ABSTRACT
There has been a remarkable decline in insurgency-related violence across the Indian Northeast owing to negotiated agreements with armed groups, and the desire of young people to find jobs and seek a life of prosperity. There are visible signs of construction of new physical infrastructure, as well as buoyant economic growth and rising literacy in many Northeastern states. Manipur’s good economic growth, however, is imperilled by a new cycle of violence between the majority Meitei community and the state’s tribal communities since May 2023. This study employs phenomenological hermeneutic analysis to argue that national security concerns play a major role in shaping development efforts, and to highlight the multifaceted nature of the conflicts, encompassing ethnic clashes, poverty, unemployment, political instability, extortion by insurgent groups, corruption, and the use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act under which the military tackles active insurgencies. The article explores innovative approaches to end the conflict in the Northeast, arguing as well that the impressive economic growth and development indicators in Manipur, as well as in a few other Northeastern states, make the forging of peace a real possibility.
Keywords: Manipur, Development, Ethnic Conflict, Security, Insurgency, Governance.
The enchanting state of Manipur in the eastern sector of the Himalayan mountain range in South Asia garnered significant attention in mid-2023 due to new ethnic clashes arising from the demand of the majority Meitei community for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status, which the state’s tribal Kuki community had resisted. The ST Demand Committee of Manipur had been advocating for ST status for the Meiteis since 2012 in order to preserve their culture, language, and ancestral lands. More than the reserved seats and the preservation of culture, it is the land that is most at stake. The Meiteis have pointed to the unfairness of the law that allows the Kukis and Nagas to buy land in the Imphal valley, but bars the Meiteis from doing so in the hills. They grouse that they have been confined to the small and “shrinking” Imphal Valley, which has only about 10 percent of Manipur’s total geographic area. The Meiteis claim that once they obtain the ST status, the restriction on buying and selling land will be lifted, leading to greater integration between the valley and the hills. Meitei activists claim that the community was listed as a tribe by the British colonial government before the merger of the Manipur princely state with the Union of India on September 21, 1949. As the Meiteis were recognized as a tribe before Manipur’s merger with India, their obtaining ST status would ensure constitutional safeguards against outsiders.
The Meiteis’ pursuit of ST status began in 1981 and gained momentum with the formation of the Scheduled Tribes Demand Committee of Manipur Valley. The Committee submitted a memorandum to the Governor and met the Prime Minister on the issue, but the Manipur government failed to respond to their demand. The Manipur High Court on March 27, 2023 instructed the state government to review the community’s request for inclusion within four weeks and provide a recommendation to the Union government for further consideration.
The conflict originated during a tribal solidarity march held in Churachandpur on May 3, 2023. When the All-Tribal Students’ Union of Manipur organized a ‘Tribal Solidarity March’ to register opposition to the Meiteis’ inclusion as a ST, it led to scuffles and violence between the two communities.[1] The whole state went under complete lockdown due to the violence.
Amid criticism from Manipuris that the central government had not taken effective measures to stop the violence, the Home Minister Amit Shah, said on May 31, 2023 that he had met victims of both sides, Meiteis and Kukis, in relief camps in Manipur and had assured them of their security.[2] The assurances had little effect as the violence spiraled out of control with the number of deaths constantly rising. It caused the home minister to instruct the chief minister of Manipur, N. Biren Singh, on June 25, 2023, to “work harder” to restore peace.[3] Amid the bloodletting, the rape and killing of two Kuki women sparked nationwide outrage, leading the Kuki Women’s Organisation for Human Rights to urge Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2023 to set up an inquiry commission to provide justice to all the Kuki women and children victimized during the Manipur unrest.[4] A video of the sexual assault showed a mob parading two purportedly Kuki-Zo women naked and molesting them in Thoubal district on May 4, a day after clashes broke out between Meiteis and Kukis. In the memorandum forwarded to the prime minister through the Churachandpur district collector, the women’s group cited at least twelve instances of the “gravest human rights violations” committed against Kuki women and children during the violence. The police, on seeing the video, arrested four people in connection with the atrocity, and local women allegedly burnt down the house of one of the accused. Till July 22, 2023, strife in Manipur had claimed over 152 lives and displaced 60,000 people.
The continuing inter-community violence made it clear that the state’s chief minister had done little to restore peace. Former military officers with vast experience of the Northeast criticized the state’s failure to stop the violence, alleging “dereliction of duty” and “complicity.” The former Navy Chief and 1971 war hero, Admiral Arun Prakash, wrote in a tweet, “Episodes of violence and depravity in Manipur are horrifying. Equally shameful are cases of dereliction of duty/complicity.”[5] The admiral added, “With 1.3 million strong central armed police forces & a 1.4 million strong army at the government’s disposal, why does a state continue to be convulsed by violence, rape & arson for over two months? Are we helpless?” A retired army lieutenant general told The Telegraph newspaper, “There is a difference between a rape committed with a criminal intent and sexual assault targeting minority women by a frenzied mob as part of ethnic cleansing.” The allegation raised the specter of the majority Hindu Meiteis going on the rampage against the largely Christian Kukis. Yet, the violence was complicated by Kukis, too, settling scores and killing Meiteis. The protracted conflict between the Kuki and Meitei ethnic groups in Manipur also caused mass displacement of over 60,000 individuals with limited prospects for resettlement. The capital city, Imphal, witnessed the forceful expulsion of all Kukis, while Churachandpur and other Kuki-dominated hill districts no longer exhibited any discernible Meitei presence.
The Meiteis, constituting approximately 53 percent of the population, are confined to approximately 10 percent of Manipur’s total land area. The remaining regions, encompassing the hill districts, are predominantly inhabited by tribal communities, particularly the Kukis and Nagas. While the Nagas of Manipur also oppose the Meiteis’ demand for inclusion as a ST, and have expressed a preference for maintaining the status quo in Manipur state, they have chosen to uphold their long-standing friendship with the Meitei community, as demonstrated in the absence of conflict between the two groups amidst ethnic strife. These ethnic tensions underscore deeper divisions between the valley and the hills of the state.
There is turmoil in Shangri-La with experts warning that ethnic violence could spread to other parts of the Northeast unless immediate measures were taken by the central and state governments to stem it. Adding to the complexity, Chief Minister Zoramthanga of Mizoram voiced support for the idea of ‘Greater Mizoram,’ which would include areas inhabited by the ethnic Zo people (Kuki-Zomi) in Manipur.[6] The route to the creation of a Greater Mizoram, he emphasized, would be peaceful and within the constitutional framework, suggesting that any move for inclusion should be in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution, rather than resorting to coercion. The demand for a separate administration by the Kuki-Zomi organizations in Manipur gained momentum following ethnic violence on May 3. Their demand found backing from some Mizo groups, particularly Mizoram’s ruling party, the Mizo National Front, which had previously led an armed separatist movement advocating the creation of Greater Mizoram until a peace accord was signed in 1986.
At the end of July 2023, nearly three months after the first ethnic riots erupted between Meiteis and Kuki-Zo tribes, tensions still ran undiminished. Although there were no fresh displacements of people, relief camps continued to swell as many who had found refuge in homes of relatives and friends had shifted to community-run shelters. In the seething atmosphere, two groups in Manipur began promoting their ideas for a route to peace. One group believed that a return to normalcy was a prerequisite for a dialogue to resolve deeper differences. The other had the priority in reverse: it put the political goal of a separate administration for Kukis as a precondition for peace.
Pradip Phanjoubam, the editor of Imphal Review of Arts and Politics, argued in an article in The Telegraph that even if a separate administration for Kukis was agreed upon for the sake of peace, the idea was “already running into walls because of flawed presumptions.”[7] Its main flaw was that it treated the conflict as a bilateral matter between Kukis and Meiteis, and that the interest of the Nagas, who were the other major ethnic group in Manipur, could not be taken for granted. It was vital to seek prior consensus of all stakeholders in order to ensure lasting peace. The ten Naga legislators in Manipur had officially made clear that no territory the Nagas considered as theirs should be touched in any separate administrative arrangement for Kukis. Phanjoubam argues that since Kukis are spread in all the districts of Manipur because of a tendency of their villages to splinter and proliferate, the Naga stance could be a spoiler. He explains that the Kukis had presumed that Manipur’s endemic divide between the hills and the valley would unite the two major hill tribes, Kukis and Nagas, against Meiteis. But this assumption missed the fact that the valley had been a melting pot of identities through the ages, making Meiteis carry attributes—linguistic and cultural—of all communities from the surrounding hills, including those of Kukis. As a result of the identity-mixing, the inherent bond between Nagas and Meiteis ran deep.
Phanjoubam posits: “In what are probably enactments of the Jungian archetypal memory, Meitei myths of origin point to the Koubru range that they consider being their sacred last station before descending into the valley.”[8] He adds, “Tellingly, at coronation, Meitei kings wore Tangkhul Naga costume. Likewise, the Meitei bridal bed on the wedding night is ritualistically covered with Leirum Phi, a sacred shawl common to Meiteis and Tangkhuls.” Moreover, “Meiteis retained much of their pre-Hindu, nature-worship traditions, and they consider forests, wetlands and peaks as sacred abodes of sylvan deities never to be desecrated. Many Naga tribes also hold these forests and peaks as sacred, although Christianity is now overshadowing these older beliefs.”[9]
Such primal bonds “had kept Nagas and Meiteis from crossing the red line that can shatter their relationship, even in the face of dangerously bitter face-offs and provocations resulting from differing political aspirations,” he explains. Thus, on May 3, both Kukis and Nagas participated in a protest rally against the Meiteis’ demand for inclusion in the Scheduled Tribe list, “but only Kukis crossed this red line at Torbung in Churachandpur district, going on an arson spree against Meitei villages on the basis of a rumor that Meiteis had burnt down a Kuki war memorial. The savagery the state has descended into today is the consequence.”[10]
In this battle, Nagas had distanced themselves from the Kuki cause, “rendering hollow the familiar conflict templates of tribals vs non-tribals, Christians vs Hindus, minority vs majority, readily lapped up by reporters and commentators of the crisis, including the European Parliament in its Manipur resolution,” Phanjoubam argues.[11] In the end, “Kukis and Meiteis must realize that they alone, not the self-righteous voices from outside, can end their mutual tragedy by rediscovering their old ties.”
There are other risks of violence spreading to other parts of the Northeast, risks posed by the influx of both Meiteis and Kukis of Manipur into adjacent states. To escape the violence, the neighboring state of Mizoram witnessed an exodus of Meiteis who were leaving the state following an “advisory” issued by an ex-militants’ association, urging caution for the Meiteis in the wake of the clashes.[12] Over a thousand Meiteis had reportedly arrived in the Barak Valley of southern Assam where the Assam government had established relief camps in Cachar district. In response to the advisory from the “ex-militants’ association,” the All-Assam Manipuri Students’ Union issued a counter-advisory to the Mizos living in Barak Valley districts, asking them to vacate the area for their own safety, citing the escalating anger among the Meiteis of Assam.
The number of Manipuris fleeing to the neighboring state of Mizoram reportedly reached 596 on May 7, 2023, adding greater pressure on this state that was already struggling with refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh.[13] At least 151 people belonging to the Chin-Kuki-Mizo community entered Aizawl district, another 228 came to Kolasib district near the Assam border, and 217 to Saitual district bordering Manipur. Most displaced people were lodged at temporary camps in several villages, while others were accommodated by their local relatives. Mizoram currently provides shelter to about 30,000 refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh. While Myanmar nationals took refuge in Mizoram following the military coup in February 2021, the Kuki-Chin people from Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts had fled their villages in February 2022 due to the ongoing crackdown on an ethnic insurgent outfit by the Bangladesh Army.
The scholar Mukul Kesavan explains the perspectives of both the Meiteis and the Kukis in a historical perspective, arguing that “Meiteis don’t like being pigeonholed as majoritarian bullies” because “they have their own history of insurgency against the Indian State,” and thus “they see themselves as a beleaguered community marginalised by a lopsided policy of affirmative action and the indifference of a remote Central government, indifferent to their needs.”[14] Meiteis, he further argues, “see Kukis as footloose aliens who have no organic connection to the Manipuri homeland,” and “the fact that Kukis were converted to Christianity relatively recently (over roughly the last hundred years) feeds into the Meitei narrative of alien encroachment.”
The long-running insurgency in the remote Indian Northeast has largely evaded global scholarly scrutiny. Western academic research in security and development studies has largely concentrated on conflicts in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, often neglecting the ongoing conflicts in contemporary Asia. The ignorance of the conflict in the Indian Northeast can be attributed to its geographical isolation and remote location, tucked away from the limelight. The Indian Northeast is a culturally diverse region encompassing numerous religious and racial minority communities, including various tribal groups and ethnic and religious minorities such as the Naga Christians in Nagaland and the Meitei-Pangal Muslim community in Manipur.
A notable feature of the Manipur conflict is that it has often lacked the dimension of religion, although religious issues began dividing the communities since the 1990s. The Meitei community is predominantly Hindu, while a portion also follows the indigenous religion of Sanamahi. The Kuki and Naga communities primarily practice Christianity while some significant minorities adhere to animism and ancestor worship.[15] The Meitei Pangals, who are Muslims have lineage with the Meiteis because, during the reign of Maharaja Khagemba (1579-1651), Muslims came to Manipur and settled by marrying Meitei women.[16] The Meiteis comprise around half of the state’s population, while the Naga and Kuki communities account for approximately 39 percent, and the Meitei Pangals constitute about 8 percent.
The Meitei Pangals, represented by the Meitei Pangal ST Demand Committee formed under the All-Manipur Muslim Organization Coordinating Committee in 2013, have been demanding Scheduled Tribe (ST) status, separately from the Meitei majority community.[17] Tribal leaders, however, have expressed dissent toward the demands of both the Meitei Pangals and the Meiteis.[18] It is worth noting that there has been no confrontation between the Meitei Pangals and the tribal communities. Instead, the Meitei Pangals have acted as a buffer between the Meiteis and the Kukis. They have been caught in the ethnic crossfire between the Kuki and Meitei communities.[19]
Historically, there has been no religious/ethnic conflict between the Meitei Pangals and the Kuki/Naga. Incidents such as the 1993 massacre of Meitei Pangals, mob lynchings, Islamophobia, and stereotyping by the majority Meitei community, have contributed to the mistrust and tensions between the two communities. The forced evictions of Pangals in 2018 had further exacerbated the situation, which also affected the Kukis.[20] The government has discounted these allegations, stating that the Meiteis had also been affected. Furthermore, the Meitei Pangals have faced taunts and accusations of sheltering Rohingya Muslim refugees. The conflict between the Meitei Pangals and Meiteis mainly revolves around religious identity.
In the past, ethnic tensions between the hill communities and the Meiteis have flared from the time of the erstwhile kingdom over political and economic issues, but not religion. The friction started escalating with the advent of the Naga national movement in the 1950s and the call for an independent Naga nation. The Naga insurgency was countered by the rise of insurgent groups among the Meiteis and Kuki-Zomi. In the 1990s, as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) group pushed harder for self-determination, the Kuki-Zomi groups began to militarize, and the Kukis launched their movement for ‘Kukiland,’ which was different from the Naga movement. However, the Kuki-Zomi demand was for a state within India, not a separate national homeland. Even though the Kukis were brought from the Kuki-Chin Hills of Burma as protectors of the Meiteis during the time of the British, the Kukiland demand created a rift between the communities.[21]
The conflict between the Kuki and Naga communities is mostly over land encroachment and self-determination. The Meitei-Kuki conflict added a hard religious edge for the first time in May 2023 with the burning of churches and the call for Hindu solidarity, connecting the Meiteis with the North Indian Hindus. Such dynamics of different communities have created numerous challenges and tensions within Manipur. Amid the ethnic violence, the Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the apex body of all Kuki tribes in the northeastern state, repeated its demand for a separate state on July 12, 2023, clarifying that its call for a separate administration meant the creation of a new state under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. In a media statement, the KIM stated that the rationale behind the demand was the “hounding” of “all” the Kukis from the Imphal Valley after “burning down their colonies/settlements and churches.”[22]
Against such background, this article critically examines the current juncture of contemporary Indian politics, focusing on the government’s endeavor to achieve peace and reconciliation in the Northeast region amid ongoing ethnic insurgencies. The unique geographical isolation of the region has bred a sense of alienation compounded by governmental neglect, further festering the issues. Consequently, the region carries the burden of an alienation syndrome, where ordinary people suffer the brunt of the conflict: their concerns regarding economic underdevelopment and hardship remain unaddressed amid social and political instability and government suppression of insurgencies and insurgent retaliation. A distressing ‘state of exception’ has normalized, perpetuating a vicious cycle of violence and counterviolence. To break free from the destructive cycle, it is imperative to challenge its legitimacy. However, reliance solely on traditional legal channels, such as state institutions, courts, and human rights commissions, may prove inadequate in addressing the multifaceted nature of the conflict.
This article, therefore, delves into the historical context of Manipur’s integration with the Indian Union and the subsequent political activity. By comprehending the current situation’s intricacies, it aims to identify potential solutions that can help bring about peace and reconciliation in the region. In unveiling the unseen complexities of Manipur’s conflict landscape, this research endeavors to shed light on the profound ramifications of ongoing ethnic insurgencies, and to explore novel pathways towards peace-building in the Indian Northeast. By doing so, it hopes to contribute to a broader understanding of the region’s challenges, and to facilitate the formulation of practical strategies to address the deep-rooted grievances and aspirations of the state’s diverse communities.
This qualitative and descriptive study puts forward arguments and analyses that use phenomenological hermeneutic analysis based on reports, firsthand accounts, and secondary sources. The article adopts a bottom-up approach, prioritizing the perspectives of ordinary Manipuri individuals. It deviates from the conventional top-down approach that tends to focus on the viewpoints of political elites and decisionmakers. The paper examines the situation in Northeastern India, taking the state of Manipur as a case study. Manipur, encompassing an area of 22,327 square kilometres and a population of 2.8 million, is situated on the Indo-Burma border in eastern India, with Nagaland to the north, Mizoram to the south, and Assam to its west.[23] The state shares an international border with Burma to the east, an area marked by rebel organizations that wield considerable sway over the region’s politics and daily life.
This paper asserts that conflict in the region is undeniably intricate and multifaceted. It identifies several facets of the conflict, such as poverty and unemployment, inadequate governance, administrative shortcomings, criminal activities, political instability caused by strikes, extortion by insurgent groups, corruption, the presence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, and active secessionist forces. While these issues have afflicted the Northeast for over seven decades, the current state of development in the region is marred by dysfunction, narrow conception, and a glaring mismatch with the requirements of the majority of the local population. Consequently, it becomes pertinent to inquire into the underlying factors that inform the region’s developmental priorities and that continue to perpetuate them despite their apparent shortcomings.
This predicament begs a slate of questions: (1) How did a lack of consensus in the decision to merge Manipur with India shape the ongoing resentment? The lack of consensus was evident even before Manipur joined India in 1949. There were groups operating around 1946 that wanted an independent Manipur. (2) How did the people’s grievances lead to the struggle between security and progress that affects today’s developmental agenda? The conflict in the state has created a security dilemma that deleteriously impacts the developmental discourse. (3) How do national security interests impede the redefinition of development priorities? (4) Where did the failure in addressing the aspirations and grievances of ethnic groups in the Indian Northeast lead to? (5) How have the feelings of alienation and marginalization in the Northeast contributed to the insurgency in the region? (6) How do infrastructural injustice, insurgency, and social exclusion intersect in hindering development in the Northeast? In the context of this article, infrastructural justice means equal access to all infrastructure facilities, irrespective of caste, tribe, creed, region, religion, and gender. Injustice occurs when certain dominant groups appropriate infrastructure and deny access to other groups. Infrastructural injustice can only be addressed by ensuring fair and just distribution of materiel among the varied categories in India and in the Northeast, in particular. There is also a clear disparity in physical infrastructure between the Northeast and other parts of India. (7) What factors determine the development priorities in the region, and what perpetuates their inefficacy?
These critical questions form the crux of this article, which explores development politics, unravelling how the developmental agenda in Manipur is contested and negotiated in light of the prevailing political scenario. The article examines the relationship between the Indian government’s development policies and the dynamics of Manipur. It argues that national security concerns play a central role in shaping development efforts in the state, with significant impact on infrastructure, industry, and people’s lives. This approach is evident at all levels of governance, including the local. It is influenced by the politics of state formation and ethnic identity, leading to the marginalization of most of the region’s population. The dominance of ethnonationalism in civil society further limits the formulation of the development agenda, perpetuating a confined development space characterized by patronage politics and the militarization of society. An alternative development agenda faces constraints both from national security concerns and the persistence of ethnic nationalism as manifested through insurgency. The article highlights how the power dynamics involving the state, the military, local institutions, ethnonationalism, and the perception of the region and its inhabitants in other parts of India contribute to the population’s marginalization and the limiting of the development space.
The present article begins by studying Manipur’s struggle with the process of its integration into the Indian Union in 1947-49. It highlights the lack of political uniformity in India’s history, and the challenges of integrating diverse populations and different groups within the state: those supporting and opposing Manipur’s merger with India. This observation aligns with the complex reality of India, which is home to a diverse array of cultures, languages, and religions. The insurgents present the coercion and lack of consultation involved in Manipur’s merger with India, as well as the prevalent socio-economic dissatisfaction, as sources of ongoing resentment and opposition, which often takes the form of insurgency.
The subsequent section elaborates on the complex insurgency in the Indian Northeast, highlighting its dynamic and multifaceted nature. It identifies factors such as secessionist nationalism, ethnic conflict, civil war, political instability, and uneven socioeconomic development as contributors to the insurgency. It discusses the failure to address the aspirations and grievances of ethnic groups, and sheds light on insurgent groups that espouse different ideologies, as well as the internal conflicts, factionalism, ethnic clashes between communities, and the influence of neighboring countries.
The third segment of the article directs attention towards the issues surrounding infrastructural justice, insurgency, and social exclusion in the context of the Indian Northeast. It argues that fairness in distributing infrastructure is essential to prevent injustice, and emphasizes the need for equal benefits regardless of social or geographical factors. Despite India’s economic growth, the Northeastern population continues to face poverty, and the region is often overlooked or remains unknown to many Indians. It draws attention to the role of the insurgency in hindering development and infrastructure, as well as corruption and social exclusion, and the potential for policy interventions to address these issues. It argues that insurgency in the region stems from feelings of alienation and marginalization, both socially and economically, and that the developmental space is limited by the struggle between security and progress. The final section encapsulates suggestions towards advancing peace, and offers final thoughts and reflections, providing a cogent synthesis of the arguments advanced throughout the article.
Throughout the longue durée of its ancient history, India did not attain complete political uniformity as a geopolitical entity. Even during the golden ages of the Gupta and Mughal empires, political unification remained an elusive dream. Nevertheless, a vague sense of shared destiny and a common identity emerged over the centuries, although it remained somewhat loose and imprecise. An amorphous spiritual identity did not translate into a concrete political unity. Instead, ancient and medieval India’s political landscape was marked by a changing array of states and principalities, invasions and alliances, leading some to argue that it was merely a geographical construct devoid of political cohesion.[24] However, under British colonial rule, political consolidation was achieved. It also led to two opposing forces on the eve of the colonial withdrawal: a pan-Indian nationalism movement that sought to establish a united, independent India, and separatist movements that aimed for independent statehood.[25]
Many scholars have envisioned the concept of political integration. Myron Weiner describes it as merging distinct political entities into a shared geographical framework with a governing body endowed with authority.[26] In contrast, Ernst Haas sees it as a process in which political actors in separate national contexts are persuaded to shift their allegiances, aspirations, and political behaviors towards a new center whose institutions exercise or demand control over pre-existing nation states.[27] For his part, Karl Deutsch regards political integration as both a process and a condition. According to him, political integration entails establishing a sense of community, reinforced by formal or informal institutions, as well as practices that are robust and pervasive enough to ensure peaceful transformation among group members. The foremost and most daunting challenge that newly independent nations faced was integrating populations informally governed to varying degrees by colonial powers.[28] Integrating people from diverse regions with differing languages, faiths, customs, and ethnicities is arduous in large multinational nation-states. As Leonard Binder notes in his analysis of political development issues in emerging nation-states, the primary obstacle confronting these countries was creating a unified nation out of a collection of tribes or isolated communities.[29]
In light of the above discourses, the history of Manipur is crucial to understanding the current political climate in the region. It illuminates the persisting skepticism of the insurgents towards the central government’s motives, and the ongoing resentment that the population harbors on account of being coerced into joining the union. Regrettably, the violent aspect of this issue is seen in the growth of insurgent groups pursuing greater political autonomy or complete separation from India.[30]
Once a princely state, Manipur opposed the prospect of joining the Indian Union. Before India’s independence, groups in Manipur conducted vigorous campaigns to restore the state’s former prestige. Hijam Irabot, a prominent communist leader from Manipur, played a significant role in mobilizing people towards this end. Irabot was also associated with the Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha devoted to developing political consciousness among common people of Manipur.[31] In 1946, Irabot and Longjam Bimol established the Praja Sangh political party to achieve an independent Manipur. Their goal entailed the creation of a parliament, constitution, and a cabinet—replacing the monarchy—in which the people’s representatives would govern the state based on socialist principles. These ideals faced opposition from individuals who went on to form the Manipur Congress, a political party that had no affiliation with the Indian National Congress.[32] In 1947, a constitution-making committee, chaired by F.F. Pearson, President of the Manipur State Durbar, drafted the Manipur Constitution.
Following India’s independence from British rule in 1947, India’s first Home Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, initiated the integration of more than six hundred princely kingdoms into the newly formed Indian Union. The process of assimilating these incongruent states was lengthy. After India gained its independence, Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assam at the time, visited Manipur to evaluate the political situation and examine the possibility of Manipur becoming a part of India. Hydari’s visit provided the central government insights into the views of both the Maharaja and the people of Manipur, which helped the Indian government in its decision-making process.
Before 1947, Manipur existed as a princely state, but with the end of British rule in the same year, Manipur regained its pre-1891 autonomy.[33] Under the constitution, Maharaja Bodh Chandra served as a constitutional monarch. In June and July of 1948, the first-ever election was conducted in Manipur under the terms of the Manipur Constitution Act of 1947, which granted adult franchise, and an elected Assembly was installed in September. Apart from the Congress party, other parties formed a coalition government. Contrary to the constitution, however, the Manipur Congress campaigned for the state to merge with India. Irabot and the Maharaja of Manipur, Bodh Chandra, fiercely opposed the Manipur Congress’ standpoint. Irabot also vehemently stood against the idea proposed by Sardar Patel to establish the state of Purbanchal, which would include Manipur, Cachar, the Lushai Hills (now Mizoram), and Tripura.[34]
On December 17, 1948, Dhabalo Singh, the president of Manipur’s ruling party, submitted a memorandum to the Maharaja, expressing the party’s desire for Manipur to retain its independence, with the Maharaja as the constitutional head and the state’s sovereignty unharmed. Furthermore, the general secretary of the ruling party, N. Ibomcha Singh, revealed in another memorandum, that most of the state’s populace was against any form of integration or merger. In the face of the tumultuous global scenario at the time, particularly the communist uprising in Burma, the Manipur Congress party, established by the people of Manipur as an independent entity from the Indian National Congress, advocated for the integration and merger of native states, particularly Manipur, in order to unify India.[35] Consequently, differing arguments arose, both to support and oppose the integration of Manipur into the Indian Union.
In September 1949, Maharaja Bodh Chandra Singh was invited by Akbar Hydari to Shillong for discussions on integration. On the first day of the conference, Hydari presented the Maharaja with a prewritten ‘Merger Agreement,’ which stipulated the integration of Manipur into the Indian Union. The Maharaja insisted that the deal could not be signed without consulting the Council of Ministers. Despite his offer of consultations, the Maharaja was placed under house arrest and barred from communicating with anyone outside. Consequently, on September 21, 1949, the Maharaja was coerced into signing the ‘Merger Agreement’ with India. The newly formed Indian government in New Delhi dismissed the legally elected Manipur government, and pressured Maharaja Bodh Chandra to sign a merger agreement on that day. The Assembly was dissolved, and Manipur was reduced to a ‘Part-C state,’ and designated as a Chief Commissioner’s Province on October 15, 1949.[36] At this time Manipur’s Kuki leaders, rejected the Manipur Merger Agreement, believing it compromised the geographical integrity of the Kukis.[37]
The Manipur Merger Agreement of September 21, 1949. E-Pao,
https://shorturl.at/gjNV1
An Advisory Council was formed in 1950 to make recommendations on the state’s management, and Manipur was designated as a Union Territory on November 1, 1955. It was replaced by a Territorial Council of thirty elected and two nominated members in 1957. Despite lacking functional power, the Government of Union Territories Act of 1963 created a Legislative Assembly of thirty elected and three nominated members. The top executive was appointed at the rank of Lieutenant Governor on December 19, 1969. Following lengthy protests in Manipur and elsewhere in India, Manipur was granted full statehood on January 21, 1972, and the same year witnessed the first state elections held under Indian sovereignty.
How Manipur was absorbed into India left a bitter aftertaste, with several rebel organizations viewing the merger as illegal and unconstitutional, and many Manipuri intellectuals expressing dissatisfaction with its implementation.[38] Formal political unification of kingdoms—and Manipur was one such entity—required overcoming local and residual loyalties, which the transitional government’s approach failed to accomplish.
When Manipur gained full statehood just over 50 years ago, on January 21, 1972, many people believed that the honor of statehood was belatedly and grudgingly bestowed as a very modest gift. Manipur had been an independent kingdom in its historical conception since the first century CE. When India gained independence, the Manipuri people possessed stories and memories that were broad and deep. Based on these memories, the Meitei insurgents see Manipur as an independent state with its present territory intact, and with the inclusion of the Kabaw Valley which was earlier a part of Manipur. In reality, Manipur ceased to be an independent kingdom in 1891 when Britain took it over after its victory in the Anglo-Manipur War. The assassination of British officials led to the Battle of Khongjom, officially commemorated by the state on April 23. Another tragedy related to the conflict, celebrated annually as Patriots’ Day, is the public hanging in Imphal of two prominent combatants, Thangal General and Tikendrajit Yuvaraj on August 13, 1891.
The loss of the state to Britain was acknowledged as part of British India’s expansion to defend its eastern borders, which inevitably resulted in the loss of Manipur’s independence. As Britain did not annex the Kingdom, as it did with Assam in 1826 after conquering Burma, it further propagated the illusion that Manipur remained an independent monarchy under British protection. Manipur became another indigenous state with administrative and political sovereignty vested in the Maharaja, but restricted to the Valley, and Britain overseeing the outer Hill districts populated by tribal people. The presence of a British resident in Imphal emphasized the ‘independent’ kingdom’s subordinate position even more.[39] It was, more or less, a princely state under British rule until the merger with India. The creation of a separate administration for governmental convenience by the British deepened the divide between the hills and the valley, which is more or less a source of conflict in recent times. Manipur has had a chequered political history that calls for deeper exploration to gain insights into modern state development.
The ongoing insurgency in the Indian Northeast is complex. Defying easy categorization and labeling due to its dynamic and ever-changing nature, the entirety of the insurgency in the Indian Northeast is not explainable with a single theory. As it is constantly in flux, it is challenging to assign a single definitive label. A multidimensional and fluid conflict has evolved, with its color and identity undergoing significant transformations. The insurgency encompasses secessionist nationalism, ethnic conflict, and civil war, all coexisting and contributing to its intricate nature.[40]
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of the Government of India, thirty-five insurgent groups exist in Manipur. These underground outfits have waged war either for a sovereign Manipur state or to form smaller independent states by dividing the present Manipur. Yambem Laba, a reporter for The Statesman newspaper from Manipur, remarks, “Insurgency is the fastest growing industry in Manipur, and insurgent organisations develop the case for which firms are formed elsewhere in the country.”[41] A total of twenty-three underground outfits under two conglomerates (the United Peoples’ Front [UPF]-8, and the Kuki National Organisation [KNO]-15), are currently under a “Suspension of Operations” (SoO) with the Government of India since August 2008. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs reports, the Government of India has entered into standstill agreements with twenty-three insurgent outfits for peace talks. The central government reports show a containment and reduction of insurgent activity.
Yet, as a result of the violence in Manipur, successive Indian governments have resorted to strong measures to maintain order, including declaring the entire state a ‘Disturbed Area,’ and authorizing the implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The AFSPA is designed to grant special powers to the Armed Forces in counterinsurgency and terrorist operations when other forces fail to control the situation. The law allows the armed forces to conduct proactive operations against insurgents in hostile environments. While the AFSPA is applicable only in the Disturbed Areas, the authority to declare an area as such rests with the central and state governments.
There is an overall decline in violence across the Northeast, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs data. The Northeast witnessed an 80 percent decline in insurgency-related incidents since 2014, with about 6,000 insurgents from different groups surrendering in these years.[42] The years 2019 and 2020 saw a two-decade low in the number of insurgency-related incidents, and casualties of civilians and security forces. The downtrend represents a golden opportunity for the central and state governments to rebuild confidence among the people.
The data shows a remarkable trend of incidents of violent extremism in Manipur falling from a peak of 740 incidents in 2008, down to 97 incidents in 2020, and 112 incidents in 2021.[43] The killing of extremists in Manipur declined from a high of 364 deaths of insurgents in 2008, down to 7 deaths in 2020, and 18 in 2021. The killing of civilians in Manipur also fell from 28 deaths in 2013 to 9 deaths in 2021. The states of Assam and Nagaland, similarly, exhibited a gradual return to peace as incidents involving insurgents are falling across the entire region.
Insurgency-related incidents in Manipur fell by almost 50 percent from 907 incidents in 2014-2017 to 462 incidents in 2018-2021, according to MHA data. The number of insurgents killed declined by almost 54 percent (from 95 deaths to 44), in the same comparative four-year period. The number of civilians killed also fell by almost 63 percent (from 65 deaths to 24), over the same period.
Insurgency related violence also declined across the Northeast Region, according to the MHA. Incidents involving insurgents fell by 95 percent (from 2,190 in 2014-2017 to 107 incidents in 2018-2021). The number of insurgents killed dropped by 77 percent (from 474 deaths to 107), in the same comparative four-year period. The number of civilians killed declined by almost 80 percent (from 343 deaths to 69), over the same period.[44]
There have been allegations that the military has misused the AFSPA, and that there have been acts of violence and abuses against suspected militants and ordinary people. The Indian Army refutes such claims, explaining that it investigates all incidents, that such cases are minimal and the violators are punished.[45] A section on the AFSPA in the Indian Army’s website explains that the Human Rights (HR) record of the Indian Army over the past two decades indicates that the provisions of the AFSPA have not been misused. Of the 1,618 HR cases/complaints received, 1,533 were investigated, with 85 allegations still under investigation. Only 55 cases (3.6 percent) were found to be true, while 1,478 cases (96.4 percent) were found to be false. As a result of these investigations, 129 individuals were punished, and compensation was awarded in 35 cases.[46] The Army states that the statistics demonstrate its commitment to addressing HR violations, to take appropriate action against perpetrators, and to provide compensation where necessary.
The AFSPA was passed by the Indian Parliament in 1958 with the understanding that it would last no longer than a year, yet it remained in effect in 2023. Although the Act grants immunity to the armed forces, there is a provision for the prosecution of armed forces personnel accused of offences. Public outrage following the Oting massacre of 2021 in Nagaland led to the formation of a committee to study the withdrawal of the AFSPA, but its report has been delayed.[47] This is not the only case. Similar challenges and resistance to accountability exist in other states in the Northeast region of India, such as in Assam and Manipur, where the extension of the AFSPA has faced criticism. Political parties in these states have expressed support for the withdrawal of the AFSPA, but the power to impose the law lies with the union government.[48] The violence of the insurgencies and the government’s counterviolence has normalized a vicious cycle of the use of force. In the end, the sufferers are the ordinary people.
There was no insurgency when Manipur merged with India: its nonviability as an independent state necessitated integration, and Manipur’s compliance with the merger signaled that it was ready to join India. The merger did not lead to a revolution which developed at a later stage. The insurgency arose in the late 1960s and 1970s when opposition to the merger resulted in a snowballing conflict. The insurgency in Manipur is fueled by other reasons as well, principally the disparity between people’s expectations and their attainment. The writer V.K. Sarin observes that political integration alone is not enough; the government’s actions should facilitate economic development in order to solidify it.[49] The Manipur example clearly shows the failure of the government in socioeconomic development. The dissatisfied groups have fought to preserve their sovereignty if their expectations were unmet.[50] Specific human needs are economic development, the provision of amenities, improved quality of life, and demonstrable people’s involvement in governance.
The integration’s fragility was apparent even before the Government of India could establish itself after independence. Numerous groups made separatist demands of the Indian Union in 1948-51, which continued thereafter. The integration of the princely kingdoms of Manipur and Tripura was not smooth. The Government of India’s unwillingness to adequately meet the political aspirations of different ethnic groups in the Northeast led to separatist movements. The government’s belated acknowledgement that the integrationist plan was flawed prompted it to accept the ethnic groups’ autonomy demand leading to creation of new states. Nagaland was created in 1963, Meghalaya in 1972, and Mizoram in 1987. But the Nagas still aspired for Greater Nagalim. The establishment of new states resulted in cascading demands from other minor ethnic groups seeking varying degrees of autonomy. Since the late 1950s, the Kukis of Manipur have sought their state.[51] The bitter taste of integration, combined with socioeconomic dissatisfaction, and the different aspirations of various communities that remained unfulfilled, were the prime factors in instigating the insurgency.
The scholar I.L. Singh remarks that aggressive youth might be discouraged from joining the insurgency by offering them the possibility of finding jobs, and this process had already started by involving young people in sporting and outreach programs. The state’s unemployment crisis is tied to its broken educational system. Examination halls are centers of malpractice such as mass copying.[52] Corruption in the state threatens the survival of society: a notable instance is the Rice Scam of 2012-13, where approximately 5,448 metric tonnes of rice worth around Rupees 3.07 crore, intended for distribution among various Anganwadi centers, was illegally diverted from the Food Corporation of India warehouse.[53] Other alleged irregularities involve the Loktak Lake, and the construction of the Mapithel Dam.[54] The former Chief Minister of Manipur, O. Ibobi Singh, who served prior to the current Chief Minister, N. Biren Singh, is being investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation in connection with a scam involving Rupees 332 crore.[55]
Moreover, the writer Surjeet Singh notes that the insurgency stems from the region’s poverty, illiteracy, and from feelings of alienation from the mishandling of sociopolitical, economic, and ethnic issues.[56] The number of persons living below the poverty line in the rural areas is 745,000 (38.8 percent), and 278,000 (32.59 percent) in urban Manipur, according to the “Economic Survey” of Manipur.[57] And, male literacy rate rose impressively from 45.12 percent in 1961 to 83.58 percent in 2011, and that of females from 15.93 percent to 70.26 percent in the same period.[58] The gender gap of Manipur in the literacy rate is clearly narrowing. Further, the literacy rate of Manipur is not only better than the Indian average of 80.89 percent for males and 64.65 percent for females, it is also the third-best among the Northeastern states.
The insurgency has undergone various phases: initially garnering support from impoverished farmers and laborers who found solace in the insurgents’ advocacy for people experiencing poverty. Over time, Manipur achieved political stability, rendering the insurgents with little purpose or cause to fight for. At present, things are different from when the movement began. In the protracted and drawn-out revolution, the image of fighting for the cause of local people erodes because not only does the number of insurgents increase quickly, the insurgents with differing ideologies and purposes battle among themselves.[59]
As the ordinary people did not reap tangible benefits, the insurgents altered their strategies and objectives. They began extorting money and forcibly confiscating wealth from individuals and families, exemplified by seizing vehicles through coercion. A range of illicit activities take place, such as extortion, tax collection, forced donations, kidnappings, and ransom demands. The levying of toll tax serves as a significant means of revenue, compelling almost every vehicle traveling through major routes to pay at multiple checkpoints when transitioning between the areas of influence of the different groups.[60]
In response, the public turned against them, prompting the government to take proactive measures such as strengthening the Manipur police force and deploying the army in the late 1990s until approximately 2001/2002. From that point onwards, the insurgents distanced themselves from the local population and relocated away from urban centres. They shifted their focus to recruiting new members, leading to the emergence of a factionalized insurgency characterized by internal strife and conflicts between insurgent groups. Indeed, the rebels cannot be viewed as mere disruptions because they command a certain level of public support directly or indirectly, as they acquire food, housing, and other aid within their communities, and gain inspiration from the region’s autonomy struggle.[61]
The insurgency remains active, exacerbated by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, contributing to regional instability. Regular strikes and protest movements against this Act, coupled with insurgents imposing taxes and exorbitant demands on travelers and goods, have severely hampered transportation in the Indian Northeast. The insurgents symbolize a violent stream of an ethnic separatist movement rooted in socioeconomic-political grievances, as well as dissatisfaction with the policies of the state.
Manipur has delivered uneven and unpredictable economic growth, but to its credit it has still expanded its economy despite the insurgencies and internal strife. According to estimates prepared by the Manipur state, at current prices Manipur’s gross state domestic product, or GSDP, grew 21.1 percent in 2017-18, and plunged sharply to 6.2 percent in 2018-19.[62] In 2019-20, GSDP registered an increase of 14.79 percent, at current prices, according to the Manipur government’s “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-2021.”[63] At constant (2011-12) prices, GSDP in 2019-20 is estimated to have increased by 7.47 percent. The exponential growth rates are 11.34 percent and 5.92 percent from 2011-12 to 2019-20, at current and constant prices, respectively. Manipur’s GSDP again fell to 4.9 percent in 2020-21,[64] and rose by 8.3 percent in 2021-22. The state government forecasts Manipur’s economy will grow at a steady 12 percent each year in 2022-2025.[65]
According to central government data (at constant 2011-2012 prices), Manipur ranked 24th among 33 Indian states and union territories, with its economy growing more than 7 percent in 2019-2020.[66] The Northeastern state of Mizoram had the highest GSDP growth rate, of 14.07 percent, among all the Indian states in 2019-2020 (at constant 2011-12 prices), followed by Bihar (10.47 percent).[67] A year earlier, two Northeastern states registered the highest—above 10 percent—economic growth rates—Tripura growing at 11.69 percent in 2018-2019, and Mizoram at 11.63 percent. Mizoram was not a flash in the pan. During the period 2012-19, Mizoram had the highest average growth rate of 12.56 percent, followed by Tripura (9.94 percent), and Gujarat (9.83 percent).[68] Among the five slowest growing Indian states were two Northeastern states, Meghalaya (3.17 percent), and Nagaland (5.46%).
The excellent performance of both Mizoram and Tripura, as well as the relatively good show put up by Manipur despite internal turmoil, demonstrates the great potential to build upon these performances. There is, indeed, an opportunity for the central and state governments to put in place growth-friendly policies.
It is worth looking at the Naga insurgency that originated in Nagaland, a neighboring state, and spilt over Manipur’s hill districts. The NSCN-IM has been instrumental in controlling most of the region while advocating for ‘Nagalim’ (Greater Nagaland). However, the Meiteis perceive their demand as threatening Manipur’s territorial integrity. Although the hills comprise the bulk of Manipur’s landmass, the hill population’s density is low, with most of the state’s populace concentrated in the valley. The Meitei community primarily inhabits the Imphal Valley, whereas the surrounding hill districts are home to the Nagas and Kukis. The ethnic clashes that broke out in the early 1990s between the Nagas and Kukis gave rise to multiple Kuki insurgent factions. The ongoing fighting between the Meiteis and Kukis of Manipur is another set of the intra-conflict, but it is an inter-conflict in terms of ethnicity.
The Kukis have long been advocating for self-determination, primarily driven by their opposition to the Village Authorities Act of 1956, which they viewed as undermining the authority of their traditional unelected village chieftains. Their strained relations with the Meiteis and Nagas, stemming from perceived neglect and territorial disputes, further fueled their desire for a separate state. The demand gained momentum in the 1990s following clashes with the Nagas, leading to the emergence of multiple armed Kuki groups. Recent actions by the Manipur government have heightened tensions and exacerbated the Kuki community’s sense of discrimination and insecurity, such as the temporary suspension of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) that had been activated by India and Myanmar in January 2018 to allow movement of villagers living along their 1,643 km-long border.[69] The suspension was extended in November 2022 because it was believed that the FMR may lead to further increase in the illegal entry of Myanmar nationals into India in view of the political turmoil in Myanmar. The FMR allows tribes living along the border to travel 16 km across either side of the border without visa restrictions. There are over 250 villages with more than 300,000 people living within 10 km of the border who frequently cross the border through 150 small and large formal and informal border crossings. Moreover, the Kukis feel discriminated against due to the eviction drives. The Kukis perceive these actions as targeting their community, particularly the Chin-Kuki tribe, although the government claims that the measures had affected various communities, including the Meiteis. Conversely, the tribal communities oppose the Meitei community’s demand for Scheduled Tribe status due to concerns among tribal groups that it would dilute their benefits, and strain limited resources. There is a slew of concerns that land and identity disputes may arise due to customary rights held by tribes, that the dominant Meitei culture could overshadow tribal identities, and that political dynamics could shift, reducing tribal representation and influence in legislative and governance structures.
This study sheds light on the multilayered nature of these clashes by delving into the intricate dynamics of ethnic conflict, particularly within the Indian Northeast. It underscores the necessity for comprehensive approaches that address the underlying causes and foster sustainable peace. Ethnic conflict can be defined as a dispute encompassing critical social, political, economic, cultural, and territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities. A fundamental prerequisite for the emergence of ethnic conflict is the close geographical proximity of two or more ethnic groups.
This condition applies to the Naga insurgent groups that assert irredentist claims on the neighboring Manipuri territory, and espouse the political ideology of Nagalim or Greater Nagaland, intending to unite within a single administration unit Nagas residing in various parts of India (e.g., Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh) and across the international border in Myanmar. The Nagas’ irredentist claims on Manipur have paved the way for further conflict, and a visit to northern Manipur, mainly to Ukhrul, gives one the impression of being in Nagaland rather than Manipur due to the significant Naga settlements. The Naga community has effectively settled in parts of northern Manipur and has a strong presence in Ukhrul despite being an integral part of Manipur. It has led to “identity wrangling” between the Nagas and the Manipuris. With many people from the hills of Manipur participating in the struggle for Naga independence, the concept of a Naga nation inevitably clashes with the notion of Manipuri identity.[70] Such ethnic contestation is a common feature of the conflict landscape of the Northeast.
Analysts argue that long-running conflicts centering on the rights and demands of ethnic and religious groups have inflicted just as much suffering, devastation, and loss of life as any other form of local, regional, or international conflict since 1945.[71] Ethnic conflicts often stem from deep-rooted animosities between warring groups, and this argument finds relevance in the context of the Indian Northeast where various tribal factions are fighting. The Naga community, as discussed above, has been at odds with their neighboring Manipuri counterparts because of their efforts to unite all the Naga people, including those residing in Manipur, under a single administrative entity. The Nagas’ irredentist claims on Manipuri territory have contributed to the outbreak of violence, creating instability and providing a breeding ground for organized crime, cross-border terrorism, and potential conflicts within the country and in the broader region.
This reasoning also applies to the wider Indian Northeast because insurgent groups from the Naga and Manipuri communities have frequently received arms, weapons, and ammunition from neighboring countries such as China and Myanmar, with whom they share a sense of cultural and ethnic affinity. Consequently, this has facilitated cross-border terrorism, interaction, and the illicit arms trade. The combination of colliding ideologies and grievances, compounded by ineffective leadership, vested interests, and spillover effects of conflicts in neighboring nations, contributes to ethnic conflicts worldwide. The conflicts are exacerbated by the significant roles played by discrimination, social exclusion, deliberate neglect of economic and social development, and the ability of leaders of marginalized communities to exploit resultant grievances by invoking ethnic distinctiveness.[72] These factors explain the situation in the Indian Northeast to a considerable extent.
John Rawls notes that “justice is the first virtue of social institution” wherein he conceptualizes “justice as fairness.”[73] Applying Rawls’s idea of justice in infrastructural accessibility and distribution, the physical infrastructure in the Northeast and other parts of India should be fair and equitable.[74] If a certain region takes all the resources and essential amenities, including basic infrastructure, for itself, then this would lead to injustice. As Rawls’s idea of justice as fairness serves as the foundation of the argument, the basic structure becomes unfair when the benefits of physical infrastructure are unequally distributed. It goes without saying that the benefits of infrastructure should be fair and just for all communities, irrespective of their social location and geographical terrain within a nation-state framework. In the past, the Northeast region lacked adequate physical infrastructure even several decades after Indian independence. As the region was historically plagued by inadequate road and rail infrastructure, travelers relied primarily on the airlines to bypass encounters with insurgents.
The delivery of infrastructure justice has significantly improved as important new strides have been made to build roads and bridges crisscrossing the Northeast, as well as better air links. There are 15 ongoing projects for air connectivity in the Northeastern region at a cost of nearly Rs 2,200 crore. Over the past decade, five north-eastern state capitals were connected with flights for the first time in 75 years with an increase in flight movements from 852 a week in 2014 to 1,817 a week in 2022, registering an increase of about 113 per cent.[75] Moreover, seven new airports were built in the region in the last nine years in addition to the existing nine airports.
In the Northeast, till 2018, over 3,000 km of roads were built with investments worth Rs. 29,000 crore. For developing highways, Assam was allocated Rs. 48,221 crore, Mizoram (Rs. 12,000 crore), Manipur (Rs. 22,000 crore), Arunachal Pradesh (Rs. 10,000 crore), Nagaland (Rs. 20,000 crore), Tripura (Rs. 8,000 crore), Sikkim (Rs. 17,000 crore), and Meghalaya (Rs. 8,000 crore).[76] The data shows that Manipur received its fair share of central funds, indicating the seriousness of the government to push forward with its Act East policy which still faces several constraints. In 2021, India called for the speeding up of regional connectivity projects with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), including the trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand, and the Kaladan transit transport project. The highway will connect Manipur to Thailand via road.[77]
As many as 20 rail projects for 2,011 kilometres, worth Rs 74,000 crore, are spread across the Northeast region. In January 2022, Manipur was connected by freight train for the first time in 75 years, as Indian Railways has broadened its network in the region to boost business, tourism, and connectivity for travelers.[78] Nagaland got its second railway station after a gap of more than 100 years with the commissioning of new terminal at Shokhuvi. The extension of the Donyi Polo Express up to Shokhuvi, connecting Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh via Guwahati, is expected to reduce dependence on road transportation to reach the remote state of Nagaland.
Between 2014-19, the National Highways Authority of India and the Border Roads Organisation built a total of 2,731 km of highways across eight Northeastern states.[79] Assam got the largest share of the pie with 1,011 km of the 2,731 km road stretches. As of 2019, the state with the second-highest construction activity was Arunachal Pradesh where 815 km of roads were laid.
The Eastern Waterways Connectivity Transport Grid project, currently underway, is projected to connect not only the Northeast and rest of the country, but also the sub-continent. When completed, it will offer nearly 5,000 kilometres of waterways for vessels traveling to and from the region.[80] A World Bank-funded Meghalaya Integrated Transport Project, initiated in 2020 to improve and modernize the transport sector, would help Meghalaya to harness its potential for high-value agriculture and tourism. The initiative consists of 13 projects worth Rs 547 crore, and includes the construction of three major bridges. The government is developing the National Waterway-1 (NW-1) on the Ganges, NW-2 on the Brahmaputra, and NW-16 on the Barak River, as well as a multimodal hub on the Brahmaputra in Guwahati, which includes a ship repairing port at Pandu, four tourist jetties as well as 11 floating terminals.[81]
It must be admitted, though, that the actual construction has been slow. Reports suggest that out of the 187 development projects sanctioned under the Ministry of Development of Northeast Region, only 45 were completed in the last eight years.[82] There are lingering perceptions among the people of the Northeast that the region is among the country’s most impoverished and underdeveloped. Amalendu Misra contends that grievance and relative deprivation are significant catalysts for civil wars.[83] Civil wars epitomize, and are the result of, the collective grievances of a population caused by economic inequality, political repression, and intense competition over scarce resources. These wars often take the shape of armed confrontations between the military forces and armed insurgents, and the active involvement of the central government, and resistance by both sides. The characteristic features of civil wars can be identified within the conflicts prevalent in the Indian Northeast. Similarly, Bethany Lacina posits that civil wars can occur in fragile states where insurgents easily obtain aid, enabling their rebellious activities.[84] This assertion is particularly applicable to the dissatisfied factions in Northeastern India.
The state continues to grapple with economic difficulties, marked by high levels of poverty and unemployment. As the influence of insurgents has waned in recent times, specific provisions of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act require revision, such as the power to make arbitrary arrests/or use force, and the immunity of the armed forces. Establishing better communication channels and fostering mutual understanding between the local population and the Indian Army is crucial. In early 2000, widespread outrage was sparked over a tragic incident in Malom, where the army killed ten innocent individuals without any subsequent accountability. Activist Irom Sharmila initiated a hunger strike in protest, igniting a year-long period of chaos marked by demonstrations, strikes, and disruptions, causing a loss of an entire academic year for students.[85]
Reports circulate regarding the neighboring countries of Myanmar and China directly supplying weapons to insurgents to combat the Indian Army, particularly in areas such as Sagitampak. For instance, according to press reports, in June 2023 four individuals, including an India Reserve Battalion personnel, were apprehended by a security team during a search operation in Imphal East district, in relation to arms smuggling.[86] They had smuggled a large cache of weapons through Myanmar that was believed to have been bought in the black market along the China-Myanmar border. Local Manipuri people frequently cross the Indo-Myanmar border by paying bribes to border security officials.[87]
It is a demonstrable fact that insurgency poses significant problems for internal development. Manipur is primarily a ruralized area characterized by hilly terrain that is sparsely inhabited and inaccessible. Building rural infrastructure, including roads and communication lines, electricity grids, and irrigation systems, is incredibly difficult. Creating and administering schools, hospitals, and agricultural institutes in such a scenario is similarly challenging. In other words, rural-urban economic contact in Manipur’s hilly and inland districts must surmount many difficulties. The insurgency has manufactured such a situation that government and NGO development workers are deterred from traveling to hilly and rural areas, as they face frequent extortion and death threats.
Despite the enormous challenges, industrial production in Manipur grew at an impressive rate of more than 94 percent in 2019-2020 over the previous year, but the electricity generating sector showed negative growth or more than 28 percent, in the same period.[88] The state’s finances are generally in good health, barring a few areas of concern. The trend of running a revenue surplus of 19 percent in 2021-22, which is expected to increase to 27 percent in 2022-23 (as a percentage of total revenue receipts) is due to factors such as higher transfer of grants from the central government, improvement in collection of the state’s own resources, and higher devolution as the state’s share in central taxes.[89] If these variables stay the course, revenue surplus is expected to increase to 36 percent and 40 percent, respectively, in 2023-24 and 2024-25.
The Manipur state government has expressed concern over the decline in transfer of revenue from the central government as a percentage of GSDP, which needs to be “addressed properly and carefully.”[90] In its medium-term fiscal policy report, the Manipur government stated that there was a downward trend since 2015-16 in the share of central revenue transfer to the state as a percentage of GSDP. It had come down from 39 percent in 2015-16 to 34 percent in 2020-21. The report explained that “the decline in central revenue transfer coincides with the trend of declining revenue surplus as % of GSDP,” that “this leaves very little space to meet our ever-expanding revenue expenditure, and that the COVID years had accentuated the imbalance further.[91] It recommends that going forward “adequate steps” need to be taken “to avoid serious cash imbalances.” These steps may include linking expenditure with the revenue receipts from the periodic inflows from the government of India. The actual transfers by the central government to the state were less than what was recommended by the 14th Finance Commission for tax transfer (the share of the state in the overall divisible pool of resources) in 2015-2020. This resulted in a shortfall of Rs. 4,606 crore in the actual transfers by the central government during the period, which the Manipur government says had “seriously impacted the financial position of the State especially in view of the fact that the State relies very heavily on Central tax transfer,” and that “the impact is carried over to 15th Finance Commission period,” which “explains the recent increase in outstanding fiscal liability.”[92]
Further, the Manipur government explains that its finances were always determined by the overall fiscal position of the central government, and that “high buoyancy in tax collection of the Central Government has always translated into higher resource transfers for the State.”[93] It cites a recent example of the transfer of shareable central tax to the state in 2021-22, when the state received more than Rs.6,000 crore on account of the recovery of the national economy. This was even more than the estimated figure of Rs. 5,328 crore to be given to Manipur in the central budget. A slowdown, however, in national tax collections because of various factors caused a squeeze in the size of shareable tax receivable by the state. In 2019-20, when the pandemic compelled a country-wide shut-down, the share of the state in central transfer was drastically cut from Rs. 5,211 crore to Rs. 4,047 crore. In such conditions, the state’s revenue surplus fell from Rs. 812 crore in 2018-19 to Rs. 445 crore in 2019-20.
The dominance of agriculture in Manipur’s economy is unshakeable as the agriculture sector contributes a major share to the GSDP. Almost 53 percent of the workers in the state are employed as cultivators and agricultural laborers producing mainly rice and maize.[94] The sector remains fragile due to its dependence on timely rainfall and weather conditions. Farmers practice permanent cultivation in the valley districts, and terrace cultivation in some pockets of the hills where jhuming or shifting cultivation is widely used. The contribution of agriculture to the state’s gross state value added (GSVA) was 27.04 percent, much higher than the manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water supply sectors with 11.56 percent, but much lower than the services sector which contributed 61.40 percent in 2019-20.[95]
The “Economic Survey” of Manipur for 2020-21 points out that “although the state is endowed with mineral and forest resources, industrialization has been painfully slow in the state.”[96] This is because of “shyness of capital, acute transport bottleneck, shortage of power and lack of entrepreneurial activity and technical skills.” Despite persistent efforts made by the government, the growth of the industrial sector in the state is slow paced, unaffected even by the various policies and packages of incentives and concessions. The Survey declares that as “almost all the public undertaking industries of the state were facing financial problems and there was paucity of funds for maintenance,” the “government decided to wind up some of its loss-making industries,” leaving only the handloom and handicraft industry in place. The handloom industry, in particular, accounts for a good number of female workers in the working population, and its products are in great demand within the state and even in the national and international markets.
As an important segment of the state’s economy, small scale industries are contributing substantially in the form of production, employment and export, thus playing a vital role in fulfilling socio-economic objectives. There were 35,000 registered units as of June 2020. But, industrial production in Manipur has decreased dramatically.[97] Even well-established enterprises and businesses have failed owing to monetary demands made by the insurgents. Services is the only sector to have shown consistent growth since 2018-19, while agriculture and manufacturing witnessed declines of 1.5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2021-22.[98] Since extortion reduces profit margins, no new investment has arrived in the state. Moreover, government and private sector income is almost nil. Due to distance and transportation problems, the private sector has not invested in Manipur, thus excluding the state from external assistance which might have increased job opportunities.
The state government explains that although Manipur is rich in natural resources, due to difficult terrain, inadequate infrastructural facilities, and varying climatic conditions, the state could not develop its industry. In the initial stage, government policy in the state was “one of revival and revitalization” of the traditional handlooms and handicrafts of the local inhabitants. It adds that at present, “there are no industries worth mentioning except traditional oriented ones” such as khadi and village industries, handlooms and handicrafts.[99] The state government in its policy announcement of 1990 “decided to focus attention on the small scale and agro-based industries without discouraging the medium and large-scale industries.” The policy is expected to serve the objective of employment generation and dispersal of industries.
In the face of continuous insurgent activity, it is most essential to address the development challenges. The uncertain law and order situation is the primary criteria behind unpredictable economic growth. The ongoing climate of insurgency has been the region’s most critical contributor to economic stagnation as security is the fundamental infrastructure of economic operations, social stability, and future certainty.[100] There is also a significant spillover impact of insurgency in one state on adjacent states. The insurgency’s first casualty is the region’s already insecure infrastructure, particularly its transportation sector. The militants’ disruptive operations cause property damage and panic among travelers, plunging the whole system in turmoil. Similarly, vehicles on state and national roadways are often assaulted, passengers and transportation employees are murdered or injured, and commodities plundered. On top of everything, the region suffers from geographical isolation, and natural disasters such as floods and landslides during the monsoon season severely hamper connectivity.
Obtaining employment opportunities within Manipur proves challenging, prompting Manipuri individuals to seek work in places such as West Bengal or other Indian states. Securing employment within Manipur on merit is a distant dream owing to the high level of irregularities which, in turn, are destabilizing the public-friendly governance approach.[101] A recent example is the Manipur High Court in October 2019 quashing the Manipur Civil Service examination in 2016 due to allegations of irregularities in the selection process. To investigate these irregularities, a two-member panel was appointed by the high court.[102] The panel discovered several issues including missing signatures on answer scripts, manipulation of marks, and improper allocation of marks without proper evaluation. The high court criticized the Manipur Public Service Commission (MPSC) for not taking the examination seriously and handed over the matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation for further investigation. In November of the same year, the Supreme Court upheld the high court’s decision and instructed the CBI to conduct a thorough investigation within a specific timeframe. The MPSC reconducted the main exam and interview in 2022.
To further complicate matters, the state grapples with a significant presence of underground terrorist factions, some of which aspire to establish a separate nation. Approximately thirty to forty such insurgent groups exist in the northeastern region, specifically in Manipur, where these groups are intertwined. The Kuki National Front, Kuki National Organisation, and United Liberation Front exemplify active insurgent groups in the area. The United Liberation Front aims to achieve independence for their homeland, driven by the belief that the central government neglects Manipur’s interests. While the current situation is relatively improved compared to previous decades, the insurgents continue to acquire weapons through Moreh, a town situated along the Indo-Burmese border.[103]
The opening of border trade between India and Myanmar was an important achievement in April 1995 of the then union minister of state for commerce as a follow-up measure to the Trade Agreement signed between India and Myanmar on January 21, 1994 in New Delhi.[104] Subsequently, residents on both sides of the border were allowed to trade in 22 items in April 1985, and currently trade has been widened to include 62 commodities/items.
Yet, a critical issue in the conflicts of the Indian Northeast is the problem of social exclusion. Northeastern people often face racial discrimination when they travel to central India for education and employment. Many individuals had been subjected to racial attacks, social exclusion, and economic marginalization. The Indian mainstream perception of the people from the Northeast as backward and uncivilized has added to the veiled misconception. Northeast Indians are often called ‘chinki,’ which many find very offensive, equivalent to the word ‘paki’ in England, which is typically directed at anyone who is of South Asian descent. The term ‘chinki’ has links with the term ‘Chinese’ or Chinese-looking. As most Northeastern people are from an East Asian or Southeast Asian racial background, Indians living in mainland India often mistake them for belonging to those groups.[105] Racism and prejudice directed at the people of the Northeast are very much entrenched in contemporary India.
Indeed, violence in the region has emerged due to feelings of alienation and marginalization. Marginalization encompasses both social and economic aspects as the people in the Northeast feel marginalized at a time when the rest of India is experiencing economic prosperity. The impressive economic growth witnessed by the country since the mid-1990s has yet to appear, or trickle-down, to the Northeastern population. Even today, at least one-third of the population faces poverty. It is disheartening that the people of India are more familiar with the United States of America than with the Northeastern part of their country. Consequently, both regional and national governments must formulate policies that address exclusionary practices and ensure that minorities in the borderlands are not marginalized but rather included within the national framework.
While violence has decreased in many areas, Manipur continues to experience significant instability. The unresolved tensions in Manipur and the broader region pose a significant threat to India’s security and represent a setback in democratic and nation-building aspirations. As such, India must take a more nuanced and equitable approach to address the complex issue of ethnocultural diversity, lest it continues to be plagued by the ‘black spot’ of unresolved conflict and political turmoil.
To formulate effective peacebuilding strategies specifically tailored to the context of Northeastern India, it is imperative to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the evolving nature and dynamics of the conflicts prevailing in the region. There are, for instance, significant ‘changing phases’ of Naga nationalism and its diverse transformation, which refers to the transformation of political consciousness with practicability: first, the state of Nagaland resulted from the demand for an independent entity outside the Indian union, then came the demand for Greater Nagalim, and then the Nagas came into an agreement with the central government. The insurgents espouse fragmented views of creating a type of state emerging out of their indigenous values, which is not a modern state, and does not possess rigid boundaries.[106]
The fluctuating patterns of violence in the Northeast necessitate a reassessment of security and political interventions to address rural insurgencies that enjoy grassroots’ support. The interventions focused on combating traditionally organized insurgencies might not effectively address the underlying conditions that give rise to these distinct patterns of violence.[107] Throughout history, the Indian government has often responded to uprisings in the region through repressive measures. As the Naga independence movement resorted to armed struggle, the Indian state promptly employed coercion and co-option to suppress it.[108] Although it is an exceptionally challenging task to devise comprehensive solutions to the issues discussed in this article, certain specific points warrant consideration.
First, a reduction in the use of military force could contribute to a partial alleviation of the situation. The Indian establishment may, however, be reluctant to opt for such an approach due to the region’s classification as a ‘disturbed area’ owing to the presence of various groups of insurgents, some of whom get their weapons from China and Myanmar. It should be noted that significant disruption is caused by insurgents, factional groups, and self-proclaimed rebels, as evidenced by their harassment and escalating financial demands on the local population.[109]
Second, is essential to bring the main parties involved in the conflicts to the negotiating table. This undertaking will be particularly challenging given the many insurgents and underground elements involved in the conflict. The complex layers of conflict in Manipur and other Northeastern states make it a daunting task to bring the disputing parties to the negotiating table. If it proves possible to convene negotiations, the proceedings must be supervised by impartial and authoritative figures.
Third, a raft of aberrations needs to be urgently addressed, such as corruption, poor governance, administrative failure, poverty, unemployment, and inadequate infrastructure. By addressing these areas, lasting peace in the Northeastern states of India can be envisaged.
Fourth, strict surveillance of the Indo-Burmese border, particularly in towns such as Moreh, would be beneficial since insurgents are believed to obtain weapons through it.[110] The government has taken several measures by deploying central security forces to provide security to vulnerable institutions and installations, sharing intelligence inputs, and providing financial assistance to strengthen the local police force and intelligence agencies through the Police Modernization Scheme. The security apparatus and counter-insurgency operations have been further strengthened by the center reimbursing the state government on security related expenditures. This scheme has been implemented in all Northeastern states, except Mizoram and Sikkim because they are relatively peaceful. The central government has also helped raise additional forces through India Reserve Battalions.[111]
The issue of statehood and identity preservation for subnational, ethnic, and cultural groups is a multifaceted and complex challenge. Decentralizing political and economic management could be a viable option to ensure a more equitable distribution of decision-making authority. The federal concept must be pragmatically used in its approach to the center-state relationship, and between the state and local governments. Decentralized power structures could combat separatism in the Northeast and throughout India. In the Northeast, as insurgency and underdevelopment are inextricably linked, measures used in isolation, such as administrative, economic, and political, are unlikely to yield positive results. A comprehensive strategy that considers the diverse social, cultural, and ethnic groups of the region is essential. Socioeconomic inequality is the basis of insurgency in the Northeast. The problem-solving process must, therefore, prioritize the region’s economic growth and address its backwardness. The contradiction between equality and efficiency is severe in the region, and societal unrest will undermine development efforts if equality is not secured. It is necessary to include all the grassroots’ groups in the development process—given the diversity of the population—with their fair share of expenses and rewards to ensure social cohesion and equitable development.
Finally, in order to address the indigenous people’s concerns about losing their independence and identity, it is imperative to ensure their protection and preservation. The merger of Manipur in the Indian union has not been without disagreement, and there had been significant tussle over it. The transition has not been smooth. At present, however, development and growth cannot occur without peace in the state. The attainment of peace in Manipur is an uphill task due to visible, multilayered conflicts and issues. The local population needs to realize that political progress and development cannot be achieved solely on the basis of external financing. Most Northeastern state governments depend on the central government for financial and nonfinancial support. There is a need to reduce nonpriority expenditures or waste, in order to better utilize the resources from the central government. It is also essential to create local resources that reduce regional inequity and waste, and empower the people with actual political power.
The sense of isolation felt by many Manipuris can be somewhat alleviated through India’s Look/Act East policies. As India strengthens its ties with Southeast Asian and East Asian countries, the people of the Northeast are likely to feel included, as the Northeast becomes a vital pathway for India’s engagement with them. The people of the Northeast will benefit from the enhanced connectivity and infrastructure development aimed at facilitating the relationship between India and Southeast Asian/East Asian nations.[112] As the Look East policy did not result in any massive transformation for the Northeast, there was a sense of pessimism among many people that the policy would create an infrastructural conduit, bypassing the region, without bringing prosperity to it. The newer Act East policy needs to seriously consider the Northeastern aspects. Many indicators are showing a marked improvement such as economic growth, literacy, and reduction in insurgency. The recent thrust to develop physical infrastructure needs to be speeded up so that a golden opportunity to bring peace and development is not missed.
Hm Izhar Alam grew up in Lilong, a small town in Manipur. When the state got embroiled in violent uprisings, he went to a boarding school in Assam. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (honours degree), and Masters in Political Science from Aligarh Muslim University. He is a University Gold Medal awardee from the same department as a graduate and post-graduate student. He is a recipient of the UGC PG Scholarship-URH and other prestigious scholarships. He is a PhD scholar and a University Grants Commission-Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Aligarh Muslim University. His doctoral research is concerned with India’s Act East policy and the Northeast. His recent work includes a research paper, “Abrogation of Article 370 and the Question of Asymmetrical Federal Arrangement in Northeast India,” in SN Social Sciences, published by Springer Nature Switzerland, and a research paper, “Climate Change, Mitigation and International Politics: A Scenario of the Indian Perspectives in the Light of the Global Contexts,” in an edited volume in a publication by Springer Nature.
[1] “ST Demand for Meiteis Gets a Fillip, Send Recommendations to Centre, Directs HC to State Govt,” The Sangai Express, April 20, 2023. https://www.thesangaiexpress.com/Encyc/2023/4/20/By-Our-Staff-ReporterIMPHALApr-19-The-High-Court-of-Manipur-has-directed-the-State-Government.html; Bikash Singh, “Manipur High Court: Manipur HC Extends Time Frame for the Inclusion of Meitei Community to ST list,” The Economic Times, May 12, 2023. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/manipur-hc-extends-periodfor-the-recommendation-of-the-inclusion-of-meitei-to-stlist/articleshow/100191766.cms?from=mdr; Phurailatpam Keny Devi, “Manipur: ATSUM to Hold Solidarity March on May 3 Protesting the Meiteis’ Demand for Inclusion in ST Category,” India Today NE, April 30, 2023. https://www.indiatodayne.in/manipur/story/manipur-atsum-to-hold-solidarity-marchon-may-3-protesting-the-meiteis-demand-for-inclusion-in-st-category-550797-2023-04-30; “Completely Factually Wrong: SC Slams Manipur HC Order on Meiteis and ST List,” The Wire, May 17, 2023. https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-manipur-hc-meiteischeduled-tribes-list; ANI, “Manipur Violence: Assam Rifles Rescues 96 People in Air Evacuation Ops from India-Myanmar Border,” The Economic Times, May 15, 2023. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/manipur-violence-assam-riflesrescues-96-people-in-air-evacuation-ops-from-india-myanmarborder/articleshow/100258023.cms; and Ritu Maria Johny, “Army Deployed as Fresh Violence Erupts in Manipur, Houses Set on Fire in Imphal,” Hindustan Times, May 22, 2023. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/fresh-manipur-violence-abandonedhouses-set-on-fire-in-imphal-curfew-army-101684755288846.html
[2] “Govt Committed To Restoring Peace In Manipur, Ensuring Return Of Victims To Homes: Shah,” Outlook, May 31, 2023. https://www.outlookindia.com/national/govt-committed-to-restoring-peace-in-manipur-ensuring-return-of-victims-to-homes-shah-news-291048
[3] “Indian government orders Manipur state chief to ‘work harder’ to end violence,” Reuters, June 25, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-govt-orders-manipur-state-chief-work-harder-end-violence-2023-06-25/
[4] “Kuki women hold sit-in for justice, urge PM Modi to set up inquiry commission, The Telegraph, July 22, 2013. https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/kuki-women-hold-sit-in-for-justice-pm-modi-urged-to-set-up-inquiry-commission/cid/1953684
[5] Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, “Military veterans condemn Modi government’s failure to stem violence in Manipur,” The Telegraph, July 24, 2023. https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/military-veterans-condemn-modi-governments-failure-to-stem-violence-in-manipur/cid/1954006
[6] “How Manipur Unrest Poses a Threat to the Entire Northeast,” The Economic Times, July 25, 2023.
[7] Pradip Phanjoubam, “Manipur’s Naga Angle,” The Telegraph, July 26, 2023. https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/manipurs-naga-angle-nagas-have-distanced-themselves-from-the-kuki-cause-in-this-fight/cid/1954475
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] “How Manipur Unrest Poses a Threat to the Entire Northeast.”
[13] Jason Rochanhlu, “Refugee Haven: 600 Manipur Tribals Flee to Mizoram,” East Mojo, May 8, 2023. https://www.eastmojo.com/mizoram/2023/05/08/refugee-haven-600-manipur-tribals-flee-to-mizoram/
[14] Mukul Kesavan, “Tipping Point,” The Telegraph, July 30, 2023. https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/tipping-point-notes-on-the-violence-in-manipur/cid/1955455
[15] E. Nilkanta Singh, “Status of religion in Tribal Areas of Manipur,” Collection of Scripts on the Culture of Manipur, The Manipur Page website. https://themanipurpage.tripod.com/culture/reltrmani.html; and Syed Ayan Mojib, “Who are Kukis & Meiteis, The Warring Tribes in Manipur,” The Statesman, June 2, 2023. https://www.thestatesman.com/india/1503186629who-are-kukis-meiteis-the-warring-tribes-in-manipur-1503186629.html
[16] S.M.A.W. Chishti, “Political Development in Manipur 1919-1949” (PhD Diss., Aligarh Muslim University, 1979), 5-7.
[17] Sangai Express, “Meitei Pangals Join ST Demand Stand,” kangla Online, October 27, 2017. https://kanglaonline.com/2017/10/meitei-pangals-join-st-demand-stand/; and Chronicle News Service, “Meitei-Pangal sustains demand for ST status,” E-Pao, February 2, 2023. http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=39..030223.feb23
[18] Chronicle News Service, “ST demand of Meetei, Meitei Pangal opposed,” E-Pao, March 23, 2023. http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=24..240323.mar23
[19] Angana Chakrabarti, “In India’s Riot-hit Manipur, Muslims Stuck Between Warring Groups,” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/12/in-indias-riot-hit-manipur-muslims-stuck-between-warring-groups
[20] Syed Ali Mujtaba, “The Plight of Meitei Pangals or Manipur Muslims Remains Unheard,” The Milli Gazette, May 27, 2023. https://www.milligazette.com/news/6-issues/34065-the-plight-of-meitei-pangals-or-manipur-muslims-remains-unheard/; and Md Chingiz Khan, “Divisive Tactics Seen Behind Targeted Eviction in Manipur,” Tehelka 15, no. 16 (2018): 42-44.
[21] Esha Roy, “Manipur’s Ethnic Faultlines: Kuki-Meitei Divide & Recent Unrest,” The Indian Express, May 7, 2023. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-politics/manipurs-ethnic-faultlines-violent-protests-kukis-and-nagas-8594147/
[22] Umanand Jaiswal, “Kuki Body Demands Separate State, Cites Article 3 of Indian Constitution,” The Telegraph, July 14, 2023. https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/kuki-body-demands-separate-state-cites-article-3-of-indian-constitution/cid/1951898
[23] “Manipur Population Census Data, 2011,” https://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/manipur.html
[24] R. Emerson, “Nationalism and Political Development,” The Journal of Politics 22, no. 1 (1960): 12.
[25] Thonkholal Haokip, “Political Integration of Northeast India: A Historical Analysis,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 2 (2012): 304-314. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.646508
[26] Myron Weiner, “Political Integration and Political Development,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 358, no. 1 (1965): 52-64. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F000271626535800107
[27] E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).
[28] K.W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954).
[29] L. Binder, “Crises of Political Development,” in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, edited by Leonard Binder and Joseph Lapalombra (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
[30] P. Tarapot, Insurgency Movement in Northeastern India (New Delhi: S. Chand Publications, 1993).
[31] N. Joy Kumar Singh, Revolutionary Movements in Manipur (New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House, 2005), 21-22.
[32] S. Chatradhari, Manipur Gi Itihasta Irabot (Manipuri language) (Imphal: Manipur Krishak Sabha, 1972); Additionally, quoted in Tarapot, Insurgency Movement in Northeastern India, 34.
[33] J. Parratt and S.N. Parratt, Queen Empress vs Tikendrajit, Prince of Manipur: The Anglo-Manipuri Conflict of 1891 (New Delhi: Har-Anand and Vikas, 1992).
[34] Haokip, “Political Integration of Northeast India.”
[35] Ibid.
[36] J. Parratt and S.A. Parratt, “A New Beginning? Manipur’s State Elections: 2002,” South Asia Research 23, no. 1 (2003): 99-109. https://doi.org/10.1177/02627280030231005
[37] T. Haokip, India’s Look East Policy and Northeast India (New Delhi: Sage, 2015), 77-78.
[38] S. Baruah, “Generals as Governors: The Parallel Political Systems of Northeast India,” Himal South Asian 14, no. 6 (2001): 1-20. https://www.himalmag.com/generals-as-governors/
[39] M.S. Prabhakara, “Insurgencies in Manipur: Politics & Ideology,” The Hindu, January 28, 2010. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Insurgencies-in-Manipur-politics-amp-ideology/article16839929.ece
[40] K. Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building in the Northeast Indian State of Manipur,” Democracy and Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 221. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1326308
[41] M. Romesh Singh, “Problems of Insurgency: A Holistic Understanding from Manipur, India,” Journal of North East India Studies 5, no. 1 (Jan-June 2015): 32.
[42] “Northeast India witnesses 80% decline in insurgency-related incidents since 2014, says Union Home Ministry,” News Services Division, All India Radio, November 15, 2022. https://newsonair.gov.in/Main-News-Details.aspx?id=450876#:
[43] “State-wise Security Situation from 1999 Onwards, Manipur,” Ministry of Home Affairs data. See, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2022-08/NE_Insurgency_North_East_25022022%5B1%5D.PDF
[44] “Security Situation in North East Region as a Whole from 1999 Onwards,” Ministry of Home Affairs. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2022-08/NE_Insurgency_North_East_25022022%5B1%5D.PDF
[45] “AFSPA,” Indian Army. https://indianarmy.nic.in/KnowYourArmy/know-your-army-main/afspa
[46] Ibid.
[47] Vijaita Singh, “Home Ministry Panel on AFSPA Removal from Nagaland Misses its Deadline,” The Hindu, February 22, 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/home-ministry-panel-on-afspa-removal-from-nagaland-misses-45-day-deadline/article65074768.ece
[48] Ravi Nair, “AFSPA in the North East—The Never-ending Trauma,” The Leaflet: Constitution First, March 12, 2022. https://theleaflet.in/afspa-in-the-north-east-the-never-ending-trauma/; and Sukumar Muralidharan, “The Oting Massacre and the State of Exception in Democracies,” The Leaflet: Constitution First, December 22, 2021. https://theleaflet.in/the-right-to-have-rights-and-the-state-of-exception-in-democracies/
[49] V.I.K. Sarin, India’s North East in Flames (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980).
[50] H.K. Sareen, Insurgency in North East India (New Delhi: Sterling, 1981).
[51] P.R. Bhattacharjee and P. Nayak, “Vicious Circle of Insurgency and Underdevelopment in Northeast India,” in Identity, Contestation and Development in Northeast India, ed. Komol Singha and M. Amarjeet Singh (New York: Routledge, 2015).
[52] I.L. Singh, Introduction to Manipur (Imphal: S. Ibemhal Publications, 1981).
[53] “Aanganwadi Rice Transport Scandal in Manipur Social Welfare Department,” Imphal Free Press, October 15, 2022. https://www.ifp.co.in/investigative/anganwadi-rice-transport-scandal-in-manipur-social-welfare-department
[54] “Rs 244 crore Loktak Lake Cleaning Scam,” The Northeast Today, April 4, 2018. https://thenortheasttoday.com/states/manipur/manipur-rs-244-crore-loktak-lake-cleaning-scam-vigilance/cid2530513.htm; and William Gurumayum, “Maphitel Dam: Stop Violating International Development Standards,” Imphal Times, April 11, 2015. https://www.imphaltimes.com/it-articles/item/2502-mapithel-dam-stop-violating-international-development-standards
[55] Arambam Sophia, “Corruption: “A Malaise in Need of a Remedy,” Technium Social Sciences Journal 12, no. 1 (2020): 126–136. https://techniumscience.com/index.php/socialsciences/article/view/1734
[56] H.S. Surjeet, “Government Initiatives Mark Welcome Change in Approach, People Democracy,” New Age Weekly organ of CPI 28, no. 48 (November 28, 2004).
[57] “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-21,” Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, January 12, 2021. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://desmanipur.gov.in/files/NewsFiles/15Feb2021011944Economic%20Survey%20Manipur,%202020-21.pdf
[58] Ibid.
[59] M.R. Singh, “Problems of Insurgency: A Holistic Understanding from Manipur, India,” Journal of North East India Studies 5, no. 1 (2015): 30-38. https://jneis.webs.com/pdf/vol.5/5.1.3.pdf
[60] Rakhee Bhattacharya, “Thriving Underground Economy,” The Statesman, July 5, 2021, https://www.thestatesman.com/supplements/north/thriving-underground-economy-1502978830.html
[61] Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building,” 232.
[62] “Press Note on Estimates of State Domestic Product of Manipur, 2016-17 to 2021-22,” Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, November 25, 2022. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://desmanipur.gov.in/Files/NewsFiles/Press%20note%20SDP%202016-17%20to%202021-22.pdf
[63] “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-21,” Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, January 12, 2021.
[64] “Press Note on Estimates of State Domestic Product of Manipur, 2016-17 to 2021-22,” Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Manipur, November 25, 2022.
[65] “Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement, Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement & Macro Economic Framework Statement and Disclosures,” Government of Manipur, July 2022.
[66] “Indian States by GDP Growth,” Statistics Times. https://statisticstimes.com/economy/india/indian-states-gdp-growth.php
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] “Manipur Border Free Movement Regime Suspension Extended,” The Morung Express, November 13, 2022. https://www.morungexpress.com/manipur-border-free-movement-regime-suspension-extended
[70] Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building,” 227; A.B. Akoijam, “Manipur: How History Repeats Itself,” Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 30 (2001): 2812; and M.E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.
[71] B. Harff and T.R. Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 1.
[72] S. Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10.
[73] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999).
[74] For more details on “infrastructural accessibility injustice,” see R.R. Ziipao, Infrastructure of Injustice: State and Politics in Manipur and Northeast India (New York: Routledge, 2020).
[75] “North Eastern Region witnesses Rapid Development due to Centre’s Thrust on Infrastructure, Connectivity,” The Print, January 3, 2023. https://theprint.in/india/north-eastern-region-witnesses-rapid-development-due-to-centres-thrust-on-infrastructure-connectivity/1296366/
[76] “North East Seamlessly Connected,” Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/PragatiKiNayiGati/pdf/northeast.pdf
[77] “Development In Northeast: String Of Road And Connectivity Projects Under NDA Govt,” Outlook, September 13, 2022. https://www.outlookindia.com/national/string-of-road-and-connectivity-projects-in-the-north-east-as-india-looks-east-news-222707
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] A. Misra, Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention & Resolution (London: Routledge, 2008), 7-8.
[84] Bethany Lacina, “Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?,” India Review 6, no. 3 (2007): 165-183.
[85] Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty and Amanat Khullar, “Tracing Irom Sharmila’s Struggle: From Years of Fasting to Seeking Votes To Repeal AFSPA,” The Wire, February 22, 2017. https://thewire.in/politics/tracking-irom-sharmila-fasting-seeking-votes-lift-afspa-manipur
[86] Jitendra Bahadur Singh, “Arms used for violence in Manipur smuggled via Myanmar, procured by insurgent groups: Sources,” India Today, June 27, 2023.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/weapons-used-in-manipur-violence-supplied-via-myanmar-route-intelligence-sources-2398477-2023-06-27
[87] Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building,” 232-233.
[88] “Press Release: Index of Industrial Production for the Month of May 2019,” Government of Manipur, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, September 27, 2019. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://desmanipur.gov.in/files/NewsFiles/01Oct2019080104State%20IIP%20May,%202019%20Release,Manipur.pdf
[89] “Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement, Fiscal Policy Strategy Statement & Macro Economic Framework Statement and Disclosures,” Government of Manipur, July 2022.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-21.”
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] “Manipur Budget Analysis 2023-2024,” PRS Legislative Research. https://prsindia.org/budgets/states/manipur-budget-analysis-2023-24
[98] Ibid.
[99] “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-21.”
[100] M. Sajjad Hassan, Building Legitimacy: Exploring State-Society Relations in Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[101] Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building,” 234.
[102] Press Trust of India, “CBI to investigate irregularities in 2016 Manipur civil service examinations,” The Print, February 3, 2020. https://theprint.in/judiciary/cbi-to-investigate-irregularities-in-2016-manipur-civil-service-examinations/359035/
[103] Mukherjee, 232-234.
[104] “Economic Survey, Manipur, 2020-21.”
[105] Nishit Dholabhai, “Panel to Scan Racism,” The Telegraph, February 13, 2014. https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/panel-to-scan-racism/cid/214283; Dholabhai, “Nido Panel for More Debate on Racism Law,” The Telegraph, July 17, 2014; and “Northeast Fatality in Capital Again,” The Telegraph, July 22, 2014.
[106] D. Kikon, “Engaging Naga Nationalism: Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies?” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 26 (2005): 2833.
[107] Lacina, “Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?,” 165.
[108] K.K.S. Hausing, “Asymmetric Federalism and the Question of Democratic Justice in Northeast India,” India Review 13, no. 2 (2014): 95.
[109] Mukherjee, “Insurgency and Peace Building,” 232-241.
[110] Mukherjee, 242.
[111] Press Information Bureau, Inputs Suggest Visit to China by Leaders of NE Insurgent Groups, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, March 9, 2011. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=70786
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