ABSTRACT
The call for a new Bandung is not merely symbolic. It is a strategic and normative proposal that insists on the possibility of shaping a world order rooted in justice, mutual respect, and pluralism. A future “Bandung 2.0” is unlikely to manifest as a unified political bloc or a formal international organization. Instead, it may take the form of a networked movement, a constellation of flexible, issue-based coalitions aligned around shared interests and interrelated challenges: digital sovereignty, economic justice, ecological survival, and democratic multilateralism. A renewed Bandung ethos could serve as a unifying moral and strategic compass to align these disparate efforts into a more cohesive agenda with practical, action-oriented goals that reflect Global South interests. In this vision, Bandung 2.0 becomes less about symbolic solidarity and more about functional cooperation.
KEYWORDS
Bandung 2.0, Global South, Prabowo, Sukarno, Soeharto
In April 1955, twenty-nine newly independent or decolonizing Asian and African countries gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, to participate in a conference that changed the trajectory of global politics. Hosted jointly by Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar), and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Bandung Conference was not only a symbolic declaration of anti-colonial solidarity, it was a conscious attempt to carve a path distinct from the binary logic of the Cold War. Though it did not formally establish the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Bandung Conference laid the ideological and political groundwork for what would become a decades-long effort by developing nations to assert agency, autonomy, and unity within a rigid global system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.[1] Today, as the global order tilts toward multipolarity—with middle powers navigating the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing, and the Global South asserting its demand for greater influence in multilateral institutions—the legacy of Bandung resonates with renewed relevance.
This article revisits the 1955 Bandung Conference as a foundational moment in shaping the political identity of the Global South, it traces its connection to the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and examines how Bandung’s original principles have been recalibrated in today’s context as a strategy of strategic autonomy through multi-alignment. It argues that contemporary Global South actors have embedded the Dasasila Bandung (Ten Principles of Bandung) not as a fixed and confining doctrine, but as a flexible framework in the pursuit of autonomous agency in global affairs. However, despite its symbolic power and normative appeal, this framework still lacks political cohesion and institutional expression. If a Bandung 2.0 is to take shape, it must go beyond rhetorical invocations and crystallize into flexible coalitions that respond to shared grievances such as climate injustice, digital exclusion, and sovereign debt, and mobilize joint opportunities for action. Rather than seeking to replicate Cold War-era alignments or build a single bloc, Bandung 2.0 can serve as a pragmatic architecture of solidarity, rooted in principles but oriented toward tangible initiatives that enhance agency and resilience in a deeply unequal global order.
1. The 1955 Bandung Moment
In 1955, the world was deeply bifurcated. On one side stood the capitalist bloc led by the United States, and on the other, the communist bloc under the Soviet Union. The logic of Cold War confrontation left little space for nations that refused to align themselves with either pole. At the same time, decolonization movements were sweeping across Asia and Africa. In this moment of flux, the Bandung Conference emerged as a third voice, one that sought to disrupt the imposed dichotomies and instead articulate an alternative grounded in anti-colonialism, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation.
Convened in the West Java city of Bandung, the conference brought together leaders such as Indonesia’s President Sukarno, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai, and Yugoslavia’s Josep Broz Tito (though Yugoslavia itself was not a participant, Tito later became central to NAM’s foundation).[2] These figures represented a wide ideological spectrum yet shared a common desire: to resist domination—whether from former colonial powers or emerging superpowers—and to assert the right to determine their own national destinies.[3]
For the first time, delegates representing hundreds of millions across the so-called Third World gathered to collectively reflect on the profound changes unleashed by decolonization and its far-reaching consequences. President Sukarno of Indonesia, who hosted the conference, opened the proceedings with a powerful speech that conveyed the aspirations behind the gathering. He expressed hope that the conference would “give guidance to humankind” and help chart a path toward “safety and peace.”[4] More than a celebration of recent milestones—such as India’s independence (1947), the triumph of the Chinese Revolution (1949), and the transition toward self-rule in the Gold Coast (1951), which would become Ghana in 1957—the Bandung Conference declared to the world that “a New Asia and a New Africa have been born.”[5]
The result of their deliberations was the Dasasila Bandung, or the Ten Principles of Bandung, which emphasized respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, equality among nations, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. [6] These principles did not just reject colonialism, they also critiqued the logic of Cold War militarism and ideological coercion. Bandung, in this sense, was as much an affirmation of self-determination as it was a rejection of great-power interference.
More than a conference, Bandung became a symbolic birth of the Global South, a term that would later come to encompass developing nations seeking greater voice, equity, and justice in international affairs. The event’s resonance far exceeded its initial outcomes. It instilled a moral vocabulary and political framework that would be echoed in future demands for a New International Economic Order, climate justice, and reform of the United Nations Security Council.
2. From Bandung to Belgrade: The Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement
While Bandung was a turning point in anti-colonial diplomacy, it did not formally create the Non-Aligned Movement. That came six years later, in 1961 in Belgrade, when twenty-five countries, led by Tito, Nehru, and Nasser, launched NAM as an institutional platform for coordinating political stances and fostering cooperation among countries unwilling to be pawns in Cold War rivalry. Yet Bandung’s intellectual and ideological legacy deeply informed this new formation.[7]
There is often a conceptual confusion between the Bandung spirit and NAM’s doctrine of non-alignment. While both stress autonomy, Bandung promoted what Indonesia called an “independent and active” foreign policy. This approach allowed States to actively engage in global diplomacy without becoming beholden to either power bloc. NAM, on the other hand, institutionalized non-alignment as a more formal rejection of bloc membership.[8]
Despite these differences, the Bandung spirit infused NAM with a sense of purpose. Its influence was visible in NAM’s collective responses to Cold War crises, from the Suez Canal invasion in 1956 to the Vietnam War and apartheid in South Africa. Non-alignment was never about neutrality but about asserting an alternative vision of global order based on equality, peaceful coexistence, and development. In this way, Bandung served as a moral and political blueprint for NAM, even if it was not its organizational beginning.
By the 1970s, NAM had grown into a formidable diplomatic force, comprising over 100 countries and influencing key United Nations resolutions. It was also instrumental in advocating for the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which sought to correct structural imbalances between developed and developing countries. However, the movement’s unity began to erode in the 1980s and 1990s, as geopolitical realities shifted and internal divisions widened.[9]
Indonesia, notably, has played a sustained role in NAM’s evolution. Indonesia’s hosting of the 10th NAM Summit in Jakarta in 1992 was both symbolically and strategically significant. Coming at the end of the Cold War, the summit marked a moment of introspection and recalibration for the movement. The bipolar order that had originally necessitated the creation of NAM had dissolved, leaving member States uncertain about the movement’s relevance in a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Against this backdrop, Indonesia played a crucial role in reinvigorating the movement by emphasizing its enduring principles while adapting its agenda to the realities of a post-Cold War global order.[10]
At the 1992 Summit, Indonesia advocated for a redefinition of non-alignment, not as passive non-engagement, but as active participation in global governance on equitable terms. President Soeharto, addressing the summit, underscored the need for NAM to shift focus from ideological confrontation to economic development, global justice, and the democratization of international institutions. Jakarta’s chairmanship of the NAM (1992–1995) sought to align the movement with the evolving priorities of the NAM members, such as debt relief, technology transfer, environmental sustainability, and a fairer global trade system.[11]
Indonesia also used the summit to reinforce South-South cooperation. The country facilitated dialogue among NAM members on ways to strengthen collective bargaining power within international forums, including the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. This was in line with Indonesia’s broader diplomatic orientation toward what it calls a Bebas dan Aktif (independent and active) foreign policy—one that prioritizes strategic autonomy while remaining constructively engaged in shaping global norms.[12]
Importantly, the 1992 Jakarta Summit reaffirmed NAM’s commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention at a time when humanitarian interventions and the notion of a “new world order” were gaining traction in Western policy circles. Indonesia positioned itself as a spokesperson for countries concerned about the erosion of national sovereignty under the pretext of humanitarianism or global security. The summit thus helped re-anchor NAM’s moral and political compass in the face of shifting power dynamics, ensuring its continued relevance in a rapidly changing world. In essence, Indonesia’s leadership at the 1992 NAM Summit reflected its broader diplomatic ambition: to act as a bridge-builder between the Global North and South, a steward of multilateralism, and a custodian of the principles of decolonial solidarity that animated the Bandung Conference nearly four decades earlier.[13]
3. Dasasila Bandung in the Age of Multipolarity and Middle-Power Diplomacy
The early 21st century presents a radically different geopolitical landscape. The Cold War binaries have collapsed, but new rivalries have emerged. U.S.-China tensions dominate headlines. In the Bandung era, non-alignment was a strategic necessity for newly independent nations, yet today’s world is more economically interconnected, technologically complex, and environmentally fragile. Unlike in 1955, where the choice was about joining or rejecting Cold War blocs, today’s powers must balance technological dependencies, financial linkages, and security guarantees. Their autonomy is constrained not only by military alliances but by digital ecosystems, trade architectures, and infrastructure financing.
Pandemics, digital surveillance, climate disruption, and debt crises have created a diffuse, multidimensional set of global threats. Sri Lanka’s financial crisis has been linked to heavy reliance on external loans for infrastructure, raising concerns about debt traps.[14] Similarly, Zambia has repeatedly faced debt distress tied to Chinese creditors and Western bondholders.[15] On the digital front, countries such as Brazil and India have raised alarm about dependency on U.S.-based Big Tech platforms (Google, Meta, Amazon) which dominate data flows and cloud infrastructures, posing risks to digital sovereignty.[16] Climate disruption also sharpens these vulnerabilities: Pakistan’s 2022 floods displaced millions and caused billions in damages, exacerbating its already fragile economy.[17]
In today’s context, many Global South countries—particularly middle powers like Indonesia, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Türkiye—are turning toward a recalibrated version of Bandung’s logic: strategic autonomy through multi-alignment. Rather than align exclusively with one great power, these States seek to diversify partnerships, hedge against risk, and assert their own development priorities.
This new form of alignment does not resemble NAM’s non-alignment. Instead, countries now balance and engage with multiple powers simultaneously, seeking technology transfers from the West, infrastructure from China, and defense partnerships from regional players. In this world, agency is not about standing apart from global power but about navigating it with dexterity. Multi-alignment is not fence-sitting; it is a strategic choice to navigate complexity without capitulation. This mode of diplomacy does not reject global order but seeks to reform it from within, based on norms of fairness, inclusivity, and sovereignty.
Indonesia offers a prime example. Under President Joko Widodo and now President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta has pursued a foreign policy rooted in the principle of Bebas dan Aktif (independent and active), adapting it to the complexities of today’s multipolar world. This has translated into simultaneous engagement with multiple strategic frameworks. It plays a central role in ASEAN, championing regional unity and centrality; participates in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), focusing on trade, digital economy, and supply chain resilience; while also deepening cooperation with China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly in infrastructure and connectivity. At the same time, Indonesia has expanded its diplomatic profile through active participation in the G20, the BRICS+ dialogue, and the Global South caucuses at the UN, platforms that it uses to advocate for reform of global financial institutions, climate finance equity, and fairer development models. This multi-pronged approach reflects a Bandung-inspired logic: pursuing national interest without becoming beholden to any single power bloc, while working collectively to shape a more just and inclusive global order.
India, similarly, has adopted a multi-vector foreign policy that reflects its aspirations as a major power in a multipolar world. As a founding member of both BRICS and the Quad, India maintains strategic ties with disparate blocs that often hold divergent worldviews.[18] While it engages the Global South through platforms like the BRICS+ and the International Solar Alliance, it also deepens defense and technological cooperation with Western powers through forums like the Quad and bilateral ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia.[19] India’s approach is not merely transactional; it seeks to position itself as a Vishwaguru (a global teacher and moral force) by emphasizing digital public goods, development partnerships, and climate leadership, particularly in the Global South.[20]
Brazil has reasserted its global role through a renewed emphasis on environmental diplomacy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. As custodian of the Amazon, Brazil has returned to climate leadership by hosting summits of rainforest nations, rejoining global climate negotiations with ambition, and pushing for a just ecological transition.[21] Lula has called for debt-for-nature swaps, financing for biodiversity preservation, and greater Global South input in shaping climate policy. Brazil also leverages its agricultural and energy diplomacy to navigate between its environmental responsibilities and development imperatives.[22]
South Africa plays a distinct role in global peace and security through its peacekeeping, mediation, and normative leadership. As Africa’s most industrialized nation and a consistent advocate for reforming the UN Security Council, South Africa has mediated conflicts in Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. Its post-apartheid moral authority, combined with its BRICS membership, allows it to act as a bridge between African priorities and global governance agendas. Pretoria has also advanced inclusive multilateralism by championing African agency within G20 and climate forums. [23]
Türkiye, for its part, has embraced an activist and flexible foreign policy, often described as “strategic autonomy.” Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye has positioned itself as a mediator in conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war (notably the Black Sea grain deal), while maintaining complex relations with NATO, Russia, and regional powers. Ankara’s approach blends Islamic solidarity, economic diplomacy, and geopolitical balancing, engaging the West when necessary while asserting its own regional ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Asia, and Africa. Türkiye’s rise as a humanitarian actor and conflict negotiator underscores a broader trend of middle powers asserting diplomatic agency beyond traditional alliances. [24]
Global South actors have embedded the Dasasila Bandung not as a rigid or outdated doctrine, but as a flexible and adaptive framework that continues to inform their pursuit of autonomous agency in global affairs. While the original Ten Principles of Bandung—centered on sovereignty, mutual respect, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence—were crafted in the context of decolonization and Cold War non-alignment, today they are being reinterpreted to address new forms of dependency and exclusion. In an era defined by strategic rivalry, climate crisis, technological asymmetries, and economic fragmentation, the Bandung principles offer a normative foundation for resisting coercive alignments, advocating for equitable global governance, and advancing developmental priorities rooted in national interest.
Rather than promoting isolation or ideological purity, this recalibrated Bandung logic encourages multi-alignment, South-South cooperation, and institutional reform—a pragmatic strategy that enables Global South states to engage assertively with major powers and multilateral institutions while safeguarding their sovereignty and policy space. In this sense, the enduring relevance of Dasasila Bandung lies not in its literal application, but in its capacity to evolve with the shifting contours of global power and postcolonial aspiration.
4. The Call for a Bandung 2.0.: Reviving Principles for a Multipolar World
Seventy years after the historic 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, calls to revive its spirit have reemerged across the Global South. Against a backdrop of growing strategic rivalry between major powers, climate and debt crises, and demands for more equitable global governance, a range of political leaders and intellectuals have proposed a renewed articulation of Bandung’s core values but now adapted to the complexities of a multipolar world.
One of the most prominent voices has been that of Megawati Soekarnoputri, former President of Indonesia and daughter of Sukarno, the original host of the Bandung Conference. On the 70th anniversary of the conference, Megawati called on Asian and African nations to “rekindle the Bandung Spirit” and convene a second Bandung Conference, which she referred to as Bandung II. Her call was grounded in a sense of unfinished business, especially concerning Palestine and the persistence of neocolonial structures in global politics. “We need monumental decisions to address injustice,” she urged, calling for a moral-political unity based on the Dasasila Bandung that first defined the postcolonial vision of solidarity, sovereignty, and peace.[25]
Indian diplomats and scholars have also contributed to the discourse around a Bandung revival. Rajiv Bhatia, a former Indian ambassador and senior fellow at Gateway House, has argued for a “Bandung Plus” approach. Rather than merely replicating the original tenets of 1955, Bhatia envisions a flexible, modernized framework focused on sustainable development, technological self-reliance, and strategic autonomy. He contends that such an approach would better reflect the needs of the 21st-century Global South, especially as countries seek alternatives to binary alignments amid U.S.-China competition.[26]
Echoes of Bandung also reverberate in China–Indonesia dialogues, where scholars and policy commentators have proposed “retrofitting” Bandung’s legacy into existing multilateral frameworks. Rather than positioning Bandung as an alternative to institutions like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, these thinkers advocate for embedding Bandung’s values—sovereignty, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—within the architecture of contemporary global governance. This strategy includes leveraging platforms such as BRICS and the G77 to counterbalance Western-dominated agendas while maintaining an inclusive and rules-based system.[27]
During a commemorative event in Bandung, Sandeep Chakravorty, India’s ambassador to Indonesia, called for Bandung 2.0 as a concrete diplomatic project. He emphasized economic transformation, technology sharing, and democratic reform of international institutions as key goals. According to Chakravorty, the Global South must not only reclaim its agency but also set the agenda on global challenges like climate change, food security, and digital equity. His vision aligns with the broader consensus that the Bandung principles, though rooted in postcolonial resistance, remain vital to advancing a more equitable global order.[28]
Others have gone further to revive NAM. Both the Philippines and Singapore have called for a revitalization—or reimagining—of NAM to better serve the interests of developing countries amid intensifying geopolitical rivalries. The Philippines urges a more dynamic NAM that can advocate effectively for the Global South in a multipolar world, especially on issues like development, peace, and reform of global governance. Similarly, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan argues for a “new NAM” that enables countries to collaborate and maintain agency despite U.S.-China tensions. Balakrishnan proposed a new NAM focused on science, technology, and supply‑chain cooperation, emphasizing that such a movement should be “multipolar, open and rules‑based.”[29]
In South Africa, Alvin Botes, a member of parliament and senior African National Congress (ANC) leader, echoed this sentiment, arguing that NAM should spearhead a Bandung 2.0. But unlike its Cold War predecessor, this new Bandung moment must move beyond state-to-state diplomacy. For Botes, Bandung 2.0 should embrace intersectional justice—incorporating the voices of youth, women, indigenous peoples, and civil society—and address ecological destruction, debt bondage, and structural inequality.[30] This perspective signals an evolution from the original anti-imperialist ethos toward a more plural and inclusive form of internationalism.
This growing interest in a new or revitalized NAM reflects deeper structural shifts in the global order. As James Traub observes, the current geopolitical environment—shaped by the war in Ukraine, intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, and persistent global crises—has fueled a resurgence of nonalignment, particularly among countries in Asia and Africa. These nations are increasingly resisting pressure to take sides, instead asserting neutral or independent positions. Drawing on insights from scholars like Jorge Heine and Adekeye Adebajo, Traub notes that economic considerations—such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative and vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic—have reinforced a more pragmatic, multipolar approach. For many in the Global South, the traditional binary of democracy versus autocracy holds little appeal compared to the pursuit of concrete benefits like infrastructure investment, trade access, and climate financing. In this context, what some have termed “Nonalignment 2.0” is emerging not as an ideological bloc, but as a flexible strategy grounded in economic self-interest and strategic autonomy.[31]
Across these diverse proposals—whether from political leaders, diplomats, or scholars—common threads emerge: a desire for strategic autonomy, a rejection of great-power hegemony, and a commitment to cooperative development grounded in solidarity. The term Bandung 2.0 has come to represent not a nostalgic return to 1955, but a reimagining of that historic moment to confront today’s challenges. It reflects the continued relevance of Bandung’s core ideas in a world where power is more diffuse but inequality remains entrenched.
5. Bandung Principles for a New Era: A Challenge of a Unified Voice
As multipolarity deepens and the Global South seeks greater voice and agency, the call for a new Bandung is not merely symbolic. It is a strategic and normative proposal, one that insists on the possibility of shaping a world order rooted in justice, mutual respect, and pluralism. However, the strategic flexibility also presents challenges for a collective action. The lack of a unified political voice, competing national interests, and asymmetric economic dependencies complicate attempts to forge collective action.
The Global South today is more economically and politically diverse than ever before. There is no single reform platform or institutional mechanism through which its members can consistently advocate for collective change. While rhetorical solidarity remains strong, translating that sentiment into coordinated policy action has proven difficult. The conditions that enabled the 1955 Bandung Conference cannot be replicated. What is possible, however, is a reinvigoration of Bandung’s moral imagination and diplomatic pragmatism—principles that remain relevant in a fragmented and multipolar world.
A future “Bandung 2.0” is unlikely to manifest as a unified political bloc or a formal international organization. Instead, it may take the form of a networked movement—a constellation of flexible, issue-based coalitions aligned around shared interests and strategic autonomy. These alignments would center on critical and interrelated challenges: digital sovereignty (AI governance, data protection), economic justice (debt restructuring, equitable trade rules), ecological survival (loss and damage financing, biodiversity protection), and democratic multilateralism (reform of the UN Security Council, IMF, and WTO).
Indonesia’s position is illustrative of this shift. In June 2024, President Prabowo Subianto, then as Defense Minister, asserted that there is “no need for a new Non-Aligned Movement,”[32] signaling a preference for action over institution-building. In this context, if Bandung 2.0 is to be reconvened—whether symbolically or operationally—it would likely take shape through adaptive coalitions that reflect shared grievances and mobilize joint opportunities. Bandung 2.0 should not be imagined as the formation of a new political bloc or institutional structure. Rather, it represents an opportunity to mobilize and coordinate the efforts of existing Global South platforms such as the G77, BRICS+, NAM, and regional groupings like the African Union or ASEAN, around shared strategic priorities. While these bodies already articulate many of the values embedded in the original Bandung Conference, their actions are often fragmented.
A renewed Bandung ethos could serve as a unifying moral and strategic compass, helping to align these disparate efforts into a more cohesive agenda with practical, action-oriented goals. This includes joint advocacy for equitable trade rules, climate finance, reform of multilateral institutions, digital and AI governance, and infrastructure standards that reflect Global South interests. In this vision, Bandung 2.0 becomes less about symbolic solidarity and more about functional cooperation, building coalitions across institutions to amplify collective bargaining power and to shape the rules of an emerging multipolar order from the perspective of justice, resilience, and autonomy. This strategy echoes Bandung's independent and active diplomacy.
Ultimately, Bandung was never about isolation. It was about inclusive engagement. It insisted that moral clarity and diplomatic pragmatism could coexist. That legacy endures. And in an age of multipolar uncertainty, it may be our best hope for a just and cooperative world order.
Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana (PhD) currently serves as the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of Sweden, concurrently accredited to the Republic of Latvia. Dr. Mulyana joined the MFA in 1993 and has since held numerous key positions, including: Head of the Foreign Policy Strategy Agency, Head of the Center for Education and Training, and Head of the Secretariat for Special Envoys of the President. His overseas postings include: Consul General of Indonesia in Sydney, Indonesian Embassy in Singapore, and Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN in New York. He graduated from the University of Padjadjaran, Department of International Relations, and pursued master’s and doctoral programmes in the United States under a Fulbright scholarship.
Cut Nury Hikmah Sabry (Nury) is a Junior Diplomat/Attaché at the Center for Policy Strategy for the America and Europe Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, a role she has held since 2022. She holds a Master’s in International Security from Sciences Po Paris and a Bachelor’s in International Relations from Universitas Indonesia. Her work centers on formulating foreign policy strategies. Beyond diplomacy, Nury embraces her role as a mom and savors quiet moments with a cup of coffee—small pauses that keep her grounded in the fast-paced world of international affairs.
[1] Christopher J. Lee, Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010); Jürgen Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics, 1927–1992 (Leiden: Brill, 2019); and Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007), 33–50.
[2] Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement, 98-100.
[3] Prashad, The Darker Nations, 35-36.
[4] Sukarno, “Speech at the Opening of the Asian African Conference,” Bandung, April 18, 1955, in Documents of the Asian African Conference, ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1955), 27.
[5] Ibid., 30.
[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, ed, “Final Communiqué of the Asian African Conference of Bandung (24 April 1955),” in The Asia-Africa Speak from Bandung, ed. (Djakarta, 1955), 161-169.
[7] Dinkel, The Non-Aligned Movement, 175–180.
[8] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the Bandung Spirit: Then and Now,” in Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, edited by Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 180; and George McT Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956).
[9] Dinkel, 267–270; Prashad, 122–126.
[10] Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2003), 124–126.
[11] Soeharto, “Opening Statement at the 10th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement,” Jakarta, September 1, 1992, cited in “Basic documents: The Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,” Jakarta, September 1-6, 1992 (Jakarta: Perpustakaan Diplomasi Kemenlu, 1992); and Soeharto, “Address by President Soeharto of the Republic of Indonesia as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Inaugural Session of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries,” Colombia Internacional 31 (1995): 33-39.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the Bandung Spirit: Then and Now.”
[14] Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times, June 25, 2018; and Cissy Zhou, “Sri Lanka’s China Debt-Trap Fears Grow as Beijing Keeps Investing,” Nikkei Asia, January 2, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/asia-insight/sri-lanka-s-china-debt-trap-fears-grow-as-beijing-keeps-investing
[15] Deborah Brautigam, “How Zambia and China Co-Created a Debt ‘Tragedy of the Commons,’” Policy Brief of China-Africa Research Initiative, no. 61 (2021); and Zanji Sinkala, “How IMF Loan Conditions Cost Zambians Dearly,” TRT Global, June 2, 2023, https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/13464638
[16] Cecilia Rikap, “South America’s Sovereignty is Being Lost in Big Tech’s Clouds,” openDemocracy, July 30, 2025, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/south-america-big-tech-brazil-chile-data-centres-united-states/
[17] World Bank, “Pakistan Floods 2022: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment,” Report, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022).
[18] C. Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015), 43–57.
[19] Harsh V. Pant and Kabir Taneja, ed, “Looking Back and Looking Ahead: Indian Foreign Policy in Transition Under Modi,” Observer Research Foundation Special Report, no. 93 (July 2019).
[20] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India’s G20 Presidency: One Earth, One Family, One Future (New Delhi: MEA, 2023).
[21] Secretaria de Comunicação Social, Government of Brazil, “2023 was Marked as a Year to Rebuild Brazilian Foreign Policy,” January 2024, https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2024/01/2023-was-marked-as-a-year-to-rebuild-brazilian-foreign-policy?; and Tom Phillips, “Brazilian President Lula Pledges ‘New Amazon Dream’ at Rainforest Summit,” The Guardian, August 8, 2023.
[22] Eduardo Viola and Matias Franchini, Brazil and Climate Change: Beyond the Amazon (New York: Routledge, 2022).
[23] Deputy Minister Alvin Botes, “South Africa’s Diplomacy in a Turbulent Geopolitical Era,” Speech at the Joint Seminar of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation and SAIIA, Sandton, Johannesburg, March 24, 2025, Government of South Africa, https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/deputy-minister-alvin-botes-south-africa%E2%80%99s-diplomacy-turbulent-geopolitical-era-24
[24] Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Mehmet Kutlay, and E. Fuat Keyman, “Strategic Autonomy in Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Multipolarity: Lineages and Contradictions of an Idea,” International Politics, January 2025; Gönül Tol, “Balance in the Black Sea: The Complex Dynamic Between Turkey, Russia, and NATO,” Middle East Institute, 2022; and Merve Aydogan, “Black Sea Grain Deal is Result of Türkiye’s Mediator Role, Says President Erdoğan,” Anadolu Agency, December 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/black-sea-grain-deal-is-result-of-turkiyes-mediator-role-says-president-erdogan/2772606?
[25] Megawati Soekarnoputri, “Indonesia’s Megawati Calls for Asian-African Unity on Palestine Issue,” Antara News, April 19, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/352965/indonesias-megawati-calls-for-asian-african-unity-on-palestine-issue
[26] Rajiv Bhatia quoted in “Bandung Spirit Turns 70: Guiding the Global South’s Future,” Antara News, April 22, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/352317/bandung-spirit-turns-70-guiding-the-global-souths-future
[27] “Indonesia and China Renew Bandung Spirit,” China Daily, April 18, 2025, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/18/WS68019f72a3104d9fd382021e.html
[28] Sandeep Chakravorty, quoted in “India dan Indonesia Siap Menghidupkan Kembali Semangat Bandung,” Media Formasi, April 17, 2025, https://mediaformasi.com/2025/04/india-dan-indonesia-siap-menghidupkan-kembali-semangat-bandung-untuk-memperkuat-global-south/
[29] Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, “Philippines Calls for Revitalized Non-Aligned Movement to Promote Interests of Developing Countries,” DFA News, June 20, 2024, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/dfa-releasesupdate/34003-philippines-calls-for-revitalized-non-aligned-movement-to-promote-interests-of-developing-countries; and Tham Yuen-C, “New Non-Aligned Movement Needed for Countries to Keep Collaborating amid US-China Tensions: Vivian Balakrishnan,” The Straits Times, June 19, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/new-non-aligned-movement-needed-for-countries-to-keep-collaborating-amid-us-china-tensions-vivian-balakrishnan
[30] Alvin Botes, quoted in “Bandung Spirit Turns 70: Guiding the Global South’s Future,” Antara News, April 22, 2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/352317/bandung-spirit-turns-70-guiding-the-global-souths-future
[31] James Traub, “Cold War 2.0 Is Ushering In Nonalignment 2.0,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/09/nonalignment-us-china-cold-war-ukraine-india-global-south
[32] “Prabowo Subianto Says No Need for New Non-Aligned Movement in Indonesia,” Tempo, June 3, 2024, https://en.tempo.co/read/1879682/prabowo-subianto-says-no-need-for-new-non-aligned-movement-in-indonesia
