ABSTRACT
This article[1] examines the relationship between the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Bandung Conference held in April 1955, within the context of Indian foreign policy. It considers the role of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in organizing this conference and explains how his support for this Afro-Asian gathering was motivated by concerns about American containment policy in Asia. In doing so, it draws two major conclusions. First, Bandung was crucial to Nehru’s strategy of promoting a non-aligned “third way” and, therefore, lessening the appeal of SEATO among Asian nations. Secondly, while this strategy helped reduce the alliance’s appeal, it was neither the sole nor the primary reason for its lack of attractiveness among Asian nations. Other factors arguably exerted a more substantial influence.
KEYWORDS
Bandung Conference, SEATO, Nehru, Eisenhower, Colombo Powers, Afro-Asian
“Some of the sponsors may regard the conference as a counter-manifesto to the Manila Conference last September and to S.E.A.T.O.,” remarked the Manchester Guardian in an editorial discussing the outcome of the Bogor Conference.[2] Held on December 28-29, 1954 in Bogor near Jakarta, this gathering had been organized by the leaders of the so-called Colombo Powers—Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan—to set the agenda and determine the membership for what would later be known as the Bandung Conference. Although the Guardian did not specify which sponsors it referred to, it was likely alluding to Jawaharlal Nehru. Since spring 1954, the Indian prime minister had grown increasingly concerned about American policy in Asia. Two aspects of Washington’s regional policy most alarmed him. The first was the decision to establish a defence partnership with Pakistan, which Nehru perceived as a direct threat to India. The second involved plans to create a regional alliance led by the United States to prevent further communist inroads in Southeast Asia following France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. Nehru considered these plans flawed because they risked escalating regional tensions into a broader East-West confrontation. When the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was finally established in September 1954, he remained resolutely opposed to it. He viewed it as a threat to regional stability, with the potential to undermine the Geneva Accords on Indochina, erode Sino-Soviet support for peaceful coexistence, and spark a serious confrontation between the United States and China. The fact that Pakistan became one of the signatories to the Manila Treaty establishing SEATO added to Nehru’s frustration and further compounded his woes.
Faced with these challenges, Nehru took decisive action to counter SEATO, aiming to assert India’s regional vision and influence. In September 1954, he rallied behind an Indonesian proposal to organize an Afro-Asian conference. Nehru had hitherto shown scant interest in the Indonesian idea, having lost enthusiasm for Afro-Asian initiatives. However, SEATO prompted Nehru to reconsider his stance, leading him, as the Guardian suggested, to use the Bandung Conference as a counter-manifesto against SEATO.
That being the case, this article has two aims: to flesh out Nehru’s reasons for opposing SEATO, and to explain his strategy for countering it. In doing so, it will draw two broad conclusions. First, Bandung played a vital role in Nehru’s strategy of promoting a non-aligned “third way” and, therefore, reducing SEATO’s appeal among Asian nations. Second, although such a strategy did diminish the alliance’s appeal, it was neither the only nor the main reason for its lack of attractiveness among Asian nations. Other factors arguably had a more significant impact.
1. The Rationale for SEATO and India’s Response
SEATO originated from U.S. efforts in the spring of 1954 to prevent the fall of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Apprehensive that France’s defeat could endanger regional stability, the Eisenhower Administration considered sending air and naval forces to help the French. However, such a move risked provoking Chinese intervention and potentially leading to the deployment of U.S. ground troops. Reluctant to accept these risks so soon after the end of the Korean War, the Administration called for a coordinated allied effort, which it named “United Action,” to counter the communist threat. Proposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, this initiative aimed to support the beleaguered French while keeping open the option of American intervention alongside regional allies. It also served as a warning to China that the United States would not tolerate communist expansion in Southeast Asia.[3] Dulles envisioned a coalition of nations—including the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and the Associated States of Indochina—that shared the goal of promoting a non-communist Southeast Asia.[4] He excluded India and Pakistan because they are not part of Southeast Asia, along with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.[5] He believed this coalition should be ready to defend its interests and take military action if necessary. However, he considered sending U.S. ground forces a last resort, and he ruled out a NATO-style alliance for the time being. He argued that creating this coalition would strengthen the West’s position ahead of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, scheduled to begin on April 26, 1954 and might also deter Communist China from further deepening its involvement in Indochina.[6]
Dulles, however, faced difficulties in securing allied support for his United Action plan, as Britain and France hesitated. Paris only sought American air support and, for the rest, preferred to wait until the Geneva Conference was over.[7] London also wished to wait, eager for the conference to be a success. The British worried that the American plan might undermine the Geneva negotiations and escalate the conflict in Indochina, all while failing to save Dien Bien Phu. They also hoped that “United Action” would include India and other Commonwealth Asian nations, as well as Burma and Indonesia.[8] The fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May reduced the urgency of United Action; yet Dulles never removed it from the table, hoping to pressure the Soviet Union, China, and the Viet Minh to lower their demands at Geneva.[9] In late summer, however, Dulles resumed his efforts. Doubting that the communists would honour the conference’s final settlement, he decided to expedite plans for a Western-led regional alliance.[10] With the French on the way out, his attention turned to deterring Chinese aggression and preventing communist infiltration by strengthening local defence forces and offering regional allies economic support and covert intelligence.[11] Washington’s allies responded positively. While their concerns about the immediate communist threat to Southeast Asia varied, they all desired inclusion in an American-led regional security framework.[12] In early September, the United States, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty establishing SEATO. The latter reflected Dulles’s preference for a “lean” defensive alliance with a limited American commitment. What Washington wanted from it was a politico-military framework primarily designed to deter communist expansion in Southeast Asia.[13]
India reacted negatively. In June, Nehru revealed to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that he was “totally opposed” to U.S. plans for a regional defence alliance.[14] His government regarded these plans not only as “wrong,” fearing they were a cloak for renewed Western intervention in Asia, but also as a “big and dangerous gamble” that could result in a devastating war. Weighing heavily on Nehru’s mind were the Eisenhower Administration’s warnings of nuclear retribution if China intervened in Indochina. He was particularly exercised by the fact that, in March 1954, the United States had conducted a thermonuclear test at Bikini Atoll, making the specter of a nuclear exchange even more terrifying. Lastly, he also worried that U.S. policy might undermine the Geneva Conference and hinder progress towards resolving the situation in Indochina.[15]
These apprehensions were undoubtedly exacerbated by a deep sense of mistrust in India towards a country viewed as “ignorant,” “power-drunk,” and “hopelessly unreliable.”[16] Dwight Eisenhower’s pledge, during the 1952 U.S. presidential campaign, to pursue the Cold War with greater resolve than his predecessor had already sparked alarm in India as a “dangerously militaristic” attitude.[17] His February 1954 decision to extend military aid to Pakistan reinforced these fears. Formalized three months later through the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA), the deal angered Nehru, who felt that American aid would seriously harm India’s security. Nehru’s cahier de doléances was extensive. American assistance would bolster Pakistan’s defence capabilities, increase the risk of war between the two South Asian neighbors, establish an American military presence in Pakistan, and bring the Cold War closer to India’s borders. It would also make it difficult for New Delhi and other Asian capitals to create a neutralist “area of peace” in Asia, and limit their freedom of maneuver.[18] When Dulles announced United Action, New Delhi raised a further objection, arguing that the creation of a U.S.-led regional alliance, coupled with the U.S.-Pakistan defence agreement, would result in India’s isolation and encirclement by the United States and its allies.[19] Nehru blamed Dulles, the Department of Defence and the military authorities for America’s “growing tendency” towards war.[20] He considered Eisenhower a well-meaning leader eager to avoid conflict, but described him as “weak” and overly influenced by “third rate advisers.”[21] Among these, Nehru took a particular dislike to Dulles, whom he saw as an anti-communist crusader with little sympathy for Asian nationalism.[22] In October 1954, he told Mao Zedong that Dulles was a “great menace” and a “narrow-minded and bigoted” individual.[23]
Nehru publicly expressed some of his concerns during a two-day debate in the Lok Sabha on foreign affairs, following the signing of the Manila Treaty. On September 29, 1954 he stated that SEATO was steering the world in the wrong direction. He acknowledged regional concerns about communism but insisted that the Manila Treaty was clearly a “wrong approach”—one that would “antagonise the great part of Asia” and increase insecurity. He admitted that the Manila Treaty, as it currently stood, “was not very strong so far as the military aspect was concerned.”[24] The advice he received a few days earlier from the Ministry of External Affairs had raised serious doubts about SEATO’s effectiveness as a military alliance, suggesting that the United States would not commit fully and allies would contribute little.[25] The Indian government’s concern, therefore, was not so much that the treaty presently “carr[ied] things far,” but rather that it might “gradually extend [its] scope and nature” over time, becoming “something much bigger and wider” with potentially adverse effects on regional security. To prevent this, Nehru advocated a different approach to regional security. As parliamentarians erupted into cheers, he insisted that the only way forward was to bring Communist China back in from the cold, as no lasting solution to Asian problems could be reached without its involvement. He believed that engaging with China might help reduce regional suspicions about its intentions and encourage it to take an active role in promoting regional stability. It would also make it harder for Beijing to breach its pledges. In saying this, he reaffirmed his faith in the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which China had already endorsed, as the next section will show. Nehru argued that they provided a clear blueprint for restoring trust between nations, and achieving stronger regional cooperation.[26]
2. Dealing with SEATO
Despite his strong reservations about the Manila Treaty, both publicly and privately, Nehru refrained from launching a head-on diplomatic offensive against it. He chose not to run a publicity campaign against SEATO and did not press South and Southeast Asian nations to stay out of it. He and his closest advisers saw little value in these tactics.[27] One reason was that Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines were willing to participate, and Nehru could do little to dissuade them. The other was that Indonesia and Burma had already decided not to join. Like India, Jakarta viewed SEATO as running counter to its policy of non-alignment.[28] While more sympathetic to SEATO, Rangoon feared domestic opposition to the Manila Treaty.[29] The only wavering nation was Ceylon, with Prime Minister John Kotelawala supporting SEATO in principle, but facing a hostile public sentiment against it.[30] Between late July and early August 1954, Kotelawala attempted to convene a meeting of the Colombo Group to mitigate Indian opposition to SEATO and allow Burma and Ceylon to consider their options.[31] However, all Nehru had to do to thwart Kotelawala’s efforts was to inform his Colombo partners that such a meeting was untimely and that he would not support it.[32] As a result, a disappointed Kotelawala was forced to yield, thereby abandoning any prospect of his government participating in the Manila Conference.[33]
Reluctant to challenge SEATO head-on, Nehru opted for a less confrontational diplomatic approach. His plan was to counter SEATO by proposing an alternative path to regional security. Knowing that SEATO stemmed from regional fears of Chinese expansionism, Nehru centred his strategy around China. Since the early 1950s, Nehru had concluded that Beijing would be more likely to tone down its revolutionary fervor and pursue a more conciliatory foreign policy if it moved out of isolation and integrated into the international community.[34] As previously noted, he believed that a policy of engagement was vital to ensure Beijing felt it had a stake in regional security and would thereby contribute constructively to maintaining stability in Asia. The signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet in April 1954—the first agreement signed by China with a non-communist country—and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to India the following June reassured Nehru that his assessment of China was correct.[35] In New Delhi, he and Zhou agreed to make the five principles of peaceful coexistence, enshrined in the preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, the cornerstone of the future bilateral relationship. These principles were: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Even more ambitiously, the two leaders expressed their desire to extend these principles to relations with other nations, believing that they would help reduce tensions.[36]
Throughout 1954, China improved relations with Indonesia and Burma, nearly completed negotiations with Nepal and Afghanistan for diplomatic representation, and expressed a desire to strengthen ties with Ceylon, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan.[37] This further convinced Nehru that Beijing shared his vision of an Asian area of peace—that is, a neutralized region where States rejected Cold War alliances, hosted no foreign bases, and embraced non-alignment.[38] It is against this backdrop that he saw an Indonesian proposal to hold an Asian-African conference as an opportunity to promote his vision and make China an integral part of it. Made by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in April 1954 during the inaugural meeting of the Colombo powers, this proposal initially received little support from Nehru and the other Asian leaders present at the summit.[39] However, the signing of the Manila Treaty on September 9, along with Beijing’s decision six days earlier to bomb the Taiwan-controlled Quemoy islands to prevent Washington from concluding a defence agreement with Taipei, prompted Nehru to back the Indonesian initiative. As he made clear in late September, the idea of an Asian-African conference had gained “an added significance” in view of SEATO and ongoing tensions in East Asia. These developments, which threatened regional stability and India’s goal of establishing a regional area of peace, required “careful consideration by the countries of Asia,” thus making such a conference necessary.[40]
Having endorsed the Indonesian proposal for an Asian-African conference, Nehru began, in late 1954, to shape its agenda and rationale. In late December 1954, the leaders of the five Colombo Powers met in Bogor, Indonesia, to discuss the agenda and composition of the upcoming Asian-African conference. Nehru and the Indian delegation played a decisive role in shaping the meeting.[41] Pakistan and Ceylon initially opposed China’s invitation, but after strong objections from Nehru and Burma’s U Nu, the meeting supported Beijing’s participation.[42] It also agreed to hold the Asian-African conference in Indonesia in late April, leaving the decision on the venue to the Indonesians, who eventually chose Bandung over Jakarta.[43] At the conclusion of the Bogor talks, Nehru expressed his hope that the forthcoming Asian-African conference would help prevent the re-emergence of the outdated concept of spheres of influence that SEATO threatened to revive.[44] With China included among the invited participants, Nehru’s strategy to counter SEATO was finally taking shape. In his thinking, the upcoming Asian-African conference was to serve as a platform to promote his approach to regional security, centred on areas of peace and the five principles, and seal China’s commitment to that vision. To succeed, his strategy relied heavily on such commitment, because only then would Asian nations feel reassured about Chinese intentions and be won over to Nehru’s non-aligned vision of Asia. Moving forward, Nehru trusted Beijing not to stray from it out of fear of provoking widespread regional condemnation if it did.
3. Nehru’s Bandung
Nehru arrived in Bandung on April 16, 1955—two days before the conference began. Leading a prominent and high-powered delegation, he was determined to gain support for his approach to regional security. However, once the conference’s proceedings got underway, Nehru realized that several delegations did not share his assumptions. The representatives of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, Libya, Turkey, Lebanon, Sudan, Ceylon, and South Vietnam condemned communism as a new form of colonialism, expressing strong reservations about what they regarded as Nehru’s naïve notion of peaceful coexistence.[45] When the conference discussed the question of regional defence pacts, Nehru delivered a lengthy and passionate plea for the five principles and areas of peace. In his speech, he strongly criticized SEATO and rebuked the decision made by some governments to join Western pacts. Mincing no words, he bluntly stated that it was wrong for these nations to join pacts involving the Western powers, whom he called “protectors of colonialism.” These pacts not only brought insecurity to them but also undermined their identity by turning them into camp followers—something he considered “degrading.” Although he acknowledged a country’s right to self-defence, he insisted that the conference not endorse the idea of forming pacts.[46] Nehru’s assumptions were once more challenged. His comments provoked a strong reaction from non-communist delegations. The representatives of Iraq, Lebanon, and the Philippines retorted that India was a large nation capable of standing alone, unlike their own countries; therefore, it made sense for them to seek protection from stronger powers, as smaller nations often do when feeling threatened. They asked, somewhat sarcastically, how Nehru could be certain that joining a pact would make them insecure, or that he knew their security interests better than they did.[47]
In the end, such a strong opposition from non-communist delegations ensured that the right of countries to join defensive alliances for self-defence was included in a ten-principle “Declaration on World Peace and Co-operation” contained in the conference’s final communiqué. Nehru was forced to put on a brave face, emphasising that the declaration also incorporated the principle that no nation should be coerced into joining collective defence arrangements and that the major powers should not use these alliances to pursue their interests. Significantly, the declaration included only four of Nehru’s five principles.[48] Although Nehru later claimed that he had never lobbied for these five principles “as though they were divine commandments,”[49] he had to recognize that they were not universally accepted, having in fact become a major “bone of contention” during the conference proceedings.[50] For the sake of a final compromise, they were subsumed into a longer declaration, with the result that the remaining four of them sat awkwardly alongside the principles recognizing the right of countries to join defensive alliances. Despite Nehru claiming that the declaration “embodied” their “essence,”[51] it was obvious that this was not entirely the case and that his vision of a neutralized region had not been fully accepted, at least not in the way he had originally envisaged.
Compensating for this was the fact that China had strongly supported the five principles, and Zhou Enlai had reassured everyone that his country posed no threat to regional security. Nehru was, of course, pleased. His efforts to strengthen China’s commitment to peaceful coexistence appeared to have been rewarded. In the short term, Beijing’s highly publicized commitment to peaceful coexistence would likely have a stabilizing effect on regional relations by easing concerns over China’s role. Increased regional stability would, in turn, undermine the justification for regional alliances, making them less attractive, just as Nehru had hoped. If, in Bandung, Nehru failed to persuade several nations of the dangers posed by regional alliances, he had, at the very least, succeeded, or so it seemed, in creating the conditions for their diminished usefulness. Moving forward, however, the success of Nehru’s strategy was inextricably tied to China’s unwavering commitment to peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately for Nehru, this commitment proved to be short-lived, as the post-Bandung years revealed.[52]
4. Conclusions
As this article has shown, the Bandung Conference played a pivotal role in India’s early Cold War diplomacy. Nehru was initially hesitant to support Indonesia’s push for an Afro-Asian summit, but he ultimately invested significant time and effort in organizing it. He viewed Bandung as a vital component of an ambitious diplomatic strategy aimed at addressing pressing Cold War concerns. One of these concerns was the American containment policy, of which SEATO was the most objectionable example. In this context, he considered the conference as an opportunity to counter Washington’s regional policy and promote a non-aligned “third way.” As discussed above, Nehru’s “third way” was predicated on the five principles and the concept of areas of peace. It also relied on China’s steadfast commitment to peaceful coexistence. Nehru believed that if Bandung could convincingly demonstrate that China was genuinely committed to his vision of a neutralized Asia and peaceful coexistence, it would greatly reassure countries in the region. In turn, this newly acquired sense of security would diminish the appeal of American containment and weaken the rationale for Cold War alliances, such as SEATO. Indeed, as this article has demonstrated, Bandung succeeded in projecting an image of China as a responsible stakeholder in regional security. In the years after the Bandung Conference, Chinese leaders effectively promoted China as “a strong, independent Asian country committed to peace and development” and actively engaged with the Afro-Asian world.[53] In this context, Nehru’s characterization of the Bandung Conference as an “outstanding success” appeared justified.[54] After all, in the wake of Bandung, support for neutralism increased across Asia, and peaceful coexistence became the buzzword in all diplomatic exchanges among Afro-Asian states, seemingly validating Nehru’s vision of a non-aligned Asia.[55] In this respect, Bandung played a key role in Nehru’s strategy to weaken the appeal of SEATO among Asian nations. As Nabarun Roy and Amitav Acharya noted, Nehru’s India not only fostered “an environment where the idea of SEATO could not take root” but also played a vital role in developing a “critique of regional defense pacts” which “would have a major impact on the fate of SEATO.”[56] In this sense, Acharya contended, Bandung “made SEATO enlargement impossible.”[57]
However, while Nehru’s opposition to SEATO indeed limited the alliance’s appeal, his contribution—and that of Bandung—should not be overstated. Other factors had a more significant impact. One such factor was the Soviet and Chinese pursuit of détente (or peaceful coexistence, as they called it at the time) with the West following Stalin’s death in 1953. Under the leadership of Stalin’s successors, particularly Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union gradually moved away from a head-on confrontation with the West. Recognizing the dangers of nuclear conflict with the United States and the need to cut military spending to boost the economy and improve living standards at home, Moscow sought to adopt a less confrontational approach towards the West.[58] So did Beijing in an attempt to address its domestic problems and frustrate U.S. efforts to encircle China.[59] Over time, the Soviet and Chinese adoption of “peaceful co-existence” as the core principle of their foreign policies fostered the widespread belief that the communist threat was receding. This made it more difficult for the Western bloc to achieve greater unity of intent and to bring the Asian neutrals closer to them. In 1956, American policymakers noted signs of “a growing unwillingness to submerge conflicting national interests and ambitions in the face of a reduced sense of common danger,” with the result that the “prospects for significantly more cohesive political groupings [had] diminished.”[60] In Asia, communist proclamations of support for peaceful coexistence eased regional fears about the Chinese threat. As a result, several Asian nations no longer felt a pressing need for Western support.
Doubts about the effectiveness of Western deterrence in Asia further reduced regional enthusiasm for U.S. containment. As a British Foreign Office paper noted in 1960, whether Asian neutrals would join Western regional alliances depended on the West’s “strength and determination” to defend them. On this score, however, the West’s record was disappointing. According to the FO, the British performance in Southeast Asia during the Second World War, and that of the Americans in Korea, had raised concerns about “the ability of the West to give effective protection without, at least, bitter suffering for those to whom it is given.” The predicament for non-communist States was clear: while the Western umbrella offered no guarantee of protection, their alignment with the West was sure to “provoke hostility” and “precipitate the very disaster”—namely, communist aggression—that Western support was meant to prevent. As a result, non-aligned Asian countries began to see “conciliation and compromise” as the most effective means to mitigate these dangers, rather than aligning with Western powers. From their viewpoint, alliances seemed “no better than provocations likely to goad the Communist bloc into retaliatory action.”[61]
This is important to remember because SEATO never embodied an iron-clad Western commitment to regional security. Nor did it represent a mechanism for enabling military interventions in Southeast Asia. Instead, the Eisenhower Administration considered it a “symbol of anti-communist unity” that would make military action unnecessary.[62] In essence, SEATO was intended as a form of “deterrent diplomacy” that the United States and its allies relied on to make up for their inadequate defence capabilities.[63] In other words, they wished to accomplish “with words what they could not do with arms.”[64] In this regard, it is no wonder that SEATO lacked a complex administrative and military structure, a unified standing command, and defence forces designated for regional defence. Nor was SEATO meant to involve the deployment of large U.S. and allied forces across its geographical area of responsibility. Most importantly, the Manila Treaty did not obligate its member states to consider an attack on one member as an attack on all.[65] However, it is true that, confronted with growing concerns from its allies about SEATO’s lack of any real military dimension, the United States ultimately agreed to some modest improvements.[66] In early 1955, SEATO members agreed to establish a formal administrative machinery and initiate military planning.[67] Despite these pledges, progress was slow to materialize—so much so that the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan complained that “nothing really constructive is being accomplished.”[68] Concerns were raised within the State Department that, unless the United States did more to strengthen the alliance, SEATO would remain nothing more than “words on a piece of paper.” If this occurred, dissatisfaction among its Asian members would grow to such an extent that SEATO would fail.[69] Dulles was also warned that unless SEATO served as a channel for increased economic cooperation and developmental aid to its Asian members, the latter might be tempted to embrace neutralism.[70] Despite such warnings, both the United States and Britain continued to provide most of their aid either bilaterally or through the Colombo Plan.[71] Eventually, SEATO expanded its administrative machinery, including a permanent structure dedicated to military planning, and allocated some national forces for SEATO use in the late 1950s. Even with these changes, SEATO never made significant progress beyond that.[72] Given the uncertainty surrounding the scope and effectiveness of the SEATO “umbrella,” it came as no surprise that some non-aligned Asian nations questioned the deterrent value of SEATO. As FO officials perceptively noted, these nations preferred to maintain their non-aligned stance, believing that this approach would “deprive the Communist bloc of any justification for aggression.”[73]
The third and final factor to consider relates to the economic implications of peaceful coexistence. As regional fears of communism eased, non-aligned Afro-Asian nations, such as Egypt, India, Burma, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, welcomed offers of technical, economic, and military assistance from the Soviet Union.[74] India’s example is revealing in this regard. Far from perceiving closer economic ties with the Soviet Union as a major security risk, Nehru and his ministers believed that strengthening Indo-Soviet cooperation could benefit India’s economy by fostering economic growth, expanding bilateral trade, and securing Soviet aid and technical support expertise. Additionally, it could generate greater competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, prompting them to provide more technical and economic assistance to India lest New Delhi move closer to the other camp.[75] Similarly, as the two superpowers moved to woo other Afro-Asian neutrals, these nations, too, received economic aid from both sides without needing to commit to either of them.[76]
Because of the reasons mentioned above, these countries had little incentive to choose sides or join Cold War alliances, such as SEATO. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that shifts in Cold War rivalry and stagnation within SEATO, rather than Nehru’s hostility, made SEATO less attractive to non-aligned Asian nations. Ironically enough, by the late 1950s, India’s main concern was no longer SEATO and its alleged destabilizing effect on Asian security. Instead, India’s primary challenge became China’s rejection of peaceful coexistence and its shift to a more radical stance in international affairs.[77] As Sino-Indian relations worsened in 1959, Nehru’s alternative vision for Asian security—one sealed in Bandung and centered on an enduring Chinese commitment to peaceful coexistence—gradually unravelled. Amid the turmoil caused by China’s military attack on India in October 1962, Nehru belatedly recognized that the threat to regional stability did not come from Western regional alliances, but from China’s revolutionary radicalism.
Andrea Benvenuti is an Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia. He currently teaches twentieth-century international history and diplomacy at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. His research interests focus on post-1945 international history, with a particular emphasis on the Cold War in Asia. He recently published Nehru's Bandung: Non-Alignment and Regional Order in Indian Cold War Strategy (London: Hurst, 2024; New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 2024) and co-authored China’s Policy: The Emergence of a Great Power (London: Routledge, 2022). He is presently completing a multi-authored two-volume monograph on the role of Western powers in Asia from the First World War to the end of the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury). He holds a DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, an MA by research from Monash University, and a BA (Hons) from the University of Florence.
[1] Elements of this article have been drawn from Andrea Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung: Non-Alignment and Regional Order in Indian Cold War Strategy (Hurst, 2024). The author is grateful to the publisher for allowing him to do so.
[2] “Afro-Asia,” Manchester Guardian, January 1, 1955, 4.
[3] Cheng Guan Ang, The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (Routledge, 2022), 26-27.
[4] Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1952-1954, Indochina, volume, XIII, part 1 (GPO: 1982), doc. 687, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d687
[5] FRUS, 1952-1954, XIII/1, Doc. 736, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d736
[6] Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles after dinner at the American Embassy (London), April 11, 1954, FO 371/112054, DF1071/267/G, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew [hereafter NAUK].
[7] Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (Random House, 2012), chapter 20, Kindle.
[8] Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles after dinner at the American Embassy (London), April 11, 1954, FO 371/112054, DF1071/267/G, NAUK.
[9] Ang, Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, 28; George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” Journal of American History 71, no. 2 (1984): 362, https://doi.org/10.2307/1901759; Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,” International History Review 11, no. 3 (1989): 459, https://shorturl.at/IaRV9
[10] Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–1965 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 25.
[11] FRUS, 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, part 1 (GPO, 1984), doc. 267, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p1/d267
[12] Fenton, Red Dragon, 26.
[13] FRUS, 1952-1954, XII/1, doc. 267.
[14] Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, second session, 10 p.m. to midnight, June 25, 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers [hereafter JN], file 264 part 1, Prime Ministers’ Museum and Library, New Delhi [hereafter PMML].
[15] New Delhi to Commonwealth Relations Office [hereafter CRO], telegram 366, April 14, 1954, FO 371/112053, DF1071/242 (B) and New Delhi to CRO, telegram 376, April 17, 1954, FO 371/112053, DF1071/229, NAUK; and Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [hereafter SWJN], second series [hereafter II], volume 25 (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1999), 552–554.
[16] New Delhi to CRO, telegram 376, April 17, 1954, FO 371/112053, DF1071/242 (B), NAUK.
[17] Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 195.
[18] SWJN, II/24 (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1999), 421, 434, 436, 437 and 442.
[19] New Delhi to CRO, telegram 376, April 17, 1954, FO 371/112053, DF1071/242 (B), NAUK.
[20] SWJN, II/27 (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2000), 34.
[21] Ibid.
[22] McMahon, Cold War, 156.
[23] SWJN, II/27, 34.
[24] “SEATO Approach Will Antagonise Great Part of Asia,” Times of India, September 30, 1954, 9; and Lok Sabha Debates [hereafter LSD], vol. VII, part II, September 29, 1954, cols. 3672-3693.
[25] T.N. Kaul to Nehru, August 23, 1954, JN, file 285 part 1, PMML.
[26] “Mr. Nehru Lashes Out at SEATO Alliance,” Times of India, September 30, 1954, 1; “SEATO Approach,” 9; LSD, vol. VII, part II, September 29, 1954, cols. 3672-3693. For a detailed discussion of this point see Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, chap. 4-7; and Benvenuti, “Constructing Peaceful Coexistence: Nehru’s Approach to Regional Security and India’s Rapprochement with Communist China in the Mid-1950s,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 31, no. 1 (2020): 91-106, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2020.1721063
[27] Nehru to Subimal Dutt and N.R. Pillai, October 9, 1954, JN, file 289, part 2, and Note by Dutt to Nehru, September 30, 1954, JN, file 289, part 2, PMML.
[28] Jakarta to Foreign Office [hereafter FO], telegrams 211 and 319, 2 and 13 August 1954, FO 371/111875, D1074/295, NAUK.
[29] FRUS, 1952-1954, XII/1, doc. 271, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v12p1/d271; and Malcolm MacDonald to Earl of Home, May 1, 1957, DO 35/5977, NAUK.
[30] Colombo to Ministry of External Affairs [hereafter MEA], telegram 133 D, August 2, 1954, JN, file 271 part 1, PMML; and FRUS, 1952-1954, XII/1, doc. 277, https://shorturl.at/hL063
[31] Colombo to CRO telegram 287, August 3, 1954, PREM 11/651, NAUK.
[32] MEA to Colombo, primin 22380, August 7, 1954, JN, file 272 part 1, and MEA to Colombo, primin 22389, August 11, 1954, JN, file 273 part 1, PMML.
[33] Colombo to CRO, telegram 302, August 9, 1954, PREM 11/651, NAUK.
[34] Anton Harder, “Defining Independence in Cold War Asia: Sino-Indian Relations 1949-1962” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015), 18; and Benvenuti, “Constructing Peaceful Coexistence”, 92-93.
[35] On the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet see Indian Embassy, Peking: Annual Political Report for the Year 1954, February 5, 1955, 2(2)-FEA/55, National Archives of India, New Delhi (NAI).
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] For a definition of area of peace see, for instance, Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, first session, 3:30 p.m. to 6:15 p.m., June 25, 1954, JN, file 264 part 1, PMML.
[39] Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, 62-67.
[40] Note on Proposal to Hold an Afro Asian Conference, September 24, 1954, JN, file 285 part 1 and Nehru to C.C. Desai, no. 688-PMH/54, September 23, 1954, JN, file 284, PMML.
[41] Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, 147-148.
[42] G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (Faber and Faber, 1966), 175-176; and Jakarta Despatch 1, The Bogor meeting of Asian Prime Ministers, January 6, 1955, A5954, 1412/2, National Archives of Australia, Canberra,
[43] Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Editions Didier Millet, 2005), 65.
[44] SWJN, II/27, 116-117.
[45] Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, 175-176.
[46] Ibid., 176.
[47] Ibid., 176-177.
[48] Ibid., 175-176.
[49] LSD, vol. IV, part II, 30 April 1955, cols. 6962–6974.
[50] SWJN, II/28 (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), 136.
[51] LSD, vol. IV, part II, 30 April 1955, cols. 6962–6974.
[52] See Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, 205-205 and 207-220; and Benvenuti, “Constructing Peaceful Coexistence,” 106-108.
[53] Gregg Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 106–131.
[54] SWJN, II/28, 144.
[55] Jonathan Ward, “China-India Rivalry and the Border War of 1962: PRC Perspectives on the Collapse of China-India Relations, 1958–62” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2016), 111.
[56] Nabarun Roy, “Assuaging Cold War Anxieties: India and the Failure of SEATO,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26, no. 2 (2015): 323, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034571; and Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Cornell University Press, 2009), 49.
[57] Ibid., 59.
[58] Benvenuti, Nehru’s Bandung, 28.
[59] Ibid., 28-29.
[60] FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX (GPO, 1990), doc. 66, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66.
[61] “Neutralism in South and South-East Asia,” FO Steering Committee paper, March 14, 1960, DO 35/8830, NAUK.
[62] Dingman, “Dulles”, 460.
[63] Ibid., 477.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Fenton, Red Dragon, appendix 1.
[66] Brian Farrell, Andrea Benvenuti, et al., Chasing Dragons: Western Military Power and Reordering Modern Asia, Volume 2 (Bloomsbury, forthcoming), chap. 6.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] MacArthur cited in Matthew Jones, “The Radford Bombshell: Anglo-Australian-US Relations, Nuclear Weapons and the Defence of South East Asia, 1954-57,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 4 (2004): 650, https://doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000314547
[70] Farrell, Benvenuti, et al., Chasing Dragons, chap. 6.
[71] Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 206.
[72] Farrell, Benvenuti, et al., Chasing Dragons, chap. 6.
[73] “Neutralism in South and South-East Asia,” DO 35/8830, NAUK.
[74] Robert J. McMahon, The Illusion of Vulnerability”: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955-1956,” International History Review 18, no. 3 (1996): 607.
[75] Andrea Benvenuti, “The Enduring Ties of Self-Interest: India’s Relations with Russia in a Historical and Contemporary Perspective,” in Enduring Alliances and Security Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, ed. Alex Tan and Nicholas Khoo (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
[76] “Neutralism in South and South-East Asia,” DO 35/8830, NAUK.
[77] Benvenuti, “Constructing Peaceful Coexistence,” 107-108.
