work is also progressing elsewhere.”[41] An untested source said that Salehin was now in Pakistan.[42]
Figure 5. The cover page of an Interview of Jama'atul Mujahidin-Subcontinent,
Emir Salahuddin Salahin. Source: www.gazwah.net
According to the Bangladesh Police Department’s Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), Jama’atul Mujahideen India, the Indian wing of the mainstream JMB, had split into three factions due to disagreement among the leaders. One faction, led by Salahuddin Ahmed who is the current emir of the JMB, has networks in various states of India, although its strongholds are in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal.[43] Of the three factions, Salehin’s group is the strongest in India and has supporters in many of the country’s states. JMB leaders Soleman, Firoz, Tareq, and Jamai worked mainly for Salehin’s faction in India and expanded the network. The second faction, led by Jahidul Islam Mizan aka Boma Mizan, a top bomb expert in the force, has its stronghold in Bardhaman.[44] And the third is led by Ezaj Sheikh, an Indian, who has strongholds mainly in various districts of West Bengal.[45]
Figure 6. Factions of Jama'atul Mujahideen–Subcontinent.
Salehin went into hiding and sought refuge in India after he and explosive expert Mizanur Rahman Mizan alias Boma Mizan were dragged out of a prison van in Trishal, Mymenshing by their followers on February 23, 2014. After they fled to India, the outfit’s activities accelerated in the country and a new chapter—Jama’atul Mujahideen India (JMI)—was proclaimed in 2018, investigators say.[46] However, conflict arose between Salehin and Mizan over procedures and priorities. Salehin was busy building the outfit’s network between Bangladesh and India, but Mizan wanted immediate action. For this reason, Mizan formed a separate parliamentary group in 2017 (see Figure 6) with an Indian citizen, Ezaj.[47]
Ansar Gazawatul Hind-Kashmir
Although they lost their emir, Imtiyaz Shah, in the Tral encounter on April 9, 2021, this faction of AQC is still reorganizing.[48] Earlier in August 2017, they had distributed three pages of twelve manifestos in Bengali, depicting the war against India (See Figure 7).
Figure 7. Manifesto of Ansar Gazawatul Hind -Kashmir. Source: www.gazwah.net
Al-Qaeda-in-the-Indian-Subcontinent-(AQIS)
After its formation in 2014,[49] AQIS, a faction of AQC, presented a seventeen-page, fourteen-paragraph code of conduct written in Bengali in June 2017 (see Figure 8). The third paragraph focuses on the faction’s targets in Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar. In Bangladesh and India, such targets are “the direct interests” of Israel and the United States, the Indian state, and those who disobey the Prophet Muhammad. In Myanmar, the targets are the Burmese Army and Buddhists groups who are killing Muslims.
On September 24, 2020, Christopher Miller, director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center, told a U.S. Senate committee that because this faction was struggling to recover from the September 2019 death of their leader Asim Umar in a U.S. military strike in Afghanistan, they were unlikely to be capable of anything but small regional attacks.[50]
Figure 8. AQIS Code of Conduct.
Source: AQIS Code of Conduct, 2017.
On March 21, 2020 AQIS claimed in one of their major Urdu language magazines that the group would change the title of their long-running publication Nawa-i Afghan Jihad to Nawa-i Gazawatul Hind, which signals the geographic shift and justifies the goals behind their formation. The publication also devoted an entire chapter to jihad in Kashmir, announcing that the region would be the epicenter of the AQIS jihadist campaign.[51] Led by Osama Mahmood, AQIS with approximately 500 members, consisting mostly of Afghan and Pakistani nationals as well as persons from Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar, is shifting its violent campaign to Kashmir and India.[52]
Hizbul Ahrar (HuA)-Pakistan
A disgruntled Taliban commander, Mukarram Khan, founded HuA in Afghanistan’s border province of Nangarhar on November 11, 2017, after breaking away from the violent sectarian faction of Teheriki Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), under the direction of Abdul Wali Raghib.[53] Abdul Wali, also known as Umar Khalid Khorasani, died in a U.S. drone attack in the eastern Afghan province of Paktia in October 2017.
In addition to Mukarram Khan, several high-ranking Taliban commanders are involved in various functions in the spread of violence in different capacities, including prominent HuA commanders Jihadaar Mehsud, Muslim Yaar, Haji Rashid, and Qari Ismael Afridi. Imran Khurasani (of the Mohmand District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan where some tribal groups live) became Mukarram Khan’s deputy, and Aziz Yousafzai has been the group’s spokesman since it was founded in 2017.[54]
Teheriki Taliban-Pakistan
Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud is the emir of the Pakistani Taliban, officially known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has become a major threat to Pakistan following the amalgamation of its splinter groups in Afghanistan in August 2020.[55] The merger of Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA) resulted in the resumption of TTP activities in Pakistan.[56]
AQIS-Bangladesh
AQIS-Bangladesh published a twenty-eight-page color magazine, Lone Wolf, on March 27, 2019, consisting of twenty-four sections. The magazine is nothing but a handbook of lone wolf attacks that encourage its followers to stage attacks on fourteen Bangladesh- and India-based targets in light of the military tactics of global jihad through a unique attack cycle (See Figure 9). Lone Wolf Magazine (one, 2019, p. 17-19), stipulates a range of targets in Bangladesh and India.
Figure 9. Lone Wolf Attack Cycle
suggested by AQIS-Bangladesh.
Source: Lone Wolf Magazine one, 2019, pages 14-24.
AQIS-Bangladesh also published Lone Wolf Two, a fifty-four-page color magazine in February 2020 (see Figure 10). Its objective was to tempt the people of Bangladesh into joining them in carrying out a religious war against the current government. Further, global analysts like Bashar and Basit believe that Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) also has close ties to AQC. ARSA emerged after the communal unrest in June 2012 in western Myanmar, but it was officially launched in 2016.[57]
Figure 10. Lone Wolf Two, the magazine
of AQIS-Bangladesh
Haraka-al-Yakin (HaY)/ARSA
The HaY came to light after the deadly attacks on the Border Guard Police (BGP) camps in Maungdaw, Myanmar on October 9, 2016. The group has recruited its members from the local Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine state in Myanmar and also from Rohingya refugee Muslims in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and other countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia. Besides, HaY collects its members from other Rohingya-based organizations like Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF). Its members are also from the Pakistan-based extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba.[58] HaY aims to restore the rights of the Rohingya in Myanmar, and to implement Sharia law in Rakhine state and in some border districts of Myanmar and Bangladesh.
The chief leader or Amir of HaY, Hafiz Tahar, who goes by the aliases of Ata Ullah, Abu Ammar, and Abu Ammar Jununi, is a Rohingya-origin, Karachi-born Pakistani citizen, who later went to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, growing up and receiving Islamic education in Mecca. In 2012, he returned to Pakistan where he underwent physical training, and took part in jihad in Kashmir. Later he entered Bangladesh through Hyderabad and Kolkata, and ultimately entered Myanmar in 2016 with the help of a Rohingya person and HaY leader, Idrish Ali. The top ranks of HaY consist of other key commanders such as Mawlana Syed Abul Kalam (finance), Zaibur Rahman (spiritual leader and fatwa provider), Idrish Ali (co-coordinator), Master Abul Kalam (trainer), Mawbia (trainer and fund collector), Omar Hashim (operational leader), Musa (operational leader), and a foreigner who is named “the Organization.”[59]
Members of HaY orchestrated an attack on the paramilitary auxiliary force Ansar Barrack at a Rohingya refugee camp in Muchni area, Hnila, Cox’s Bazar on May 13, 2016 in Bangladesh.[60] During the attack, they killed Ansar Commander, Ali Hossain and looted arms and ammunition. The fourteen attackers were divided into two groups. One group consisting of six persons entered the camp to conduct the operation under the leadership of Master Abul Kalam and Rafiq Ullah. Master Abul Kalam was from Kutupalong Rohingya camp of Ukhia and Rafiq was from Musuni Camp-D Block of Teknaf in Bangladesh. A second group consisting of eight persons was deployed outside the camp to provide security to the invaders under a senior leader, Khairul Amin, from Kutupalong Rohingya camp of Ukhiya.[61]
In Myanmar, members of HaY planned to conduct five simultaneous attacks on five different Border Guard Police (BGP) camps under the command of five separate commanders of HaY, but they succeeded in invading three camps due to failure in coordination.[62] The leaders were: Ata Ullah, Master Abul Kalam, Mawbia, Omar Hashim, and Musa. Under the leadership of the HaY Amir Ata Ullah, and with the support of three hundred to four hundred local Rohingya people, they attacked the Tanshik police camp of Maungdaw, Myanmar and captured seventy to eighty firearms on October 9, 2016. The dead included ten to fifteen BGP members and five to six HaY fighters. When Amir Ata Ullah started the operation on Tanshik police camp of Maungdaw, the Myanmar Army got the news and started firing from helicopters, forcing the attackers to flee from the field. In each of the attack operations, 250 to 300 local Rohingya Muslim people were involved in killing, firing, and looting.[63]
ARSA caught media attention after it assumed responsibility for an attack on Myanmar border posts in October 2016, in which more than a dozen security guards were killed.[64] The subsequent evictions of Rohingyas by the Myanmar authorities were highly controversial as they resulted in the mass exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh. While ARSA has been weakened in Myanmar, there are reports that the group is becoming more active in Bangladesh, where more than 1.1 million Rohingyas were living as refugees in 2021. ARSA has exploited the refugees, especially since the end of 2018, in order to continue recruiting operations among the Rohingya people. In 2019, ARSA carried out two relatively minor attacks on Myanmar security forces. ARSA is believed to be supported by the Rohingya diaspora and has close ties to the Rohingyas living in Malaysia.[65]
The main weakness of ARSA is the lack of access to sophisticated weapons and explosives. As a result, the group mainly performs hit-and-run operations. ARSA also appears to have suffered from internal clashes, with the group becoming increasingly embroiled in crimes such as murder, robbery, and the looting of law enforcement weapons across the border in Rohingya refugee camps. The Bangladeshi authorities have alleged that at least fourteen criminal groups are active in Rohingya refugee camps, some of which are reportedly linked to ARSA.[66] The most active ARSA faction is known locally as Hakim Bahini, named after Abdul Hakim, a Rohingya refugee from Maungdaw, Rakhine State. The main advantage of ARSA is its deep integration into the thirty-two Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and the active contacts with the Rohingya diaspora abroad.[67]
Islamic State (IS) in South Asia and their media campaign
The battlefield losses of the Islamic State in Syria have reduced the group’s territory, but its ideological strength and brand appeal remains unaffected.[68] The loss of territory did not undermine the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks despite former President Donald Trump’s early declaration of victory against IS on March 23, 2019. After the loss of Baghouz, IS carried out the Easter-morning bomb attacks on three luxury hotels and churches in Sri Lanka, which killed over 250 people and injured 500 others on April 21, 2019.[69] Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi confessed to the attack and released a video on April 29, 2019 that assured global IS members, networks, individual supporters, and sympathizers that the caliph was alive and responsible for the group. In the video, Baghdadi called on supporters of the group to carry out further terrorist attacks.[70] The group still has between 14,000 to 18,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria, including 3,000 foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). These fighters are battle-tested, ideologically pious, and highly qualified.
It is believed that thousands of South Asian citizens have returned to the region after joining the ranks of terror groups in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq; that regional militant groups inspired by the ideology of IS carry out attacks on its behalf; and that IS operates locally in South Asia through Wilayahs (provinces) such as Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) in Kashmir, Islamic State India, Islamic State Pakistan, and Islamic State Bangladesh.[71] While the Islamic State is expanding and decentralizing its operations in some areas, it is downsizing and centralizing in others. For example, IS has decentralized Wilayah Khorasan in South Asia by announcing two new Wilayahs in Kashmir (India) and Pakistan on May 10 and May 15, 2019, respectively.[72]
Figure 11. Islamic State (IS) inspired groups in South Asia.
Source: See footnotes 72-76.
In South Asia, ISIS has the several partners and sleeper cells, most of which are linked to one another (see Figure 11). They include IS-Khorasan,[73] Wilayat-e-Hind,[74] Wilayat-e-Pakistan,[75] National Tawheed Jamat (NTJ) and Jamiyati Millati Ibrahim (JMI)-Sri Lanka,[76] Neo-Jamatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (NJMB), Katiba al-Mahdi fi Bilad al-Arakan (KMBA) or the Mahdi Brigade in the Land of Arakan.[77]
AQ and IS Inspired Groups in Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar and their Propaganda Campaigns
Two AQ inspired groups are working in Bangladesh: the AQIS-Bangladesh locally known as Ansar Al Islam Bangladesh/Ansarullah Bangla Team and Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). JMB merged with Jama’atul Mujahideen-Subcontinent in 2018. The emir of Jama’atul Mujahideen-Subcontinent, Salauddin Salehin, is now a fugitive in India. The terror outfits shot and killed Shahzahan Bachchu, the sixty-year-old owner of the Dhaka-based publishing house, Bishaka Prokashoni, on June 11, 2018.[78] An ex-general secretary of the Munshiganj chapter of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, Bachchu was active on Facebook and frequently criticized various religions. He had expressed concerns to relatives just a few hours before his death that he would be murdered by radical groups because of his writings.[79]
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Figure 12. Ansar al Islam claims responsibility for killing Xulhaz Mannan and Tanay Mojumdar in 2016.
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Figure 13. JMB-Subcontinent claims responsibility for death of S. Bachchu.
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At present, there is no significant threat of attack from AQIS Bangladesh, headed by dismissed military officer, Major Syed Ziaul Haque. This group is constantly broadcasting its propaganda campaign to attract the attention of Bengali-speaking people in both India and Bangladesh. This group is constantly broadcasting its propaganda campaign to attract the attention of Bengali-speaking people in both India and Bangladesh. The group published a target list on April 8, 2016, and soon afterwards on April 25, 2016, the gang assassinated Xulhaz Mannan, the creator of Roopbaan, Bangladesh’s only lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) magazine founded in 2014 to encourage better acceptance of Bangladesh’s LGBT population. The killing of Tanay Mojumdar, like Mannan, appears to be retaliation because he was openly gay and a leader in the battle for LGBT rights. They were both killed for their secular views and activities that were perceived to be against Islam.
Neo Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (NJMB) recently formed a twenty-member committee to build a strong base in Bangladesh under the leadership of Mahadi Hasan Jon, who now heads the NJMB from Turkey. The committee members, all from the military wing of the force, have established the Committee for the Islamic State of Bengal Province. The NJMB’s improvised explosive device (IED) expert, Sabbir Hossain, aged twenty-six, also known as Bamchi Barak alias Major Bamchi alias Abu Hafs al Bengali, is pursuing the NJMB strategy as the commander of his unit’s military wing in the Mymensingh region. The newly formed committee has four subsections: Control Wing, Military Wing, Sharia Wing, and Financial Wing.[80]
After collecting a specimen firearm from Kashmir, Jon also plans to set up an explosive factory in Bangladesh and train members in Pakistan in making firearms.[81] Law enforcement agencies obtained evidence of Jon’s plan and seized three bombs and bomb-making materials, following a raid on a house in the Kazipara area of Madanpur Harbour in Narayanganj on July 11, 2021 in which they arrested Major Osama aka Nayeem, a suspected member of the NJMB.[82]
From 2015 to 2019 Bangladesh was subjected to more than fifty-four terrorist attacks in various districts by the IS-inspired group Neo Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (NJMB). According to the Site Intelligence Group—an American NGO that tracks jihadist online activity—this terror group was responsible for the bombing of the Bangladeshi police’s motorcycle garage near Khulna, the attack on police in Chittagong, the bombing of the Hindu temple in Naogaon, the execution of a witch practitioner in Gazipur, and the explosion at the Pallabi police station in Mirpur, Dhaka taken over in 2019-2020.[83]
Wilayat-e-Hind
It is unusual for a terrorist group to counsel its supporters to be patient. However, the commander of the Islamic State’s Wilayat-e-Hind, Abu Hamza al Kashmiri, who goes by the moniker Abu Hamza, recommends just that. Abu Hamza begs potential followers to be patient and loyal in the second edition of the group’s new English-language journal, Voice of Hind, since “success comes with patience.” He particularly instructs the group’s adherents to “avoid demonstrations, sloganeering, and stone pelting, and instead utilize alternative tactics to strike the infidels, such as petrol bombs and knives.”[84]
The Islamic State India published the inaugural edition of Voice of Hind in the final week of February 2020, featuring a portrait of Mohammad Zubair, a Muslim man who was beaten up by a mob during communal disturbances in Delhi. The organization called for punitive action against the conduct, citing the Quran. “So where are you going?” the magazine taunted Muslims in its headline piece in an appeal to India’s Muslims It insulted the country’s Muslims for their confidence in democracy and warned that they were “on the verge of being robbed of your every shred of dignity” without directly mentioning the riots that killed fifty-three people, predominantly Muslims.[85]
Katiba al-Mahdi fi Bilad al-Arakan (KMBA), or the Mahdi Brigade in the Land of Arakan
The Katiba al-Mahdi fi Bilad al-Arakan (KMBA, or Brigade of Al-Mahdi in the Arakan State in English) pledged its bayat (allegiance) to the new Islamic State Chief, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qureshi, in November 2020. The KMBA has published two editions of “ARKAN,” their propaganda magazine. ARKAN is not like other pro-Islamic State propaganda publications. The magazine’s main message (at least for now) appears to be aimed at luring recruits to the KMBA’s ranks. The presentation is text-heavy, which is oddly more in line with Al-Qaeda’s method of disseminating propaganda and diktat materials than the IS, which is considerably more savvy and on top of digital trends. The fact that it takes a more Al-Qaeda-like strategy raises fascinating issues about the group’s heritage.[86]
AQ, IS, and Rohingya
Given the reactions of various global jihadist groups to persecuted Rohingya Muslims in Bangladesh, the Rohingyas remain the most vulnerable to radicalization both online and offline. AQ and its staff have long exploited the Rohingya issue. A report published in Bangladeshi media in December 2018 claimed that at least forty Rohingyas were recruited in the name of humanitarian activities by the AQ-inspired Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), one of the oldest militant groups in Bangladesh. The group renamed itself Jamaatul Mujahideen (JuM) and opened a new chapter in India in 2018. Also in December of 2018, Bangladeshi authorities confiscated large quantities of knives along with evidence that local networks were attempting to assemble improvised explosive devices (IED) in Myanmar.
ISIS networks have reportedly recruited Rohingya refugees who could be used for attacks in Myanmar or abroad. ISIS has, on several occasions, expressed its intention to exploit the Rohingya issue, and some sources suggest that the group plans to use the territory of Bangladesh to attack Myanmar. In May 2019 the Malaysian authorities arrested two Rohingyas along with Indonesians and Malaysians for allegedly planning attacks like IS wolf packs in Malaysia.[87]
In September 2015, IS Furat Media published an article entitled “Bangladesh and the Declaration of the Califat,” calling for armed jihad in Myanmar originating from neighboring countries.[88] ISIS also used its online publication Dabiq to express its intention to establish a base in Bangladesh to launch revenge attacks in Myanmar for the treatment of Rohingya Muslims. For example, the November 2015 issue of Dabiq states that ISIS plans to expand in South Asia by establishing a base in Bangladesh that would be a stepping stone for its expansion into India and Myanmar.[89]
Conclusion
The above findings clearly indicate that both AQ and IS have great interest in establishing an Islamic Khalipha in the region. Both groups are trying to exploit the plight of Muslims to strengthen their capacity. AQ and its inspired groups are boosting their strongholds in South Asia through Islamic eschatological narrative known as Gazwatul Hind. The AQ-inspired groups are propagating that they are preparing themselves to stage attacks on targets in India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The bonding among the IS inspired groups poses a great threat to the region. Although the Indian National Investigation Agency (NIA) established a research cell on IS in March 2019 and Bangladesh government articulates a “zero tolerance” policy toward terrorism and the use of its territory as a terrorist safe haven, it has become necessary to establish an Intelligence-led Integrated Comprehensive Approach (IICA) by all the countries of South Asia to fight against the jihadi outfits, AQ and IS.
Md. Nasir Uddin, PhD, is an alumnus of the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, University of Rajshahi. He is on the editorial boards of Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, IGI Global Publication, Common Ground Research Networks, Journal on Excellence in College Teaching (JECT), International Journal of Social Science Studies (IJSSS), Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine, International Journal of Social Science Research (IJSSR), International Journal of Cyber Behavior, Psychology and Learning (IJCBPL), American Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Innovation (AJMRI), and several other journals. He worked as a Scientific Committee Member of the 8th International Conference on Social Sciences (ICOSS 2021), organized by the International Institute of Knowledge Management (TIIKM), Sri Lanka. His research interests are in security studies, geopolitics, public health, and anthropology. His research gate id is https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Md-Uddin-139.
[1] “Bill Roggio, “U.S. Kills Al Qaeda Emir Ayman al Zawahiri in Drone Strike,” FDD’s Long War Journal, August 2, 2022, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/08/u-s-kills-al-qaeda-emir-ayman-al-zawahiri-in-drone-strike.php.; and “ISIS Announces Formation of Caliphate, Rebrands as ‘Islamic State,’” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 29, 2014, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/isis_announces_formation_of_ca.php.
[2] Pamela G. Faber and Alexander Powell, “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS): An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study,” CNA, October 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1041741.pdf.
[3] “U.S. Kills al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri in Kabul Drone Missile Strike,” Reuters, August 3, 2022.
[4] Roggio, “U.S. Kills Al Qaeda Emir Ayman al Zawahiri in Drone Strike.”
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State Confirms Baghdadi’s Death, Names New ‘Emir of the Faithful,’” FDD’s Long War Journal, November 1, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/11/islamic-state-confirms-baghdadis-death-names-new-emir-of-the-faithful.php.
[8] “Al-Qaeda ‘Shadow of Former Self’ Decade after Bin Laden Death,” France 24, April 28, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210428-al-qaeda-shadow-of-former-self-decade-after-bin-laden-death.
[9] “Global Terrorism Index (2015-2020),” Institute for Economics & Peace, 2021, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/reports/.
[10] Ajit Kumar Singh, “South Asia: Changing Face of Terror—Analysis,” Eurasia Review (blog), April 30, 2019, https://www.eurasiareview.com/30042019-south-asia-changing-face-of-terror-analysis/.
[11] Lise Waldek, “Endemic Violence in Afghanistan: A Socio-Cultural Perspective,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 216–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1473630.
[12] Moinul Khan, “Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: Why It Failed to Take Root,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 1 (April 2011): 51–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2011.553181.
[13] Julian Droogan, “The Perennial Problem of Terrorism and Political Violence in Pakistan,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 202–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1473631.
[14] Shafi Mostofa and Natalie J Doyle, “Profiles of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 5 (2019): 18.
[15] Eric Jardine and Simon Palamar, “Numerous, Capable, and Well-Funded Rebels: Insurgent Military Effectiveness and Deadly Attacks in Afghanistan,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 4 (August 8, 2015): 628–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.847826.
[16] C. Christine Fair, “Who are Pakistan’s Militants and their Families?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 1 (December 28, 2007): 49–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550701733996.
[17] Neil Krishan Aggarwal, “Exploiting the Islamic State-Taliban Rivalry for Counterterrorism Messaging,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2016.1223868.
[18] Khuram Iqbal and Zahid Mehmood, “Emerging Trends of On-Campus Radicalization in Pakistan,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2021): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1902551.
[19] Hekmat Karzai, “Understanding the Role of the Media in Facilitating the Spread of the Extremist Message in Afghanistan,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 4, no. 1 (April 2009): 76–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335300.2009.9686925.\
[20] Mostofa and Doyle, “Profiles of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh.”
[21] Ali Riaz and Saimum Parvez, “Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 6 (November 2, 2018): 944–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481312.
[22] James Khalil, John Horgan, and Martine Zeuthen, “The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, December 18, 2019, 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1699793.
[23] Nathan Irwin, “The Complexity of Responding to Home-Grown Terrorism: Radicalisation, de-Radicalisation and Disengagement,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 10, no. 2 (July 3, 2015): 166–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1089639.
[24] Arie W. Kruglanski, Xiaoyan Chen, and Agnieszka Golec, “Individual Motivations, The Group Process and Organisational Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 3, no. 1 (April 2008): 70–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335300.2008.9686906.
[25] Riaz and Parvez, “Bangladeshi Militants.”
[26] Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, “Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 830–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671.
[27] C. Christine Fair and Ali Hamza, “Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan,” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 6 (November 2, 2018): 962–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1481313.
[28] Md. Nasir Uddin, “The Female Involvement in Terrorist Outfits in Bangladesh: A Qualitative Study,” Counter Terrorism Journal 1, no. 1 (January 2021): 113–35.
[29] Ahmad Dj, “Islamic State: The Problems,” Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs 5, no. 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.4172/2332-0761.1000246; Shannon C. Houck, Meredith A. Repke, and Lucian Gideon Conway, “Understanding What Makes Terrorist Groups’ Propaganda Effective: An Integrative Complexity Analysis of ISIL and Al Qaeda,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 12, no. 2 (July 3, 2017): 105–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2017.1351032; Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “A Typology of Insurgent, Terrorist and Extremist Threats in India,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 231–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1473629; Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: Comparing the Movement in India and Bangladesh,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 15, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 64–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1729394.
[30] Mostofa and Doyle, “Profiles of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh.”
[31] Riaz and Parvez, “Bangladeshi Militants.”
[32] James A. Piazza, “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (April 2012): 213–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.648680.
[33] Barak Mendelsohn, “Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Challenges of Succession in Terrorist Organizations,” Terrorism and Political Violence, December 10, 2020, 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1844673.
[34] Md Nasir Uddin and Md Musfikur Rahman, “Catalyst of Religious Extremism in Rohingya Refugee Camps: A Qualitative Analysis,” chapter, Handbook of Research on Applied Social Psychology in Multiculturalism (IGI Global, June 21, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6960-3.ch015.
[35] Uddin, “The Female Involvement in Terrorist Outfits in Bangladesh.”
[36] Iftekharul Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 6 (2019): 14–18.
[37] “Al Qaeda.Pdf Powered by Box,” Stanford University, January 2019, https://stanford.app.box.com/s/u6k7dq7lscpze5vqxim4emvt3vrxd71z;
Also see, Counter Extremism Project, accessed April 22, 2022, https://www.counterextremism.com/topics/al-qaeda.
[38] Animesh Roul, “Al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri Invokes Kashmir Again, Calls for ‘One’ Jihad,” Jamestown, July 16, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaedas-ayman-al-zawahiri-invokes-kashmir-again-calls-for-one-jihad/.
[39] Ariel Koch, “Reflections of the Rohingya in the Online Jihadi Propaganda,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, March 25, 2021, https://dayan.org/content/reflections-rohingya-online-jihadi-propaganda.
[40] Bill Roggio, “FDD Analysis: Al Qaeda Continues to Operate throughout Afghanistan,” FDD’s Long War Journal, April 8, 2021, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/04/analysis-al-qaeda-continues-to-operate-throughout afghanistan.php.
[41] Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, “Bangladesh’s Most Wanted Terror Duo Launches Indian Unit,” Hindustan Times, February 10, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/bangladesh-s-most-wanted-terror-duo-launches-indian-unit/story-Wc5tptQVsyXSRVoJVXtYWM.html.
[42] “JMB Chief Salahuddin Salehin now in Pakistan, IB Report,” kolkata24x7, May 28, 2019.
[43] Mohammad Jamil Khan, “JMB Men Lead 2 of 3 JMI Factions,” The Daily Star, April 12, 2021, https://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/news/jmb-men-lead-2-3-jmi-factions-2076141.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Mohammad Jamil Khan, ‘“Neo JMB’ Rising Again?” The Daily Star, September 29, 2020, https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/neo-jmb-rising-again-1969081.
[47] Khan, “JMB Men Lead 2 of 3 JMI Factions.”
[48] “J-K: Ansar Ghazwat-Ul-Hind Chief Imtiyaz Shah among 2 Terrorists Killed in Tral Encounter,” The Economic Times, April 9, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/j-k-ansar-ghazwat-ul-hind-chief-imtiyaz-shah-among-2-terrorists-killed-in-tral-encounter/videoshow/81983423.cms.
[49] Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Opens Branch in the Indian Subcontinent,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 3, 2014, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/al_qaeda_opens_branc.php.
[50] “Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent Only Capable of Small-Scale Regional Attacks: US Official,” The Economic Times, September 25, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/al-qaeda-in-indian-subcontinent-only-capable-of-small-scale-regional-attacks-us-official/articleshow/78313378.cms.
[51] Animesh Roul, “Al-Qaeda’s South Asian Branch Gravitating Toward Kashmir,” Jamestown, April 17, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/al-qaedas-south-asian-branch-gravitating-toward-kashmir/.
[52] “Al Qaeda’s Al-Zawahiri Likely to Be in Afghanistan, Pakistan Border Region, Probably Alive but Too Frail: UN Report,” The Economic Times, June 5, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/al-qaedas-al-zawahiri-likely-to-be-in-afghanistan-pakistan-border-region-probably-alive-but-too-frail-un-report/articleshow/83255145.cms.
[53] Animesh Roul, “Hizb Ul-Ahrar: Pakistan’s Cross-Border Taliban Problem Remains Critical,” Jamestown, December 17, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/hizb-ul-ahrar-pakistans-cross-border-taliban-problem-remains-critical/.
[54] Roul, “Hizb Ul-Ahrar.”
[55] “Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud,” Counter Extremism Project, June 10, 2021, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/mufti-noor-wali-mehsud. Also see, “Pakistan Taliban Reunites with Two Splinter Groups,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/18/pakistan-taliban-reunites-with-two-splinter-groups.
[56] Syed Fazl-e Haider, “Pakistan’s Dual Counter-Terrorism Challenges: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s Merger and Cross-Border Campaign from Afghanistan,” Jamestown, March 26, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/pakistans-dual-counter-terrorism-challenges-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistans-merger-and-cross-border-campaign-from-afghanistan/.
[57] Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape.”
[58] Uddin and Rahman, “Catalyst of Religious Extremism in Rohingya Refugee Camps.”
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid; Also see, Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape.”
[68] Abdul Basit, “What Next for the Islamic State after Territorial Losses?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 6 (2019): 1–7.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Catrina Doxsee, Jared Thompson, and Grace, “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP),” accessed April 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp.
[74] Farhan Zahid, “Two New IS Wilayat in South Asia: IS Reinvigorates Itself in Pakistan and India,” Jamestown, 3 July 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/two-new-is-wilayat-in-south-asia-is-reinvigorates-itself-in-pakistan-and-india/.
[75] Ibid.
[76] “National Thawheed Jammath (NTJ) and Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI) to Be Banned in Sri Lanka,” High Commission of Sri Lanka in India, April 30, 2019, https://slhcindia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=996:national-thawheed-jammath-ntj-and-jamathei-millathu-ibraheem-jmi-to-be-banned-in-sri-lanka&catid=50:demo-category&Itemid=1.
[77] Kabir Taneja, “Reviewing the Evolution of Pro-Islamic State Propaganda in South Asia,” ORF, accessed 23 April 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/reviewing-the-evolution-of-pro-islamic-state-propaganda-in-south-asia/.
[78] Khan, ‘“Neo JMB’ Rising Again?”
[79] “Investigators Perplexed,” The Daily Star, June 13, 2018, https://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/investigators-perplexed-1590313.
[80] Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Neo JMB Forms New Committee,” The Daily Star, July 6, 2021, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/neo-jmb-forms-new-committee-2123866.
[81] Ibid.
[82] UNB News, “CTTC Arrests ‘Neo JMB Member’ during Narayanganj Raid,” New Age, July 12, 2021, https://www.newagebd.net/article/143516/cttc-arrests-neo-jmb-member-during-narayanganj-raid.
[83] “IS Claims Bombing Bangladeshi Police Motorcycle Garage Near Khulna,” SITE Intelligence Group, December 6, 2019, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-claims-bombing-bangladeshi-police-motorcycle-garage-near-khulna.html; “IS Claims Bombing on Bangladeshi Policemen in Chittagong,” SITE Intelligence Group, February 29, 2020, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-claims-bombing-on-bangladeshi-policemen-in-chittagong.html; “IS Claims Bombing Hindu Temple in Naogaon, Northern Bangladesh,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 2, 2020, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-claims-bombing-hindu-temple-in-naogaon-northern-bangladesh.html; “IS Documents Execution of Practitioner of Witchcraft in North of Bangladeshi Capital,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 16, 2020, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-documents-execution-of-practitioner-of-witchcraft-in-north-of-bangladeshi-capital.html.
[84] Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Policy Brief: Islamic State in India: Wilayat-e-Hind,” (blog), April 1, 2020, https://mantraya.org/policy-brief-islamic-state-in-india-wilayat-e-hind/.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Bashar, “Rohingya Crisis and Western Myanmar’s Evolving Threat Landscape.”
[88] Ibid.
[89] Bashar; Also see, Basit, “What Next for the Islamic State after Territorial Losses?”; Uddin and Rahman, “Catalyst of Religious Extremism in Rohingya Refugee Camps.”
