ABSTRACT
This article explores the myth and reality of Western claims that Russia had historically sought a blue water, or warm water, port in foreign countries. Russia’s desire to turn from its traditional Western- and Eurocentric strategy towards Southeast Asia was driven by four principal factors: Moscow’s quest for a warm water port, its thrust to counter the United States’ dominance in Southeast Asia, its policy to develop and deepen multilateral relations, and its desire to generate economic gain in strategic partnership with Southeast Asian states. Russia’s relationship with Southeast Asia spans the spectrum of defense, trade, and diplomatic engagements at the bilateral level with individual countries, and the multilateral level with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 plunged Moscow’s relations with Southeast Asia—into uncertainty. While many of the original founding members of ASEAN have close links with the United States, Russia has emerged as the biggest arms supplier to other member states. Yet, Russia’s future engagement with the region is clouded in uncertainty over new obstacles of its own making.
Keywords: Russia, Southeast Asia, ASEAN, Ukraine, sanctions, defense trade, economic ties, diplomatic engagements
Russia’s intervention in Southeast Asia is not a new turn in Moscow’s foreign policy. The former Soviet Union had desired a naval port in the region for strategic purposes during the Cold War, which led to its acquisition of the former American naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in 1979. Soviet presence at the Vietnamese military port generated incessant debate on whether Moscow sought a foothold in Southeast Asia to counter the United States’ military presence in the region, or was it driven by a desire to find an outlet for its naval forces in a blue—or warm—water port. At the time, trade and investments were still not high on Moscow’s agenda as it was kept at an arm’s length by many of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that were staunchly anti-communist in the period following the end of the American war in Vietnam.
Since the nineteenth century, Anglo-American policymakers and political actors have claimed that the former Soviet Union sought a “blue-water” or “warm-water” port overseas for its icebound naval forces in the frozen Russian north that made it difficult for its ships to operate. These assertions of Soviet intent were made consistently from the nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War. It is arguable whether Moscow had ever created a policy that aimed to seek a warm water port in Southeast Asia. Yet, it became common practice among scholars, Anglo-American policymakers, and the elites in the English-speaking world to hold on to the view that Russia had historically exhibited a desire to obtain a warm water port, a characterization that gained even more frequent use whenever tensions ran high. Vladivostok port, in fact, begins freezing just before Christmas and the ice breaks in early April. The ice is often half a meter thick around the shores and at the head of the harbor. The first rudimentary ice-breaker arrived in January 1895, but it did not serve its purpose properly. The port is presently kept ice-free by the exhaust water from the power plants churning water in the bay.
The idea of a Soviet/Russian drive for a warm water port has persisted even though no Soviet or Russian leader has ever admitted to such an intention, and even though there is no serious scholarly study that demonstrates the existence of such a Soviet/Russian impulse.[1] Nineteenth century Western thinkers were obsessed with rising Russian maritime and naval power, believing that this great power’s access to the sea was limited by climate and geography that left its northern ports icebound. The American geopolitical thinker, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, believed that a warm water port represented an “evident need” for Russia.[2]
Green argues that Mahan seemed to have adopted the term “warm water port” from the English geopolitician, H.J. Mackinder, as before 1904 Mahan used the phrase “unfrozen waters” when discussing the concept. The myth went right up the political hierarchy with the British foreign minister and prime minister, Arthur Balfour, believing in the reasonableness of Russia’s desire for a “warm water port as an outlet for her great Siberian railway.”[3] One of President Woodrow Wilson’s advisors, Isaiah Bowman, also used the concept in his academic writing.
Most sensationally, the “Testament of Peter the Great”—a document used by pre-First World War geopoliticians to buttress their claim that Russia was gripped by a drive for a warm water port—was shown to be a “crude forgery” that appeared on the eve of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, created by a French government agency to whip up disinformation to build support for the campaign against Russia.[4] In the Second World War, Hitler circulated the document, and thereafter the Soviet government made strenuous efforts to emphasize its falsehood.[5]
The “warm water port” thesis almost disappeared after the First World War only to be revived after the Second when it could be found in speeches and analyses of policymakers. Documentary records of the short-lived Nazi-Soviet alliance in 1939-41, and the extensive records of the wartime Allied conferences at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, reveal that both German and Anglo-American policy was based on the belief that the Soviets possessed an urge, one it had inherited from Imperial Russia, for a warm water port.[6] In the post-Second World War period, the “warm water port” thesis again declined in the West possibly because the Soviet Union had served admirably as a strong ally to the West in the war and could perhaps be trusted. The thesis reappeared as Moscow was again seen with suspicion when a Soviet blue water fleet appeared in the 1960s, and the superpower began intervening in Third World crises in the 1970s. The thesis exercised influence into the 1990s and beyond.
Western policymakers thus formulated the concept of the warm water port by imposing on Russia their own concerns with trade and naval power, a process by which these policymakers recognized the limitations of climate and geography facing Russian ships. Their failure to locate any Russian document, or source, to confirm their drive for a warm water port made them rely on the fake “Testament” that these policymakers themselves confessed was fraudulent.[7]
The warm water port thesis, thus, developed legs, so to speak, based on premises that were deductive, fraudulent, or not confirmed by Soviet/Russian documents or sources. It had appeared in reputable Anglo-American studies to explain Soviet/Russian behavior, often exaggerating their motive and desire to acquire such overseas ports. Green argues that such characterization exaggerated or mis-evaluated the level of the threat from the Soviets in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.[8] In fact, studies of Soviet/Russian overseas naval bases demonstrate their unwillingness to make large investments in construction such naval facilities. The Russians already possessed an excellent “non-freezing” port in Murmansk, and advances in icebreaker technologies had allowed them to operate their iced ports even when they were frozen.
Russia still held foreign naval bases but its experience was not always worthwhile. At the end of the Russo-Finnish War (1939-40), the Soviet leader Josef Stalin demanded that his country be granted a base at Hanko, near Helsinki, but it proved useless, causing the Soviets to return it in 1942. After Stalin’s death, the Soviets returned Port Arthur to the Chinese. Port Arthur anyway was not a perfect base of operations other than being a warm water port, as its small and shallow harbor did not permit ships to enter at low tide, and there was no room for maneuver.[9] The Soviets acquired ports in Egypt and Somalia in the 1960s but returned them in the 1970s following their expulsion. In 1979, the Soviet Union acquired Cam Ranh Bay, a port built by the Americans, where the Soviets added new infrastructure, until Russian ships left for good in 2002. Eight years after their withdrawal, Russia stated in October 2010 that it was considering returning to their former Vietnamese naval base under a fresh lease.[10] Vietnam has indicated that it is open to the Russians returning to Cam Ranh Bay, explaining that the use of the port for maritime transport, repair of ships, and military technology to “ensure peace and stability in the region is the appropriate direction.”[11]
Moscow has obsessed over the question of globalizing its foreign policy, apart from the last years of the Cold War when it entered into détente with the United States, a period when Soviet policy was characterized by a pro-West tilt. Within the new foreign policy space, the Russian idea of a Eurasian zone bulks large, based on the idea that Russia is a civilization, both Asian and European, which Moscow has propagated since the twentieth-century. Yet, until the mid-nineteenth century, the term “Eurasia” did not have much resonance in Russia. But Russian policymakers, writers, and thinkers changed their worldview from a narrow Russian destiny to a broader Asian and European one that came with the expansion of the Russian Empire’s territorial movement south and west across the Asian landmass, and with the acquisition of more and more non-Slavic citizens.[12] Russia’s status as a Eurasian power would enable it to first claim leadership in Asia, which then might eventually lead to Russian hegemony over both Europe and Asia.
When the Soviet Union came into being in 1917/1922, socialist ideology held sway and “Eurasian” ideas were barely tolerated. Gradually, the Soviet leadership was seized by an imperial aspiration to build a world empire starting from the Eurasian land mass that would erase the division between Asia and Europe. Eurasianism soon developed a variant, “neo-Eurasianism,” an elaborate conservative ideology that emerged in Russia in the 1990s. According to Marlene Laruelle, Eurasianism is an ideology affirming that Russia and its surrounding states of the former Soviet Union occupy a middle space between Europe and Asia, where the populations are a “mix” of Slavic and Turko-Muslim people, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features.[13] Eurasianism specifically rejects the view that Russia is located on Europe’s periphery, reinterpreting the country’s geographic location as a “third way” that turned into a attractive doctrine because it “offers an understanding of the collapse of the Soviet Union and restores Russia’s troubled historical and political continuity.”[14]
The success of Eurasianism feeds off its flexibility as an ideology, its diversity, and the breadth of its coverage. Laruelle argues that it is “a political doctrine in the strict sense of the word, a theory of nation and ethnos, an alter-globalist philosophy of history, a new pragmatic formulation of ‘Sovietism,’ a substitute for the global explanatory schemes of Marxism-Leninism, a set of expansionist geopolitical principles for Russia, and much else.”[15] It is certainly not to be over-simplified as an element of Russian foreign policy, or as a theoretical foundation of Russian nationalist politics, or even as a new patriotism promoted by the regime of President Vladimir Putin. Eurasianism, Laruelle explains, has more to do with the theoretical presuppositions of its doctrine, which are, first, a rejection of Europe, the West, and capitalism through criticism of “Atlanticist” domination, which is believed to be globally catastrophic. Second, it is an articulation of the cultural unity and shared historical destiny of Russians and non-Russian peoples of Russia, as well as the former Soviet Union, and of parts of Asia. Third, the centrality of the Eurasian space places Russia in the middle of the region from where it asserts an imperialized political organization, from which secession is destined to fail, which leaves the newly independent states, free from Soviet control, no choice but to return to a unified political entity. Fourth, the Eurasian doctrine promotes a belief in the existence of cultural constants that explain the deeper meaning of contemporary political events through the prism of shared cultural history.
With this sort of matrix of ideology, Russian ideologues believe religion is the foundation of civilizations, and that civilizations, not individuals or social groups, are the real driving force of history. Laruelle argues that such an essentialist interpretation of the world serves an undisguised political objective of showing that the Western model is not applicable to the post-Soviet countries because civilizations cannot adopt anything from the outside.[16]
Laruelle argues that Eurasianism performs a large role in Russia for three reasons. First, it assuages the feeling of failure of the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990s by justifying the disaster in strictly ethnic and culturalist terms. Second, Eurasianism offers a simplistic explanation of the conflicts of the post-Cold War world and of Russia’s role in international politics. Third, Eurasianism has helped to articulate a pseudo-scientific speak which avoids politics and justifies authoritarianism through culture. Indeed, what is occurring in Russia is not unique or even exclusive because the rise of nationalism in many countries testifies to those societies turning sharply to embrace national identities, cultures, and religions.
Up in the corridors of the Kremlin, neo-Eurasianism operates as policy in the shape of Pragmatic Eurasianism that claims that the central geographical location of Russia in Asia presents it the chance and the ability to forge a more balanced foreign policy. One manifestation of such policy was the partnership between Russia, India, and China in the 1990s, but it did not signal a Russian break from the West. It demonstrated a Russian desire to balance its critical global alliances to avoid reliance on any one partner or side. Russian policy eventually resulted in the crafting of its Pivot to Asia policy which is believed to have begun in 2013 in order to take advantage of the dynamic economies of the Indo-Pacific region,[17] and due to Moscow’s desire to turn its geographical backyard into a Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia’s tilt to the eastern world resulted from its compulsion to address its domestic and strategic needs with the larger goal of, first, developing its underdeveloped territories in its east and in Siberia by integrating them with the rapidly growing economies of Asia. Second, Russia aimed to raise its profile in a region that occupied center stage in geopolitics. Moscow seemed to pivot to the Indo-Pacific in the turmoil of the global financial crisis of 2008-09 with the objective of attracting investments to Siberia and the Russian Far East, and to strengthen its opening to China and the wider eastern region. With Moscow’s relations with the West souring rapidly, it was left holding fewer cards than before. Russia was forced, in a sense, by circumstances of its own making—its invasion of Crimea in February 2014 resulted in a breakdown of relations with the West, and gave an urgency to its need to tighten its partnership with the countries of the east. Such febrile events led to Putin’s announcement of the Greater Eurasia at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2016.
Putin’s route to the Greater Eurasia concept ran through rocky diplomatic terrain of Europe. Russia had originally aimed to integrate into Europe as the leader of the post-Soviet space. Moscow’s concept of “Greater Europe” stretched from Lisbon to Vladivostok. But Russia and the West had a falling out, which culminated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, as well as the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, and the Western sanctions on Russia that came next.
The idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership took root when Moscow understood that it had been completely isolated by the West. After “losing” Ukraine for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014 for good, Russia had to re-orient its integration goals in the post-Soviet space.[18] The Greater Eurasian Partnership, therefore, had two economic goals. First, it aimed to connect Russia and the EAEU to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The second goal was to move beyond China and connect the EAEU with Iran, India, and Southeast Asia. It was, and is, Russia’s strategy to keep China in check.[19]
To place Russia in proper perspective, it is worth re-examining its recent past. Moscow was left reeling under financial crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The image of the Soviet Union as a magnanimous provider of financial, military, and economic aid to its Southeast Asian regional allies took a severe drubbing when in 1990 it stopped all assistance to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. It is estimated that through the 1980s, the Soviet Union gave Vietnam US$ 1 billion in military aid each year and a similar amount in economic aid, and in addition it delivered US$ 1 billion a year to Laos and Cambodia.[20] The Soviet funds were designed to prop up their ally states in the region in the struggle against U.S. hegemony, representing Moscow’s efforts to retain influence in those states. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended those channels.
Russia excluded itself from the Southeast Asian security matrix when it relinquished its naval base in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay in 2002, retaining only radar intelligence operations in the country. It was, arguably, a humiliating retreat even though Moscow drew cold comfort from the simultaneous U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay in the Philippines.
Kremlin policymakers launched their re-entry into Southeast Asia sensationally with eye-catching sales of fighter jets to new clients—Malaysia in 2001, and both Malaysia and Indonesia the following year.[21] The success of the Russian pitch was demonstrated in the reinvigoration of their weapons factories. At once, Moscow established influence in countries where it previously had none, but most importantly it began posing a threat to the domination of United States on whom many regional countries relied for armaments. In these ways, Russia made its presence felt in the Southeast Asian region that had remained somewhat peripheral to its security interests that had concentrated on securing its borders with Western Europe. For Russia, Southeast Asia serves as a large stage to conduct a string of foreign policy goals and operations, such as obtaining a seat in ASEAN’s network of alliances, challenging the U.S. led regional order, disrupting the U.S.-led alliance system, and punching holes in U.S. sanctions.
Russian interests in Southeast Asia are driven by two factors: first, as it never had an adequate foreign policy for Southeast Asia, it sought to rectify the lapse. Second, in pursuit of its goal to become a great Asian power, Russia has attempted to deepen its role in the Southeast Asian region since the end of the twentieth century. Sergei Agafonov criticizes the Russian leadership, an outsider in Asia, for lacking a concept of foreign policy for Asia, and for issuing a foreign policy declaration that had no relationship with reality[22] (see Buszynski 2006). Valerii Denisov claims that “Russia was excluded from the Asia-Pacific region by the Americans,” who had insisted that there was no place for Russia in regional economic integration. Denisov argues that the United States could not regard Russia as an equal partner and had prevailed upon Asian countries to ensure Russia’s exclusion from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum or APEC[23] (Denisov 1994). Vostrikov believes that “it was important for Russia to focus its diplomacy upon the emerging great powers such as India and China” (Vostrikov 1994). It is understandable that since the era of the Soviet Union, Moscow had pursued a “multipolarity” approach to the Asian powers of Asia-Pacific.
Anton Tsvetov (2016) argues that Southeast Asia is least secondary to China within Russia’s overall foreign policy. The main value of Southeast Asia for Moscow lies in its image-building strategy, with the West as the primary audience, and that the Asian pivot itself is secondary to Russia’s overall foreign policy.[24] Hendra Manurung (2018) believes that in Southeast Asia, a region whose history of relations with the Soviet Union/Russia is fundamentally different from that of the West, perceptions of Russia today are remarkably different.[25] Some scholars believe that Soviet/Russian interest in Southeast Asia had always been more a function of power projection against Chinese and American influence than a natural by-product of geographic setting as is the case in Northeast Asia. Paradorn Rangsimaporn (2009, 788) believes that Southeast Asia is important for Russia in four influential respects: ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian regionalism, the vision of multipolarity in Asia, the lure of a potential ASEAN market, and finally because each ASEAN country pursues its own diversified interest, the relations of each ASEAN country varies with Russia too.[26] Andrew C. Kuchins (2014, 129-130) explains that since Russia was historically focused on European power until the Cold War confrontation with the United States, engaging in Asian affairs does not come naturally to Russia’s elite, but President Putin was aware of the shifting global economic balance of power to Asia, and had understood that Russia’s integration was essential for its successful long-term development.[27] Yet Nivedita Kapoor (2022) argues that after a decade of Russia’s focus on Asia, the pivot poses lingering questions regarding its effectiveness, with three factors raising skepticism: “the non-fulfilment of the original aims of the pivot, unclear policy goals, and the ongoing realignments in the Asia-Pacific.”[28]
As many scholars suggest, the concentration on Russia’s Asia pivot began after the Crimean annexation in 2014 when Russian leaders, confronted by the West, implemented the Asian pivot to move Russia away from the West and towards the Asia-Pacific. For Russia, the Asian pivot “is important to improve Russia’s geopolitical position and revitalize the development of Russia’s Far East, and other resource-rich regions such as Siberia and the Arctic.”[29] Russia’s quest to become a balancer comes belatedly as substantial balance had already been brought to Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific by escalating U.S. interventions to moderate Chinese hegemony and rising U.S.-China strife. The U.S. balancing occurred through the establishment of the QUAD (Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, Japan, India, and the United States), and the AUKUS (security pact between Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States). In view of these configurations, Russia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic affinity for Southeast Asia remains an essential factor in determining the politics of the Western powers in the Southeast Asian region. The Russian pivot to Asia, therefore, exhibits an important strategy: “a civilizational alliance against Western universal values,” a geopolitical effort to provide a regional alternative to the U.S.-centered alliance system, and a geoeconomic push to integrate Russia into Asia’s dynamic economy”[30] (Gorenburg and Schwartz 2019, 10).
It is easily deducible that Russian foreign policy’s primary thrust is to reestablish a multipolar global system. It has repeatedly voiced its concerns over a geopolitical order determined by the West, especially the United States. Moscow had challenged the existing geopolitical order through the Crimea annexation , the Syrian civil war, through its stance on the Iran nuclear agreement that resulted in its deepening relationship with China, and the Ukraine War in 2022. Russia’s chief worry is the post-Cold War configuration in Europe, principally the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Russian leaders watched in dismay the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Western triumphalism that the Cold War had ended in American victory, and that capitalist neo-liberalism was a new model dictating the world order. Putin’s conception of Russian foreign policy aimed to wrest back some of the glory of the former Soviet Union by striking alliances across the world. In this effort, Putin conceives multifaceted collaborations as a vital tool in his country’s strategic relations. David Oualaalou rightly points out that “Russia can deploy and rely on relatively inexpensive diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, and energy tools to exert influence and expand its global presence.”[31] As a successor of the Soviet Union, Russia preserves a balance in the international system. When Putin became president in 2000, his geopolitical strategy aimed to regain the Soviet Union’s prior global status that it had lost in 1991. As Russia sees it, its presence in Southeast Asia has become necessary to maintain balance in international relations. According to the Russian script, the country gradually reentered the region by developing its trade in military hardware, through economic collaboration, and diplomatic engagements.
The view gaining ground among scholars is that ASEAN desires Russia’s presence as a balancer, an essential component of maintaining regional symmetry among the great powers, and it found in post-Soviet Russia a suitable partner to counter the power disparity in Southeast Asia. For example, in May 2014, the ASEAN-Russia summit, held in Sochi on the 20th anniversary of the Russia-ASEAN dialogue partnership, intended to strengthen Russia and Southeast Asia’s economic and security collaboration.
Russia’s intervention in the region is occurring at a time when the countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia are facing regional-level rivalries over unsettled territorial disputes, such as between China and Japan, Japan and South Korea, Japan and Russia, China and Brunei, and variously between China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The disputants occasionally emphasize regional cooperation instead of confrontation. To stabilize the volatile regional order, ASEAN created a web of institutional networks such as its eleven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States; and other mechanisms such as the ASEAN Plus Three, the APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Richard A. Bitzinger and Barry Desker view these formations as providers of “strategic stability” in a “relatively insecure” region.[32]
The ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership began in July 1991 when a deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation attended the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur at the invitation of Malaysia. Subsequently, Russia was elevated to full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN at the 29th AMM in July 1996 in Jakarta. At the AMM held in 2004, Russia signed on to ASEAN’s founding document, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a political declaration on the norms and principles governing relations among member countries. Next, the 2004 ASEAN-Russia Foreign Minister’s Meeting proposed a joint declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism covering counter-terrorism and transnational crimes.
Overlaid with a gloss of cordiality, ASEAN-Russia cooperation runs the spectrum of politics, security, trade and investment, and culture. The political and security cooperation are seen in the EAS, the ARF, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) Plus One with the Russian Federation, the ASEAN Plus Russia Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC+Russia), and so on.[33] Their economic cooperation is conducted through the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and Russia Consultations. The 10th AEM-Russia Consultation articulated the ASEAN-Russia trade and investment plans for 2021-2025, aiming to deliver better results in the digital economy, sustainable development, and regional integration of ASEAN and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). ASEAN-Russia economic relations have prospered in tourism, agriculture, food security, and science and technology. ASEAN has been working with the so-called Russian Business Communities represented through the Russia-ASEAN Business Council or RABC, established by the Russian Chamber of Commerce in 1998 to foster closer trade with ASEAN.
The ASEAN-Russia trade story so far is headed south after peaking at US$ 23 billion in 2014, and then plummeting to US$ 18.20 billion in 2019, and further down to US$ 14.07 billion in 2020, driven low by the seasonal nature of business and lack of established product lines.[34] Foreign direct investment flows from Russia to ASEAN also witnessed disinvestment from US$ 83.45 million in 2019 to US$ 63.18 million in 2020.[35] Yet, the two sides have identified cooperation in energy as a promising area of growth in which scientists from Russia and ASEAN states collaborated in 2015-16 in joint initiatives in renewable energy. In recognition of the potential, the two sides endorsed a new ASEAN-Russia Energy Cooperation Work Plan for 2016-2020 at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Energy-Russia Consultation held in July 2016 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The Work Plan, a successor of the first work plan adopted in 2010, demonstrates the willingness and readiness of the partners to focus on oil and gas, the electric power sector, civilian nuclear energy, and promotion of renewable energy.
The other signposts are socio-economic linkages. ASEAN and Russia signed an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation in 2010 to develop exchanges in music, theatre, archives, libraries, museums, cultural heritage, dance, visual arts, film, copyright, folkcraft, decorative and applied arts, and circus (an area of special Russian expertise since the Cold War when Russian circuses entertained Vietnamese revolutionaries during the war years).[36] The ASEAN-Russia Year of Culture in 2016 resulted in the ASEAN-Russia Culture Ministers’ Meeting, and the 1st ASEAN-Russia Culture Festival, both held in Sochi in May 2016, and the performance of the ASEAN-Russia Youth Symphony Orchestra in Vientiane in April 2017 and in Singapore in October 2019, respectively.
The central document guiding ASEAN-Russia relations is the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that aims to conduct their strategic partnership in 2021-2025. The CPA draws legitimacy from two official statements: a Joint Statement issued at the 3rd ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership in 2018, marking the elevation of ASEAN-Russia relations to a Strategic Partnership, as well as the Chairman’s Statement at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Session with the Dialogue Partners in Bangkok in 2019.[37] The current CPA updates the previous “Comprehensive Plan of Action to Promote Cooperation between ASEAN and Russia (2016-2020),” and other related ASEAN-Russia cooperation documents. The entire “plan” hinges upon the understanding that ASEAN and Russia “share a common view on the importance of upholding ASEAN Centrality in the regional architecture which should be built upon ASEAN-led mechanisms,” and that ASEAN and Russia have an important role in fostering peace, stability and inclusive growth in the Asia-Pacific.”[38]
Although the two sides are committed to working on the above-mentioned areas of cooperation, there is a huge uncertainty caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is quite possible that ASEAN as a collective puts the CPA on ice. Certainly, certain ASEAN member states are unlikely to pursue further cooperation with Russia until it removes its troops from Ukraine and peacefully settles the conflict under UN supervision.
Not unexpectedly, ASEAN took a soft position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, issuing two statements till mid-March 2022 on the war, calling for restraint by “all parties” and a peaceful settlement to the “military hostilities.” Neither statement named Russia nor described the war in Ukraine as an invasion. The ambiguity cloaked further ASEAN statements in a cloud of mystery. ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ statement on Ukraine on August 3, 2022 in Phnom Penh, again, did not name Russia, except in the subtitle to the remarks, which did name Ukraine but only in the context of providing healthcare to those in the besieged country, and voiced support for UN efforts towards a peaceful resolution while reaffirming respect for (Ukraine’s) sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity.[39]
Soon it was business as usual for ASEAN. The ASEAN Post Ministerial Trilateral Meetings with its Dialogue Partners on August 3-4, 2022 in Phnom Penh “welcomed with satisfaction the progress in the implementation of the ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) 2021-2025 and looked forward to its full and effective implementation of the CPA.”[40] ASEAN welcomed Russia’s support for ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN’s leading role in the evolving regional architecture, and recognized Russia’s active engagement. The meeting reaffirmed the need for “close-knit collaboration” between ASEAN and Russia and reiterated the importance of upholding multilateralism and enhancing mutual trust, confidence, and respect for regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity. The meeting reviewed the First ASEAN-Russia Naval Exercise (ARNEX) held from November 28 to December 3, 2021. The meeting chimed an optimistic note on holding future meetings.
Clearly, ASEAN had normalized its relationship with Russia. The meeting (1) encouraged stronger ASEAN-Russia economic cooperation by implementing the ASEAN-Russia Trade and Investment Cooperation Roadmap, and ASEAN-Russia Trade and Investment Work Programme for 2021-2025; (2) welcomed the elevation of ASEAN-Russia Tourism Consultation to ministerial level in January 2022, and adoption of the ASEAN-Russia Work Plan on Tourism cooperation 2022-2024; (3) welcomed Russia’s support in narrowing the development gap within the region through its participation in the Initiative for ASEAN Integration. ASEAN noted Russia’s assistance in enhancing regional preparedness and capacity in prevention and responding to communicable infectious diseases; and (4) looked forward to the finalization and adoption of the ASEAN-Russia Plan of Action on Education 2022-2026.
Since President Putin took office in 2000, Russia’s defence-industrial sector has occupied center stage in the country’s military modernization program, enabling the Kremlin to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, as well as in Europe and the Middle East. The defence-industrial sector is crucial for Russia as it provides employment for over a million workers, and generates foreign currency revenue through the sale of military hardware to clients abroad. While on the global horizon, Russia ranked as the world’s second largest arms exporter after the United States in 2021, in Southeast Asia, however, it was the biggest arms supplier. In the two decades from 2000 to 2021, Russia’s arms exports to Southeast Asia were worth US$ 10.87 billion, followed by the United States (US$ 8.4 billion), France (US$4 .3 billion), Germany (US$ 2.94 billion) and China (US$ 2.9 bil lion).[41]
The Soviet footprint goes back to the Vietnam War years, when Moscow was the principal supplier of military goods to Vietnam, a relationship that only grew since Putin’s coming to power.[42] At the time, the Soviet Union had no Southeast Asian markets other than Vietnam. Russia made inroads, first, because its weapons have a significant advantage over U.S. weapons in their lower cost. Owing to their small defense budgets, some Southeast Asian nations have welcomed Russian arms as the more attractive choice. Second, some Southeast Asian states began signing arms contracts with Russia due to the increasing military assertiveness of China in the region that caused some of these countries to become insecure and distrustful.
The China-factor, to varying degrees, pushed these countries to rearm. From 2000 to 2021, Russia sold arms worth US$ 6.54 billion to Vietnam, US$ 1.68 billion to Myanmar, US$ 1.27 billion to Malaysia, and US$ 1.15 billion to Indonesia.[43] Russia failed to make headway in Cambodia and in Laos which had fallen under Chinese sway, and despite the best efforts of Russian arms salesmen, they could not break into Thailand that remained under U.S. influence and chary of adopting Russian technology. With prices cheaper than U.S. and European arms manufacturers, Russia lured Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia to look at its entire raft of military equipment such as fighter jets, submarines, tanks, and small arms. They made an offer these countries could not refuse with Russian manufacturers accepting part-payment in commodities, as well as options to enter joint production of some systems. The Russians also benefited from a captive market in Vietnam that had, until 2016, been blocked from Western arms due to sanctions, as well as the smaller markets of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos that still face the ban.[44]
A closer reading shows that Russian arms sales to Southeast Asia have declined since 2000, falling from US$ 1.2 billion in 2014 to US$ 89 million in 2021. Storey points out four reasons for the precipitous fall. First, Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist forces in the Donbass region of Ukraine in 2014 led to U.S. and European sanctions, and export controls on the Russian defence-industrial sector. Russia paid a hefty price for its invasion of Ukraine which disrupted the alliance between Russian and Ukrainian defence firms, hurting the quality and timely delivery of Russian equipment. Second, Russia’s biggest customer in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, slowed down its military modernization program, partly because of concerns over Moscow’s ability to fulfil orders. Russia’s defence-industrial sector looked at other regional countries but failed to find new markets in Thailand and the Philippines, both U.S. allies.
Third, Southeast Asian countries are wary of buying Russian weapons due to the Trump Administration passing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017 that allows the U.S. government to impose sanctions against individuals or countries that have commercial dealings with Russia’s defence manufacturing industries. It is understood that such concerns led to the Philippines’ decision not to sign a defence contract with Russia, and to Indonesia’s decision to cancel an order for 11 Russian-made SU-35 fighter jets in December 2021 in favor of the U.S. and French fast jets.[45] Fourth, Russian arms sales face tough competition from the U.S. and European rivals, and from new entrants to the market such as companies from India, China, and South Korea. It is expected that after the Ukraine crisis is settled one way or another, it may be business as usual for Russia to return to the old trend of Southeast Asian states, which had for long looked towards the United States for weapons, to either shift or hedge their imports by turning to Russia or some of the new entrants—with a caveat that the reliability of Russian weapons that have not performed well in Ukraine may dissuade Asian customers.
Svetlana Klyuchanskaya explains that “the growing defence spending in Southeast Asia has several factors [driving it] including China, piracy, and terrorism.”[46] But Russian deals run into familiar obstacles, as seen above. Yet, Russia has proposed to supply MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Thailand to pay off a debt to Thailand to purchase 500,000 tons of rice. Despite the low price, the Thai military was more comfortable with American weapons and showed little interest. Royal Thai Air Force Chief Marshal Gun Primarntip said that the MiG-29 was not suitable for Thailand which was accustomed to U.S. systems (Bangkok Post, February 27, 1993). Deputy Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan also spoke out against the Russian offer of MiG-29s, stating that they were not compatible with existing Thai weapons (Bangkok Post, February 25, 1993). Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi visited Singapore in March 1993 in order to explore business opportunities, but the possibilities were limited. Singapore officials examined the prospects of joint ventures in military industries, but had no interest in Russian weapons (Straits Times, March 8, 1993; Reuters, March 7, 1993).[47]
During the tenure of Yeltsin, Russia’s astonishing sale of military weapons within ASEAN was to Malaysia, impelled due to the ideological inclination of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. Mahathir’s vitriolic criticism of the United States for its hegemony, interventions, and imperialism, as he saw it, to dominate Asia, drove him to seek alternative arms suppliers. In the early 1990s, Malaysia intended to buy a frontline fighter aircraft, and the Defense Ministry’s proclivity was the American FA-18 or the F-16. The ministry pointed to the logistical nightmare that would be created by servicing both Western and Russian weapons if the MiG-29 were purchased. It identified the problems relating to technical services and spare parts, the short engine life of the Russian fighter, and its primitive avionics. One objection was met when Malaysia, in February 1993, concluded a technical servicing agreement with India for the maintenance and support of Russian weapons. In March 1993, Rutskoi visited Kuala Lumpur and offered better teams to fend off American competition.[48] He agreed to a counter-trade deal in palm oil and an offset program which would allow local manufacturers to provide spare parts for the MiG-29. He also offered submarines, naval vessels, laser-guided missiles, and virtually the full range of Russian weapons to the Malaysians (Straits Times, March 4, 1993). Malaysia’s Defense Ministry remained strongly opposed to purchasing Russian weapons, and Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak publicly stated that Malaysia could not accept the logistical problems of combining Western and Russian equipment (Reuters, March 23, 1993).[49]
Mahathir and Putin had a convergence of views that centered around an ideological critique of the United States. When Mahathir visited Moscow in March 2002, he underlined his intention to widen relations with Russia, declaring that Malaysia could be Russia’s “gateway” to Southeast Asia.[50] Mahathir discussed the purchase of fighter bombers during his visit. A contract for the purchase of 18 Su-30MKM fighters for US$ 900 million, 30 percent in countertrade payable in Malaysian palm oil, was agreed in May 2003.[51]
Despite the earlier concerns, the Royal Malaysian Air Force purchased 18 Su-30MKM fighters, which were delivered in batches from 2007, retiring what was believed to have been 10 MiG-29s, which were operated from the mid-1990s.[52] Jane’s reported in November 2019 that Malaysia had received an offer from Russia to partly exchange its ageing fleet for newer fighters, according to Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu (who told the parliament). Sabu stated the government was considering Moscow’s offer but he indicated that the RMAF’s priority was to procure capabilities such as surveillance and light attack. He also indicated that Malaysia would not realistically consider buying a new multirole combat aircraft until after 2030. In parliament, Sabu was asked if Malaysia “is willing to accept the Russian government’s offer to take back 28 jets” and “replace them with new aircraft made by [Russia].” The deal—reported to include the transfer of new Su-35 or MiG-35 models—would also likely comprise the countertrade of Malaysian palm oil. Sabu replied that although the acquisition of multirole combat aircraft “is not in the Ministry of Defence’s plans, it is still scrutinising the Russian government’s offer.” Sabu added that in line with the RMAF’s long-term modernization program it will continue to prioritize maintaining its existing fleets of Su-30MKMs and eight Boeing F/A-18 Hornets acquired in the late 1990s. This sustainment priority would continue through to 2030, he said. According to the RMAF, it operates 19 Sukhoi Su-30MKM multirole fighters.[53]
Despite some success in selling weapons to the region, Russia could not overcome the misgivings of some Southeast Asian countries. In terms of arms sales, Russia’s success with Malaysia was promising. Still, compared with the long-term deals Russia had negotiated with China and India, it was less rewarding than expected due to the traditional obstacles.
Many Russian policymakers have advocated for the deepening of Russia’s regional integration through institutions in Asia. ASEAN-Russia economic cooperation has strengthened over time through multilateral platforms such as the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM)-Russia, and the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)-Russia. Yet, as shown above, ASEAN-Russia trade, having reached a high of US$ 23 billion in 2014, plunged to US$ 18.20 billion in 2019, and further down to US$ 14.07 billion in 2020, driven down by the seasonal nature of business and lack of established product lines.
A fillip to trade could come from ASEAN’s alliance with a group of post-Soviet states belonging to the Eurasian Economic Union, or EAEU, consisting of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan that was created in May 2014, and came into effect the following year. The EAEU made its first imprint in the region, signing a free trade agreement with Vietnam in October 2016, opening up opportunities for Vietnamese exporters, and leading to the possibility of other member countries joining the Russia-led union.[54] The free trade deal with Vietnam covers more than 90 percent of all goods traded between the EAEU and Vietnam, which would save exporters from the EAEU about US$ 40 million to US$ 60 million each year, while Vietnamese companies can expect savings of up to US$ 5 million to US$ 10 million a year.[55] Russia’s main exports to Vietnam consist of nuclear reactors, mineral fuels, oil and its distilled products, and fertilizers. Imports from Vietnam are electrical machinery, boilers, and knitwear. Russia’s Ambassador in Hanoi, Konstantin Vnukov, admitted in October 2016 that making progress in Southeast Asia had been difficult. “Despite a number of certain hurdles, our trade and investment ties are getting stronger. Vietnam already tops the list of Russia’s biggest trade partners within the ASEAN.”[56]
The Kremlin regards Vietnam as a “traditional” trading partner in Southeast Asia and one where the trade prospects were most encouraging. Yet, Paradorn Rangsimaporn (2009) explains that weak economic links between Russia and Southeast Asia had hindered Russia’s search for influence in the sub-region.[57]
Taking a cue from Vietnam, the Russia-led EAEU and Singapore signed a Free Trade Agreement in October 2019, but it was not in effect at press-time. The FTA was the first comprehensive pact signed by the Eurasian countries since it was created in 2015, and it opened the door to a vast US$ 1.9 trillion Eurasian market by gross domestic product. At the signing ceremony in Yeravan, Armenia, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that the FTA was significant as it showed resolve to resist the tide of protectionism.[58] “It’s also a signal to the rest of the world that we are continuing to promote trade liberalisation, economic cooperation at a time when there are opposite pressures in many countries to go for nativism, self-sufficiency and protectionism.” Lee added, “We’re going in an opposite direction. I think it’s a significant move for us. I think it’s also a significant move for the Eurasian Union.” Under the trade deal, EAEU member states would reduce tariffs on 90 per cent of goods exported by Singapore to their markets, that would increase to 97 percent over a 10-year period. Goods that would benefit were chemical products, prepared foodstuff, and mineral oils.
Indonesia, during the regime of President Soekarno, proposed establishing a closer relationship with Russia on the basis of economic, political, military and cultural links. Moreover, Russia believes that Indonesia plays a significant role in the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) in Southeast Asia and in the Indo-Pacific region. The idea of the Global Maritime Fulcrum was declared by President Joko Widodo when he came to office in 2014 to refocus Indonesia’s development paradigm to prioritize its maritime aspect in the Indo-Pacific.[59] Divided across five pillars of maritime culture, maritime resource management, maritime infrastructure and connectivity development, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defence, the implementation of the GMF is expected to have a significant regional impact, particularly in setting regional maritime agendas.
The deeper integration mainly seeks to deepen economic ties between Indonesia and Russia in the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and greater Eurasia. Hendra Manurung et al (2021) argue that Russia is an unconventional market for Indonesia’s principal goods. Indonesia has proposed eradicating multiple trade restrictions in Russia and sought to export Indonesian products, including agricultural, plantation, and fisheries, by seeking licencing from Russia. Indonesian tropical fruits, coffee, and palm oil were in high demand in Russia.
Indonesia began negotiations with the Eurasian Economic Union in September 2020 on an Indonesia-EAEU free trade agreement.[60] It was expected that the agreement would be concluded toward the end of 2022, covering the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, but at presstime it had not been signed. The EAEU has great interest in Indonesia as it is ASEAN’s largest economy. Trade turnover between the EAEU and Indonesia increased by 41.5 percent to US$ 3.7 billion in 2021 over the previous year, with bilateral exports increasing by 34.1 percent, and imports growing by 44.5 percent, according to the EAEU.[61]
President Putin pushed for an Indonesia-EAEU free trade pact, declaring after meeting President Widodo at the Kremlin in June 2022, “We attach great importance to the creation of a free trade zone between Indonesia and the Eurasian Economic Union. I hope that negotiations on the relevant draft agreement will be held by the end of the year and they will be fruitful.”[62] Putin recalled that many Russian companies, including energy companies, operated in Indonesia. “There is an interest in the development of national nuclear energy. Rosatom State Corporation (Russian nuclear corporation), which has unique experience, competencies, technologies that have no analogues in the world, is ready to participate in joint projects, including those related to the non-energy use of nuclear technologies, for example, in medicine, in agricultures,” the Russian leader noted.
Significant trade partnerships between Russia and Malaysia are restrained by the hegemonic position of the United States, and by China’s economic dominance in the region. On March 15, 2010, Russia and Malaysia agreed to a “Sister City” agreement between Vladivostok and Kota Kinabalu that aimed to strengthen their relationship through beneficial economic exchanges.[63] Yet, the Malaysian-Russia trade is small. OCBC Bank economist Wellian Wiranto explains that Malaysian exports to Russia comprised just 0.33 percent of Malaysia’s total outward shipments in 2021, while imports from Russia made up just half a percent of total Malaysian imports in the same period.[64]
In 2016, at a meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and President Putin the two leaders agreed to build their relations on humanitarian grounds, the economy, investment, and military-technical cooperation. For the first time, Malaysia attended the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2019, where Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, enjoying a return to power, expressed an interest in Russian business organizations in Malaysia setting up a university and cooperating in the aerospace industry.[65] Malaysia’s imports from Russia in 2019 were worth US$ 1.76 billion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade.[66] Top items of import were electronic equipment, machinery, and rubber. A recent problem is that the palm oil trade between Malaysia and Russia experienced a sharp drop in 2019, after an increase in 2015-2018. In the absence of a direct trade agreement between the two countries, many Malaysians believe it is high time to initiate a pact with the EAEU, a step that would take the exports of oil palm products to a new level and wrest the market back from a long-time competitor, Indonesia.[67]
A Thailand-EAEU free trade agreement has been under study since 2016, but it seems wedged in diplomatic politics.[68] Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha declared that he hoped to conclude an FTA agreement with the EAEU in a speech via video link at the Far Eastern Economic Forum in September 2021.[69] “No doubt that the EAEU has very great potential as a market in the Eurasian region. Thailand intends to continue constructive dialogue with the EAEU member states, including Russia and Kazakhstan, so that we can move together on such an important and urgent agenda,” he stated, pointing to the prospects of Eurasia as a link between Russia and the Indo-Pacific. The Thai PM revealed that Thailand was actively developing its Eastern Economic Corridor along the east coast of the kingdom to build on its status as a popular tourist destination, which bore similarity to the Russian Far East, as both possessed enormous potential. He rallied foreign investors to invest their capital in digital technologies, healthcare, and smart logistics in the Thai EEC. In 2021, Russia-Thai bilateral trade was about US$ 4 billion, although the two governments intend to increase it to US$ 10 billion by 2023. Thai exports to Russia in 2020 were US$ 958 million, with automobiles, auto components, and rubber finding markets in Russia, while imports from Russia accounted for US$ 2.17 billion, led by crude oil, steel, armaments, and fertilizer. In September 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai on Russia-Thailand cooperation in trade, economic and cultural ties.[70]
The response of ASEAN countries to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was shaped, to an extent, by the ringing condemnation of Moscow’s aggression by most European states. Many Southeast Asian countries were neutral in their diplomatic position, seemingly dismissive of the prevalence of U.S. hegemony in the Southeast Asian region. As Russia’s war against Ukraine grinds on, Southeast Asian states have expressed concern about the violence and called for a ceasefire. With the exception of Singapore, most Southeast Asian states neither directly criticized Russia nor joined Western-led sanctions and export controls.
Singapore took the strongest, and most vocal, stand in Southeast Asia against Russia, describing its action as an “invasion” and a “clear and gross violation of international norms.” Singapore had rarely imposed sanctions or export restrictions in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution, but had done so in relation to Ukraine. No other Southeast Asian country followed suit on sanctions. Some regional countries took a clearer stand in the United Nations with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, and Thailand voting in favor of a March 2 UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia immediately withdraw from Ukraine. Myanmar’s representative to the UN also voted in favor, but since its representative was appointed by the government overthrown in the military coup in 2021, the vote carried legitimacy. Long time Russian allies, Vietnam and Laos abstained.
At the national level, Southeast Asian government responses have varied but no other ASEAN country has come close to Singapore’s strategic and moral position. Indonesia’s foreign ministry, for example, described the war as “unacceptable” but did not name Russia. Malaysia stuck to the ASEAN statement script. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared his country would remain “neutral.” Vietnam made little public comment. Myanmar’s military rulers backed Russia and blamed the war on Ukraine and on the West.
It is necessary to understand Singapore’s response. The island republic, having suspended all cooperation after Russia invaded Ukraine, announced sanctions against the invader declaring that Singapore was “a consistent and staunch supporter of international law and the principles enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter.”[71] It added that the “sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all countries, big and small, must be respected,” adding that “Singapore takes any violation of these core principles seriously, as they are fundamental to the survival of Singapore, a small state.” Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the “sanctions and restrictions aim to constrain Russia’s capacity to conduct war against Ukraine and undermine its sovereignty.” Singapore would, thus, impose export controls on items that “could be directly used as weapons to inflict harm on or to subjugate the Ukrainians, as well as items that can contribute to offensive cyber operations.” Singapore imposed a ban on the transfer to Russia of weapons, as well as electronics, computers, and items in the “telecommunications and information security” category. Singapore imposed financial measures targeted at designated Russian banks, entities, and activities in Russia, and fund-raising activities benefiting the Russian government. Digital payment token service providers were specifically prohibited from facilitating transactions that could help to circumvent the financial measures. The measures applied to all financial institutions in Singapore, including banks, finance companies, insurers, capital markets intermediaries, securities exchanges and payment service providers.
A weak-kneed or unprincipled public stand by individual ASEAN member states sent out a message that the regional grouping would tolerate an invasion of a small country by a larger one, and undermined the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity embossed in ASEAN’s foundational agreements. ASEAN’s failure to stand up to Russian invasion firmly and unequivocally threatened to consign the grouping to historical irrelevancy, threatening ASEAN centrality, and opening the path for the U.S. led regional alliances such as the QUAD and the AUKUS, to entrench themselves. ASEAN seemed to have strayed from its duty to ensure that Russia returned to the straight and narrow as a responsible global leader.
For both Russia and Southeast Asia there was, and is, much at stake in building a future regional order defined by peace. It was believed that Russia’s intervention in Southeast Asia could change the regional order to a multipolar one, but its belligerence in Ukraine has put paid to the expectation that it could act as a stabilizer. Its status as an important defence exporter to Southeast Asia, and a full dialogue partner of ASEAN, ought to have made Russian presence in Southeast Asia essential to balance both China’s military assertiveness as well as the longstanding hegemony of the United States. It is no longer clear, or possible, that Russia can play any such role.
Saranya Antony A is an Assistant Professor at Government College of Arts and Science, Androth Island, Lakshadweep, an institution affiliated to Pondicherry University. Her doctoral research was on “Higher Educational Reforms and Transformation of Public Universities in Lithuania and India in the Neoliberal era” at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies (CRCAS), School of International Relations Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She has studied in the Department of Education Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kaunas Technological University, Lithuania for one semester under the Erasmus +Learning Mobility Fellowship in 2018. She completed her MPhil in 2016 from CRCAS, SIS, JNU. The topic of her dissertation was “Representation of Russia in the Baltic Media over Ukraine Crisis of 2014.” She did her MA in Politics (international studies) from SIS, JNU. Her publications are, “The Singing Revolution, Independence and Democratic Transformation in Baltic States: Nationalism, Identity and Culture,” in Nation Building in Baltic States History, Memory and Identity (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2018); “Mapping of Neoliberal Reforms and Students’ Resistance Movement in Indian Public Universities Since 2014,” in Sketches on Developing India: A Socio-Economic Perspective (Kerala: Academic Publication Wing, 2019); “National Education Policy 2020, Reforms in Higher Education and Public Universities in India: Promises, Practices and Problems,” Journal of Parliamentary Studies, Volume 11, Issue 1 & 2, January-December 2019; and “Escalation of Ukraine Crisis and Russia-West Geopolitical Rivalry: Implications for Regional Stability, Security, and Peace, The IUP Journal of International Relations, Volume 16, No. 1, 2022.
[1] William C. Green, “The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth,” Naval War College Review 46, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 80-102.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] A. Ya. Vyshinskiy and A. Lozovskiy, eds., “Petra I zaveshchaniye” [Testament of Peter the Great], Diplomaticheskiy slovar [Dictionary of Diplomacy] (Moscow: Foreign Affairs Publishers, 1948-1950).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 98.
[9] William R. Sprance, “The Russo-Japanese War: The Emergence of Japanese Imperial Power,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 6, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 1-24.
[10] Vladimir Radhyuhin, “Russia Renews Interest in Vietnam Base,” The Hindu, October 8, 2020.
[11] Alex Snegov, “Hanoi Envoy Cautions Against Military Alliances,” TASS, May 18, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/news/2016/05/18/vietnam-open-to-russian-return-to-cam-ranh-bay_594025
[12] Abbott Gleason, “What is it? Is it?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1 (January 2010): 26-32.
[13] See, Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press: 2008), and Sarah Dixon Klump, “Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire,” Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-eurasianism-ideology-empire
[14] Ibid. Laruelle quoted in Klump.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Yuri M. Yarmolinsky, “Russia’s Pivot to Asia Policy in the Wake of Western Sanctions,” Observer Research Foundation, March 22, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russias-pivot-to-asia-policy-in-the-wake-of-western-sanctions/
[18] Seckin Kostem, “Kennan Cable No. 40: Russia’s Search for a Greater Eurasia: Origins, Promises, and Prospects,” Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-40-russias-search-for-greater-eurasia-origins-promises-and-prospects
[19] Ibid.
[20] Harish C. Mehta, “Soviet Biscuit Factories and Chinese Financial Grants: North Vietnam’s Economic Diplomacy in 1967 and 1968,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 2 (April 2012): 301-335.
[21] Arms Control Association, “Russia Clinches Jet Sale to Malaysia,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-99/russia-clinches-jet-sale-malaysia
[22] Sergei Agafonov, “Na Aziatskie politicheskie igry Andreya Kozyreva ne priglashayut,” Izvestiya, March 26, 1994.
[23] Sergei Denisov, “Patneru nuzhno verit,” Pravda, May 20, 1994.
[24] Anton Tsvetov, “After Crimea: Southeast Asia in Russia’s Foreign Policy Narrative,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 1 (2016): 55-80.
[25] Hendra Manurung, “Indonesia and Russia Relations in Response with Changing Strategic Environment, Politica 9, no. 1 (2018): 59-72.
[26] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, no. 2 (2009): 207-244.
[27] Andrew C. Kuchins, “Russia and the CIS in 2013: Russia’s Pivot to Asia,” Asian Survey 54, no.1 (2014): 129-37.
[28] Nivedita Kapoor, “Russia’s Pivot to Asia: A 10 Year Policy Review,” BRICS Information Portal, April 6, 2022, https://infobrics.org/post/35470
[29] Richard Connolly, “Russia’s Economic Pivot to Asia in a Shifting Regional Environment,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 16, 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/briefing-papers/russias-economic-pivot-asia-shifting-regional-environment
[30] Dmitry Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, “Russia’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Russia/NIS Center, March 2019, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gorenburg_schwartz_russia_relations_southeast_asia_2019.pdf
[31] David Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics: Remaking the Global Order (Springer e-book collection, 2021).
[32] Richard A. Bitzinger and Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival 50, no.6 (2008): 105-128.
[33] “Overview: ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations,” ASEAN, Asean.org, June 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Overview-ASEAN-Russia-Dialogue-Relations-as-of-June-2022.pdf
[34] Ibid. Also see, Andrey Gubin, “Russia’s Blossoming Ties with ASEAN,” East Asia Forum, February 5, 2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/05/russias-blossoming-ties-with-asean/
[35] “Overview: ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations,” ASEAN, Asean.org, June 2022,
[36] See, Mehta, “Soviet Biscuit Factories, and Chinese Financial Grants,” Diplomatic History.
[37] “Comprehensive Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN and the Russian Federation Strategic Partnership (2021-2025),” ASEAN, Asean-org, October 28, 2021, https://asean.org/comprehensive-plan-of-action-cpa-to-implement-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-the-russian-federation-strategic-partnership-2021-2025/
[38] Ibid.
[39] Joint Communiqué of the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Asean.org, August 3, 2022, https://asean.org/joint-communique-of-the-55th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/
[40] Chairman’s Statement, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Sessions with the Dialogue Partners and Trilateral Meetings, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, August 3-4, 2022, Asean.org, https://asean.org/category/statements-meetings/?_sft_classification=000-asean-in-general,100-political-security
[41] Ian Storey, “The Russia-Ukraine War and its Potential Impact on Russia’s Arms Sales to Southeast Asia,” ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, May 5, 2022, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-47-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-potential-impact-on-russias-arms-sales-to-southeast-asia-by-ian-storey/#:
[42] See, Mehta, “Soviet Biscuit Factories and Chinese Financial Grants.”
[43] Storey, “The Russia-Ukraine War and its Potential Impact on Russia’s Arms Sales to Southeast Asia.”
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Svetlana Klyuchanskaya, “Russia and Southeast Asia: Cooperation in Strategic Areas,” Security Index 94, no.1 (2011): 37-52.
[47] Buszynski Leszek “Russia and Southeast Asia: A New Relationship,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no.2 (2006): 282.
[48] Ibid., 283.
[49] Ibid., 283.
[50] Ibid., 286.
[51] Ibid., 286.
[52] Jon Grevatt, “Malaysia Considers ‘Fighter Exchange’ Offer from Russia, Jane’s, November 28, 2019.
[53] Royal Malaysian Air Force (2022): Current Active Inventory, https://www.wdmma.org/royal-malaysian-air-force.php
[54] “Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union FTA,” World Trade Organisation, https://wtocenter.vn/fta/188-vietnam--eurasian-economic-union-vn-eaeu-fta/1
[55] “Vietnam Joins Russia-led Free Trade Zone,” RT, October 5, 2016, https://www.rt.com/business/361654-russia-vietnam-eeu-trade/
[56] “Free Trade Agreement between Eurasian Economic Union, Vietnam comes into force,” TASS, October 5, 2016, https://tass.com/economy/904384
[57] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
[58] Jeremy Koh, “Eurasian Economic Union-Singapore FTA shows Resolve to Resist Tide of Protectionism: PM Lee,” CNA, October 1, 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/singapore-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement-853581
[59] Evan Laksmana, “Indonesia as ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’: A Post-mortem Analysis,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 8, 2019, https://amti.csis.org/indonesia-as-global-maritime-fulcrum-a-post-mortem-analysis/
[60] “EAEU to Start Negotiations on Concluding Free Trade Agreement,” EAEU Commission, June 7, 2022, https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/news/eaes-nachnet-peregovory-s-indoneziey-o-zaklyuchenii-soglasheniya-o-svobodnoy-torgovle/
[61] Ibid.
[62] “Russia hopes to hold talks on Free Trade Zone with Indonesia in 2022,” Tass, June 30, 2022, https://tass.com/politics/1474127
[63] Kucera William and Pejsova, “Russia’s Quiet Partnership in Southeast Asia: Russia-Malaysia Strategic Partnership through Sabah Case Study,” IRASEC Discussion Papers, April 2012, https://www.irasec.com/ouvrage35
[64] Nur Hanani Azman, “Minimal Effect on Russia from Russia Trade Stoppages,” The Malaysian Reserve, August 19, 2022.
[65] President of Russia meeting with Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad (2019), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61448.
[66] “Free Trade Agreement with Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects for Malaysia,” Malaysian Palm Oil Council, https://mpoc.org.my/free-trade-agreement-with-eurasian-economic-union-prospects-for-malaysia/.
[67] Ibid.
[68] “Thailand-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement,” Asian Development Bank, https://aric.adb.org/fta/thailand-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement.
[69] Thai Prime Minister wants Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement Concluded,” Russia Briefing, September 20, 2021, https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/thai-prime-minister-wants-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement-concluded.html/.
[70] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2021), press release, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1778197/
[71] “Sanctions and Restrictions against Russia in Response to its Invasion of Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, March 5, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/03/20220305-sanctions
Agafonov, Sergei. 1994. “Na Aziatskie politicheskie igry Andreya Kozyreva ne priglashayut.” Izvestiya, March 26.
ASEAN. “Comprehensive Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN and the Russian Federation Strategic Partnership (2021-2025).” Asean-org, October 28, 2021, https://asean.org/comprehensive-plan-of-action-cpa-to-implement-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-the-russian-federation-strategic-partnership-2021-2025/
____. Chairman’s Statement. 2022. “The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Sessions with the Dialogue Partners and Trilateral Meetings Phnom Penh, Cambodia,” August 3-4, 2022. Asean.org, https://asean.org/category/statements-meetings/?_sft_classification=000-asean-in-general,100-political-security
____. “Joint Communiqué of the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.” 2022. Asean.org, August 3, https://asean.org/joint-communique-of-the-55th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/
____. “Overview: ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations.” 2022. ASEAN, Asean.org, June, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Overview-ASEAN-Russia-Dialogue-Relations-as-of-June-2022.pdf
Asian Development Bank. nd. “Thailand-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement.” https://aric.adb.org/fta/thailand-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement
Azman, Nur Hanani. 2022. “Minimal Effect on Russia from Russia Trade Stoppages.” The Malaysian Reserve, August 19.
Bitzinger, Richard A. and Barry Desker. 2008. “Why East Asian War is Unlikely.” Survival 50, no. 6: 105-128.
Connolly, Richard. 2021. “Russia’s Economic Pivot to Asia in an Shifting Regional Environment.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 16, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/briefing-papers/russias-economic-pivot-asia-shifting-regional-environment.
Denisov, Sergei. 1994. “Patneru nuzhno verit.” Pravda, May 20.
EAEU. 2022. “EAEU to Start Negotiations on Concluding Free Trade Agreement.” EAEU Commission, June 7, https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/news/eaes-nachnet-peregovory-s-indoneziey-o-zaklyuchenii-soglasheniya-o-svobodnoy-torgovle/
Gleason, Abbott. 2010. What is it? Is it? Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 1: 26-32.
Gorenburg, Dmitry and Schwartz Paul. 2019. “Russia’s Relations with Southeast Asia.” Russia/NIS Center, March, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gorenburg_schwartz_russia_relations_southeast_asia_2019.pdf
Green, William C. 1993. “The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth.” Naval War College Review 46, no. 2: 80-102.
Grevatt, Jon. 2019. “Malaysia Considers ‘Fighter Exchange’ Offer from Russia.” Jane’s, November 28.
Gubin, Andrey. 2022. “Russia’s Blossoming Ties with ASEAN.” East Asia Forum, February 5, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/05/russias-blossoming-ties-with-asean/
Kapoor, Nivedita. 2022. “Russia’s Pivot to Asia: A 10 Year Policy Review.” BRICS Information Portal, April 6, https://infobrics.org/post/35470
Klump, Sarah Dixon. nd. “Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.” Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-eurasianism-ideology-empire
Klyuchanskaya, Svetlana. 2011. “Russia and Southeast Asia: Cooperation in Strategic Areas.” Security Index 94, no. 1: 37-52.
Koh Jeremy. 2019. “Eurasian Economic Union-Singapore FTA shows Resolve to Resist Tide of Protectionism: PM Lee.” CNA, October 1, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/singapore-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement-853581
Kostem, Seckin. 2019. “Russia’s Search for a Greater Eurasia: Origins, Promises, and Prospects.” Kennan Cable 40, February, Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-40-russias-search-for-greater-eurasia-origins-promises-and-prospects
Kucera, William and Eva Pejsova. 2012. “Russia’s Quiet Partnership in Southeast Asia: Russia-Malaysia Strategic Partnership through Sabah Case Study.” IRASEC Discussion Papers, April, https://www.irasec.com/ouvrage35
Kuchins, Andrew C. 2014. “Russia and the CIS in 2013: Russia’s Pivot to Asia.” Asian Survey, 54, no. 1: 129-37.
Laksmana, Evan. 2019. “Indonesia as ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’: A Post-mortem Analysis.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 8, https://amti.csis.org/indonesia-as-global-maritime-fulcrum-a-post-mortem-analysis/
Laruelle, Marlene. 2008. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press..
Malaysian Palm Oil Council. nd. “Free Trade Agreement with Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects for Malaysia.” https://mpoc.org.my/free-trade-agreement-with-eurasian-economic-union-prospects-for-malaysia/
Mehta C. Harish. 2012. “Soviet Biscuit Factories and Chinese Financial Grants: North Vietnam’s Economic Diplomacy in 1967 and 1968.” Diplomatic History 36, no. 2: 301-335.
Manurung, Hendra. 2018. “Indonesia and Russia Relations in Response with Changing Strategic Environment.” Politica 9, no. 1: 59-72.
Oualaalou, David. 2021. The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics: Remaking the Global Order. Springer e-book collection.
President of Russia. 2019. “Meeting with Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad.” September 5, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61448
Rangsimaporn, Paradorn. 2009. Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin. Palgrave Macmillan.
____. 2009. “Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, no. 2: 207-244.
Radhyuhin, Vladimir. 2020. “Russia Renews Interest in Vietnam Base.” The Hindu, October 8.
Royal Malaysian Air Force. 2022. Current Active Inventory. https://www.wdmma.org/royal-malaysian-air-force.php
Russia Briefing. 2021. “Thai Prime Minister wants Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Agreement Concluded.” September 20, https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/thai-prime-minister-wants-eurasian-economic-union-free-trade-agreement-concluded.html/
Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021. “Press Release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s conversation with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand Don Pramudwinai.” https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1778197/
Russia Today. 2016. “Vietnam Joins Russia-led Free Trade Zone.” October 5, https://www.rt.com/business/361654-russia-vietnam-eeu-trade/
Singapore, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2022. “Sanctions and Restrictions against Russia in Response to its Invasion of Ukraine.” March 5, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/03/20220305-sanctions
SIPRI. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI), https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
Snegov, Alex. 2016. “Hanoi Envoy Cautions Against Military Alliances.” TASS, May 18, https://www.rbth.com/news/2016/05/18/vietnam-open-to-russian-return-to-cam-ranh-bay_594025
Storey, Ian. 2022. “The Russia-Ukraine War and its Potential Impact on Russia’s Arms Sales to Southeast Asia.” ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. May 5, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-47-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-potential-impact-on-russias-arms-sales-to-southeast-asia-by-ian-storey/#:
Sprance, William R. 2004. “The Russo-Japanese War: The Emergence of Japanese Imperial Power.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 6, no. 3: 1-24.
TASS. 2022. “Russia hopes to hold talks on Free Trade Zone with Indonesia in 2022 .” June 30, https://tass.com/politics/1474127
____. 2016. “Free Trade Agreement between Eurasian Economic Union, Vietnam comes into force.” October 5, https://tass.com/economy/904384
Tsvetov, Anton. 2016. “After Crimea: Southeast Asia in Russia’s Foreign Policy Narrative.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 1 (2016): 55-80.
Vyshinskiy, Ya and A. Lozovski, eds. 1948-1950. Petra I zaveshchaniye [Testament of Peter the Great]. Diplomaticheskiy slovar [Dictionary of Diplomacy]. Moscow: Foreign Affairs Publishers.
World Trade Organisation-Free Trade Agreement Portal. 2015. “Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union FTA.” May 29, https://wtocenter.vn/fta/188-vietnam--eurasian-economic-union-vn-eaeu-fta/1
