ABSTRACT
The Bandung Conference of 1955 marked a seminal moment in international relations and decolonization. As one of the most prominent voices at the conference, India played a crucial role in shaping the agenda, articulating the aspirations of newly independent nations, and championing the emerging principle of non-alignment. This article examines India’s motivations, strategies, and contributions at Bandung, situating its participation within the broader context of postcolonial internationalism, Cold War geopolitics, and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement.
KEYWORDS
Nehru and Bandung, Non-Aligned Movement, Global South, Cold War, Panchsheel
The Bandung Conference, convened on April 18-24, 1955 in Indonesia, was a landmark gathering of twenty-nine Asian and African countries, most of which had recently attained independence or were on the cusp of it. Officially known as the Asian-African Conference it represented a collective effort by the Global South to assert an autonomous voice in world affairs, outside the binary logic of Cold War power blocs. India, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, emerged as a key leader in this endeavor. India’s active role in the conference was not incidental but stemmed from its deep commitment to anti-colonial solidarity, peace, and development—ideals that had guided its foreign policy since independence in 1947.
The conference was co-sponsored by Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka (Ceylon), India, and Pakistan, collectively known as the Colombo Powers. The Bogor conference, held in Bogor, Indonesia, on December 28-29, 1954, was a preparatory meeting for the Bandung Conference. It involved the leaders of the five Colombo Powers. The primary goal of the Bogor conference was to finalize the date, agenda, and composition of the upcoming Asian-African Conference.[1]
1. In This Special Issue
We present articles by scholars and diplomats on significant thematic and geographical aspects germane to the Bandung Conference, offering a view from the West, Asia, and Africa.
Christopher J. Lee, Lead Editor of the journal Safundi, argues that Bandung served as a moment of postcolonial spectacle, inhabiting a historic intersection of the end of empires, and new postcolonial possibilities. Dr. Lee explains that the symbolism of Bandung slipped after 1965, if not quite disappearing completely. The diplomatic failures of Bandung contributed to this decline. It reflected a shift away from postcolonial optimism as Cold War intervention, underdevelopment, coup d’etats, and one-party States came to define the politics of Africa and Asia. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, the Bandung moment has re-emerged as a historical locus for re-chronologizing the past and the reframing the present. The refashioning of Bandung appears less like mythmaking and more like a hijacking, providing a gloss of Afro-Asianism that emphasizes economic solidarity geared toward global capital from, and for, the Global South. Returning to Bandung after seventy years, therefore, requires critical judiciousness that dispels the notion of romanticism while not resorting to outright dismissiveness.
Andrea Benvenuti, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, examines the broader regional picture, particularly the relationship between the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Bandung Conference held in April 1955, within the context of Indian foreign policy. It considers the role of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in organizing this conference and explains how his support for this Afro-Asian gathering was motivated by concerns about American containment policy in Asia. Professor Benvenuti draws two major conclusions. First, Bandung was crucial to Nehru’s strategy of promoting a non-aligned “third way” and, therefore, lessening the appeal of SEATO among Asian nations. Secondly, while this strategy helped reduce the alliance’s appeal, it was neither the sole nor the primary reason for its lack of attractiveness among Asian nations. The author states that other factors arguably exerted a more substantial influence.
The two Indonesian diplomats, Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana (Ambassador of Indonesia to Sweden) and Cut Nury Hikmah Sabry (Junior Diplomat/Attaché at the Center for Policy Strategy for the America and Europe Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia), explain that although the Bandung Conference did not formally establish the Non-Aligned Movement, the Bandung Conference laid the ideological and political groundwork for what would become a decades-long effort by developing nations to assert agency, autonomy, and unity within a rigid global system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The authors explain that today, as the global order tilts toward multipolarity—with middle powers navigating the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing, and the Global South asserting its demand for greater influence in multilateral institutions—the legacy of Bandung resonates with renewed relevance.
Taking an incisive economic approach, Hebatallah Adam, Professor of Economics at the Jindal School of International Affairs, positions the Bandung Spirit as a crucial inspiration for postcolonial economic autonomy. Dr. Hebatallah critically examines the early strategies of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and state-led growth, and evaluates their effect on the economic aspirations of newly independent states, and their adaptation to globalization and neoliberal reforms. The study demonstrates the similarities between past and contemporary forms of economic dependency, particularly through sovereign debt, digital colonialism, and the impact of multinational corporations. Dr. Hebatallah finds that ISI and other state-driven strategies initially supported local industries and represented a departure from colonial economic frameworks; however, they ultimately struggled to sustain long-term growth and competitiveness. The author explains that contemporary methods of economic regulation, particularly in the digital realm, create power disparities that undermine the autonomy of countries in the Global South. The study concludes that the Bandung values of non-alignment, solidarity, and self-determination remain significant despite existing challenges, and that these ideas can help countries in the South work together for a more equitable world.
Professor A. Sooklal (South Africa’s High Commissioner to India, Bangladesh and Nepal) explains that the leaders who gathered in Bandung had a collective vision to work together as countries of the Global South, most of whom had just gained independence as sovereign independent States leaving behind the devastation wrought upon their countries by colonialism. The world of 1955 is vastly different from that of 2025, yet the pressing challenges confronting countries of the Global South remain the same, i.e., poverty, under-development, rising inequality, the erosion of the rules based global order and multilateralism, and climate change among others. Do the ten guiding principles adopted at the Bandung Summit have relevance today? Professor Sooklal argues that they are, perhaps, more relevant today than ever before.
2. Historical Context and Motivations
A convergence of historical experience, political ideals, and strategic calculations drove India’s involvement in the Bandung Conference. As a former colony that had achieved independence through largely non-violent means, India saw itself as a moral exemplar among decolonizing nations. Nehru, in particular, envisioned India as a bridge between the East and the West, advocating for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect among nations. The Conference stimulated “the urge within these nations to develop their economies and enhance the social standards of their peoples.”[2]
India took a bold initiative to generate solidarity among the newly emerging Asian nations. This was most notably seen in the convening of the Asian Relations Conference (ARC), held in New Delhi in March–April 1947, just a few months before India's own independence. Indonesia participated actively in this historic gathering. Jawaharlal Nehru, the host of the conference, spoke warmly about Indonesia, highlighting its deep cultural and historical ties with India. The Indonesian delegation comprising twenty-five members was led by Dr. Abu Hanifa, leader of the Masyumi Party. Dr. Hanifa later expressed his delight at meeting Indian leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and Sarojini Naidu.[3] The then Prime Minister of Indonesia, Sultan Sjahrir, also attended the final day of the conference. In his concluding remarks, he declared: “We owe all of you a great debt, and it is from the very depth of my heart that I say thank you and goodbye.”
This spirit of Asian solidarity was soon put to a more severe test. In response to Dutch military actions aimed at suppressing the newly declared Indonesian Republic, Nehru strongly criticized the intervention as being contrary to the ideals of a “new Asia.” In collaboration with U Nu of Burma, Nehru convened another conference on Indonesia in January 1949, aimed at rallying international support against Dutch aggression. Despite pressure from Western allies, representatives from eighteen countries participated in this significant event.
These conferences—on Asian relations and specifically on Indonesia—inspired Nehru and other Asian leaders to consider establishing a more permanent organization promoting Asian unity. Over time, this idea expanded to include newly decolonized African nations, culminating in the historic Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries in April 1955.
At Bandung, Sukarno famously declared: “Let a new Asia and a new Africa be born.” Bandung emerged amidst the intensifying Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Newly independent countries faced immense pressure to align with one bloc or the other. India’s articulation of non-alignment at Bandung was, therefore, a bid to preserve sovereign autonomy in foreign affairs and avoid entanglement in great power rivalry. It was also a strategic assertion of agency by countries that had long been relegated to the periphery of global power structures.[4]
3. India’s Delegation and Strategy at Bandung
India sent a high-profile delegation to Bandung, led by Nehru and included Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon. Indian Ambassador to Indonesia, Badruddin Tyabji, acted as an efficient sherpa for the Conference. The Indian delegation played a central role in shaping the conference agenda and mediating between the diverse ideological positions of participating states. While countries like China and Egypt advocated a more confrontational stance toward Western imperialism, India emphasized conciliation, cooperation, and constructive engagement.
Nehru saw the conference as an opportunity to foster Afro-Asian cooperation and discuss shared Afro-Asian concerns; his overriding motivation lay in Cold War considerations. In other words, he primarily intended to use the Afro-Asian gathering to win approval for the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” or Panchsheel, and to promote his vision of a neutral Asia. In this context, he saw China’s participation in the conference as critical to attaining India’s regional goals.[5]
Nehru’s approach was characterized by a delicate balancing act: he criticized colonialism and racism while avoiding outright alignment with the Soviet bloc. He cautioned against anti-Western hysteria, and stressed the importance of internal development and regional cooperation.[6] India's rhetorical emphasis on peaceful coexistence was encapsulated in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” jointly articulated with China in 1954. These principles were reiterated at Bandung and resonated with many participating nations.[7]
The Indian delegation, under Nehru’s leadership, actively participated in the discussions and played a crucial role in shaping the conference’s outcome. The conference resulted in a ten-point declaration, known as the “Bandung Declaration,” which emphasized principles such as respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. At the closing session Nehru declared:
I should like to draw your attention, to direct your minds, not to that statement which is an important statement, but rather to the imponderables, to the fact that we have met and gathered here from thousands of miles, conferred together, seen each other, and in spite of all manner of differences and arguments, made friends with each other.[8]
He further said, gesturing toward domestic and international contradictions:
We are determined in this new chapter of Asia and Africa to make good. Not, primarily, not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. Secondly to rise in the economic domain, in the social domain; to become prosperous, to bring happiness to our people. To put an end to all the age-old shackles that have tied us; not only political—you call them colonialism, rightly—but the other shackles of our own making, which are tighter.
4. Key Themes and India’s Contributions
A flurry of themes dominated the Bandung Conference such as anti-colonialism, racial equality, economic development, and disarmament. India’s contributions were significant across all these areas:
Anti-Colonial Solidarity: India lent strong support to the anti-colonial struggles still ongoing in Algeria, Angola, and Palestine. Nehru argued that political independence must be accompanied by economic and cultural liberation.[9]
Non-Alignment and Peace: India’s advocacy for non-alignment became a cornerstone of the conference. Nehru’s speeches emphasized the dangers of military alliances and called for the establishment of a new international order based on justice, equality, and mutual respect.[10] In his closing speech Nehru stated: “We shall only cooperate in future and we shall obviously only be friends and equals; there is no friendship when nations are not equal . . .”
Economic Cooperation: India underscored the importance of economic self-sufficiency and South-South cooperation. The conference endorsed greater trade and technological exchange among developing nations, anticipating themes later developed by the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77.[11] Nehru iterated that “we raise our voices against the domination and colonialism from which many of us have suffered for so long, and that is why we have to be very careful that any other form of domination does not come in our way.”
Racial Equality and Human Rights: India, as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society, championed the cause of racial equality. Nehru spoke forcefully against apartheid in South Africa and racism in the United States and Europe, advocating a global ethic of human dignity.[12] “Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflict, full of trouble, full of hatred, and their conflicts continue, and their wars continue, and we have been dragged in their wars because we were tied to their chariot wheels.”[13]
Mediation and Diplomacy: India often played the role of mediator during tense exchanges between more radical states and moderate participants. Its ability to bridge ideological divides helped maintain unity and focus during the conference. Nehru declared, “Whether our influence is great or small, it must be exercised in the right direction, in an independent direction, in a direction which has integrity of purpose and ideals and objectives behind it. It represents the ideals of Asia, it represents the new dynamism of Asia, because if it does not represent that, what are we then?”[14]
At the Golden Jubilee Celebration of the Bandung Conference in 2005, Dr. Manmohan Singh the then Prime Minister of India declared, “These celebrations prove that the Bandung spirit remains a source of inspiration. Speaking for India, it is a particular pleasure to recall the mutually enriching encounters between our peoples over the millennia and to invoke the shared vision of these great leaders, committed to creating an Afro- Asian identity.”[15]
5. India’s Relationship with China at Bandung
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Bandung Conference was the India-China dynamic. Both countries were prominent Asian powers with overlapping visions of regional leadership. India and China had recently articulated the Panchsheel Principles and initially cooperated at Bandung. However, underlying tensions, especially over border issues, were already apparent. While Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai projected solidarity at the conference, their relationship would sour in the following years, culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
At Bandung, however, India welcomed China’s participation and resisted Western efforts to isolate Beijing. Nehru believed that integrating China into a broader Asian framework would foster peace and mutual understanding. This inclusive approach was a hallmark of India’s diplomacy at the time, though it would later be criticized as overly idealistic. The participation of China was agreed to by the five Colombo Powers, since they had all extended diplomatic recognition to China. There were initial objections by Pakistan acting on behalf of its mentor, the United States. Despite that, Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai hobnobbed at Bandung.[16]
Japan was a participant at Bandung which was the first international conference it attended after recovering its sovereignty since the end of the Second World War. Beyond that symbolism, Japan’s participation was somewhat unusual given that the conference primarily focused on newly independent Asian and African nations seeking to decolonize and resist imperialism. Japan’s relationship with the West, particularly the United States, was still evolving, and the United States was wary of Tokyo’s potential alignment with neutralist or anti-Western sentiments emerging from the conference.[17]
6. Criticisms and Limitations
Despite its achievements, the Bandung Conference was not without limitations, and India’s role attracted both praise and critique. Some observers felt that India’s emphasis on moderation diluted the radical potential of the conference. Others argued that Nehru’s idealism lacked sufficient pragmatism, especially regarding China. Moreover, the diversity of political systems among the participants—ranging from liberal democracies to one-party states—meant that consensus was often superficial. India’s balancing act, while effective in the short term, struggled to translate into a sustained multilateral framework. Nevertheless, the conference sowed the seeds for future cooperation among developing nations.[18]
The India-Indonesia bonhomie fell apart over the Bandung follow-up. Their divergent foreign policy priorities, Cold War alignments, and differing leadership visions eroded post-Bandung India-Indonesia unity. The Indonesian perception that India sided with Malaysia in the 1963 Konfrontasi in Borneo. As well, India-Pakistan relations, already buffeted by the 1947-48 invasion of Jammu & Kashmir, contributed to this too. The equanimity with China broke, and a war ensued in 1962.
7. Legacy and Long-Term Impact
The Colombo Powers, as the five host nations of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, worked to realize a new vision of Asia that integrated the outer reaches of the mainland on the basis of ancient geographical ties and a cosmopolitan international order. Most importantly, they sought to reclaim Asian agency in the international negotiations on the Korean and Indochina conflict, and spread resistance to collective security pacts in Asia.[19]
Though the final outcomes of the Bandung Conference did not fully match the high expectations, largely due to Cold War tensions and Western suspicions that the movement leaned toward the Soviet Union or China, the event marked a significant moment in history. It boosted the self-confidence of newly independent countries and laid out broad directions for their future paths.[20]
However, contradictions were already present. Among the African invitees were three territories on the brink of independence: the Gold Coast, Sudan, and the Central African Federation. In contrast, South Africa was excluded due to its apartheid policies, and Israel was left out under pressure from Arab nations, which had been at war with it since 1948.
Following the conference, Nehru and others began to reconsider the status of countries like Australia and New Zealand. While geographically distant from Europe, they were often aligned with it politically. Some leaders began to explore the idea of including these nations in a broader Asian framework, possibly as part of future efforts toward regional solidarity. In the end, the Bandung Conference laid the ideological and institutional foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), formally established in 1961. India remained a leading voice within the NAM, advocating for disarmament, economic justice, and a more equitable international order.
India’s performance at Bandung elevated its global profile and affirmed its status as a leader of the postcolonial world. While subsequent geopolitical shifts—such as the Sino-Indian War and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971—would complicate its non-aligned posture, the core principles articulated at Bandung continued to shape India’s foreign policy ethos. In retrospect, Bandung was not just a diplomatic event but a symbolic reordering of world politics. It challenged the dominance of Western powers and created a space for alternative voices. India, through its leadership and vision, helped articulate a collective identity for the Global South.[21]
8. Conclusion
India’s role in the Bandung Conference was pivotal in articulating a postcolonial vision of global order based on peace, sovereignty, and cooperation. Far from being a passive participant, India actively shaped the conference’s agenda and outcomes. While not without flaws, its diplomacy at Bandung exemplified the aspirations of a new era, where formerly colonized nations sought not just independence but a meaningful voice in world affairs. The legacy of Bandung endures in India’s ongoing commitment to South-South cooperation, multilateralism, development, and strategic autonomy. As global power dynamics shift in the twenty-first century, the values and vision championed at Bandung remain surprisingly relevant.
Gurjit Singh served as an Indian diplomat for thirty-seven years, representing India in Germany, Indonesia, Timor Leste, ASEAN, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the African Union, and held postings in Japan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Italy. As Ambassador to ASEAN, he played a key role during the launch of the Act East Policy in 2014. A prolific writer, he has authored books on India’s ties with Japan, Indonesia, and Germany, including a comic book and YouTube video that creatively explored India-Indonesia relations. An expert on the Indo-Pacific and Asian affairs, he frequently comments on ASEAN, the Act East Policy, and regional dynamics. His latest book, The Mango Flavour: India & ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy, was published by the ISEAS, Singapore in August 2025.
[1] Andrea Benvenuti, “The Bogor Conference,” Nehru’s Bandung: Non-Alignment and Regional Order in Indian Cold War Strategy (2024; online, Oxford Academic, November 21, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197790236.003.0009.
[2] Tillman Durdin, “Colombo Powers Plan Asian-African Action,” New York Times, January 2, 1955, https://www.nytimes.com/1955/01/02/archives/colombo-powers-plan-asianafrican-action.html; and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech at Asian Relations Conference 1947 9 last paragraph) March 24, 1947, in Tibet Sun, https://www.tibetsun.com/news/1947/03/24/pt-jawaharlal-nehrus-speech-at-asian-relations-conference-1947
[3] S.D. Muni, “The Bandung Spirit,” in Masala Bumbu, edited by Gurjit Singh (Indonesia: Beritasatu Media Holdings, 2015), 50-55.
[4] Partha S. Ghosh, India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2009).
[5] Benvenuti, “The Bogor Conference.”
[6] Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
[7] Kanti Bajpai, “The Idea of Non-Alignment: India's Foreign Policy after Nehru,” International Affairs 67, no. 2 (1991): 233-246.
[8] Statement by the Indian Delegation at the Closing Session, Bandung, 24 April 1955, Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung. Djakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955, pp. 183-187, https://shorturl.at/cSNtT
[9] Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007).
[10] Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 28 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2004).
[11] Mohammed Ayoob, India and the Third World: Leadership and Foreign Policy (London: Zed Books, 1980).
[12] Jyotika Sharma, “India and the Fight against Apartheid,” South African Historical Journal 62, no. 1 (2010): 77–94.
[13] “Jawaharlal Nehru: Select Speeches,” India Quarterly 45, no. 4 (1989): 367-401. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45072336
[14] Ibid
[15] Prime Minister's speech at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, 23 April 2005, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/pm_April05.htm
[16] See Inder Malhotra, “Memories of Bandung,” in Masala Bumbu, edited by Gurjit Singh (Indonesia: Beritasatu), 2015, 56-59.
[17] Taizo Miyagi, “The Birth of ‘Asia’: The Bandung Conference and Japan’s Dilemma,” in Japan’s Quest for Stability in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2017).
[18] George McT Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956).
[19] Cindy Ewing, “The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia at Bandung, Cold War History 19, no. 1 (2018): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2018.1500553
[20] Muni, “The Bandung Spirit.”
[21] Amitav Acharya, The End of the American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
