Rising Asia Journal
Rising Asia Foundation
ISSN 2583-1038
PEER REVIEWED | MULTI-DISCIPLINARY | EASTERN FOCUS
RESEARCH ARTICLE

MD. NASIR UDDIN

University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh   

AN ARMED “TRAINING ALLIANCE” OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN EXTREMISTS
Fueling Terrorism in South Asia

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the mutual armed training between the Islamist Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) and the Christian Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) in Bangladesh. It uses a mixed-methods approach with content analysis and applies political and network theories of terrorism to understand the extent and reasons behind their collaboration. The findings show a cycle where mutual armed training boosts both groups’ ability for violence. This research study brings to light the factors fueling their collaboration, providing important insights to tackle a growing threat.

KEYWORDS
Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS), Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), armed training, Al-Qaeda, political and network theories of terrorism

The South Asian region has witnessed the formation of a complex landscape of insurgency and violent extremism in recent decades. It has been fueled by factors such as historical grievances, ethnic and religious tensions, and the presence of militant groups espousing radical ideologies. An emerging phenomenon that warrants closer examination is the concept of “reciprocity of armed training” where seemingly disparate groups with distinct objectives engage in the mutual exchange of military and combat training. This practice raises significant concerns due to its potential to exacerbate existing security threats.

Reciprocity of armed training refers to the exchange of knowledge, skills, and tactics related to weaponry, combat techniques, and military strategies among individuals or groups at risk of radicalization. Such training can occur within organized groups, clandestine networks, or online communities. It serves as a phenomenon of growing concern as it can contribute to the radicalization process in several ways. First, it reinforces extremist beliefs as individuals share training experiences that validate and strengthen their existing ideologies. Second, it fosters group cohesion and camaraderie among individuals who share extremist views, providing a sense of belonging and support. Third, it equips individuals with practical skills and knowledge related to violence, potentially raising their capacity to pursue extremist agendas.

This study focuses on two extremist groups both of whom operate in Bangladesh. While these groups have distinct ideologies and objectives, evidence suggests they engage in reciprocal armed training, potentially leading to the aforementioned risks of radicalization and escalation of violence. An understanding of the dynamics and motivations behind their collaboration is crucial to assess the security implications and formulate effective counter-terrorism and conflict resolution strategies.

Figure 1: Map of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Mizoram[1]

This research study aims to investigate the extent and nature of the armed training reciprocity between the JAFHS and the KNF. By analyzing their motivations, operational capabilities, and the potential consequences of their collaboration, this study seeks to contribute valuable insights to the understanding of this emerging phenomenon and to inform the development of tailored interventions that promote peace, stability, and security in the region.

1. Justification of the Study

This researcher has conducted a thorough examination of the existing data on the subject in order to understand the gaps in the existing studies of reciprocity of armed training in the area. The conclusions of this study offer compelling new information about the scope and makeup of the relationships that exist between local insurgent and terrorist organizations.

The existing studies on alliances offer both commonalities and differences in their focus, methodologies, and implications. Bapat and Bond concentrate on militant group alliances,[2] while Popovic explores inter-rebel alliances and foreign sponsorship.[3] Burchal Henningsen’s research delves into alliance cohesion among Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, and Farah discusses the merging of terrorist and criminal groups, with a specific emphasis on the threat to Europe and the United States.[4] Al Qurtuby’s work centers around Christian-Muslim alliances in peacebuilding, focusing on the case of Ambon Island.[5] Burchal Henningsen Gade et al.,[6] and Farah employ case studies and discuss factors contributing to alliance growth. A common strength of these studies is their emphasis on the importance of alliances in shaping group behavior, capabilities, and conflict outcomes, contributing to our understanding of regional and global security and geopolitical landscapes. Bapat and Bond’s article, however, lacks an extensive discussion of challenges and risks related to alliances, and Popovic’s work could benefit from considering additional factors in their examination. A limitation of Burchal Henningsen’s study is its focus on a specific region which could be enhanced by a broader analysis. While Al Qurtuby’s and Gade et al.’s works share a common thrust on the role of alliances in conflict situations, their approaches differ, with Al Qurtuby emphasizing a specific case and Gade et al. exploring rebel alliances in fragmented civil wars more broadly. Additionally, Horowitz and Potter’s article examines terrorist group alliances,[7] offering a narrower focus than the works of Al Qurtuby and Gade et al. who look at broader conflict dynamics.

The studies on networks and alliances among terrorist and separatist groups present several points of comparison, contrast, and weakness. Both “Networks and Netwars” and “Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars” explore the concept of networks in conflict contexts, with the former concentrating on netwar and challenging traditional hierarchical structures, while the latter investigates rebel alliances in fragmented civil wars.[8] Both works demonstrate the importance of understanding the dynamics of networks and their influence on alliance formation, including shared ideology, enemies, and external sponsors. However, “Networks and Netwars” provides a broader perspective beyond rebel alliances, encompassing various actors in netwar, while “Networks of Cooperation” specifically concentrates on rebel cooperation within civil wars. A weakness in Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s work is that it lacks an extensive discussion of challenges and risks related to alliances, while Gade et al.’s study could benefit from considering additional factors in their examination of alliance formation. On the other hand, “Networks of Rebellion” by Staniland offers valuable insights into the organizational dynamics of insurgent groups, but the author could further strengthen their analysis by including case studies from other regions beyond the examples provided.[9] Similarly, while Parkinson’s article explores the impact of social networks on rebel mobilization using compelling case studies, it could benefit by incorporating examples from other conflict contexts to enhance its generalizability.[10] Realuyo’s article on the “terror-crime nexus” of Hezbollah provides crucial insights into the group’s exploitation of criminal networks, but a limitation is its focus solely on this specific group, and it would gain from a broader examination of other terrorist organizations’ involvement in criminal activities.[11]

The studies on terrorism, transnational organized crime (TOC), and insurgencies present several points of comparison, contrast, and weakness. In his study, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later,” Schmid explores the evolving relationship between terrorism and TOC, gesturing towards a shift to terrorists and criminals using TOC networks to finance their activities and smuggle weapons and drugs.[12] In contrast, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism” offers a comprehensive overview of the relationship between TOC and terrorism, emphasizing their growing trend of convergence through collaboration, symbiosis, and competitive overlap.[13] While both studies emphasize the threat posed by the cooperation of terrorists and criminals, Schmid’s article dwells on more recent developments, while Makarenko provides a broader historical perspective. A potential weakness in Schmid’s work could be a lack of in-depth analysis of the historical context of the relationship, while Makarenko’s article might benefit from including more recent case studies to strengthen its relevancy. 

Clarke’s study, “Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality,” provides a historical overview of SALW trafficking and its use in major conflicts,[14] while Uddin’s article delves into the structures and propaganda of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in South Asia.[15] The former study highlights the challenges in preventing SALW trafficking, while the latter emphasizes the threat posed by these terrorist groups and the need for coordinated regional efforts to counter them. Both articles contribute to an understanding of terrorism and security issues, but Uddin’s work specifically focuses on Al-Qaeda and the IS, limiting the scope to South Asia, while the former study offers a broader historical context. A potential weakness in Uddin’s work could be the lack of examination of other terrorist groups operating in the region.

Daniel Byman’s “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,”[16] and Bunker’s “Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications,” offer comprehensive overviews of their respective subjects.[17] Byman’s work explores the concept of proto-insurgencies and provides insights into early warning indicators and counterinsurgency strategies. On the other hand, Bunker’s book delves into the use of UAVs by terrorist and insurgent groups and emphasizes the need for new military strategies to counter their threat. Both books contribute significantly to the study of insurgencies and terrorism, but Byman’s work specifically focuses on proto-insurgencies which are not yet full-blown insurgencies, while Bunker concentrates on UAVs used by these groups. A potential weakness in Byman’s work could be the lack of in-depth case studies to illustrate the concept of proto-insurgencies, while Bunker’s book might benefit from further exploring the potential implications of UAVs on military operations.

Bailey et al.’s article, “The System Made Me Do It: Strategies of Survival,”[18] explores how people in informal economies cope with challenges, while Realuyo’s article on the “The Terror-Crime Nexus: Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators” deals with Hezbollah’s exploitation of criminal networks to finance terrorist activities.[19] Bailey et al.’s work offers insights into different types of informal economies and their impact on social and economic development, while Realuyo highlights the threat posed by Hezbollah’s criminal activities. Both contributions are valuable for understanding specific aspects of informality and terrorism, but they approach different topics. A potential weakness in Bailey’s work could be the need for more concrete examples and case studies to support the strategies of survival discussed, while Realuyo’s article could benefit from exploring the broader implications of the terror-crime nexus beyond Hezbollah.

The aforementioned investigations do not address the extent and type of mutual ties between the JAFHS and the KNF that required the present researcher to conduct the study through the following conceptual framework (see Figure 2). 

2. Objectives of the Study

This study’s main objective was to look at the scope and character of the linkages that the JAFHS and the KNF have in common. This researcher has thoroughly investigated the following specific questions in order to fulfil the study’s overall goal.

  • What is the scope and origin of the links that the JAFHS and the KNF have in common?
  • How are these two groups structured organizationally?
  • How have their mutually beneficial ties become a threat to the South and Southeast Asian region?

2.1 Methodology

In developing the methodology, this researcher emphasized a thorough selection and analysis of diverse sources to provide a comprehensive understanding of the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF. The methodology is detailed below, addressing specific questions raised:

Data Collection:

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to investigate the scope, origins, and security implications of the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF.

  • Data were collected from two primary sources: public documents and social media:

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the public discourse surrounding the JAFHS, the KNF, and their potential collaboration, a multifaceted approach to data collection was employed involving searching prominent national and regional newspapers in Bangladesh such as Prothom Alo, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, The Business Standard, Pabattanews, and Hill Voice using tor and google browser.[20] The timeframe for data collection ran from January 2019 to June 2024, ensuring the inclusion of recent developments. Additionally, the researcher incorporated academic resources including books and journals authored by reputable scholars focusing on these groups and the broader regional security landscape.

Official websites and social media accounts of the JAFHS and the KNF were scrutinized for pertinent content, adhering to ethical protocols. Diplomatic reports from South Asian countries’ diplomatic websites were consulted to provide external perspectives on potential collaborations. The content selection prioritized materials explicitly discussing or offering valuable insights into the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF such as pronouncements, press releases, recruitment materials, and online discussions hosted by these groups or pertinent forums.[21]

  • Focus Group Discussion:

The researcher organized two private focus groups to gain deeper insights into the perspectives of individuals directly involved in the security landscape. Each focus group comprised five seasoned security analysts and six experienced journalists and storytellers in Dhaka, Bangladesh, totaling eleven participants in each group. The selection process for participants involved identifying individuals with significant experience and expertise in the subject matter. During the focus group discussions, a range of topics related to the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF was covered.[22] These topics included but were not limited to:

    • Motivations behind the collaboration.
    • Perceived benefits and risks associated with the collaboration.
    • Assessments of the organizational structures and capabilities of the JAFHS and the KNF.
    • Potential security implications for the region.
    • Strategies for mitigating the risks posed by the collaboration.
    • Insights from participants’ professional experiences and observations in the field.

Data Analysis:

Informed by insights of the focus groups consisting of security analysts and journalists, the study employed a multifaceted approach to data analysis. Public documents and social media content underwent thematic analysis, focusing on collaboration dynamics, organizational structures of the JAFHS and the KNF, and potential security implications, identifying key themes during the discussions.[23]

Additionally, we employed a grounded theory approach to analyze the data gathered from the focus groups, aiming to uncover potential themes that may not have been explicitly raised during the discussions. To ensure a systematic analysis, a coding scheme was established prior to data analysis, informed by both the research objectives and the content of the focus group discussions. The coding scheme facilitated the identification of key themes and sub-themes pertaining to the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF, promoting consistency across analyses through intercoder reliability. Intercoder reliability refers to the extent to which multiple coders, independently applying the coding scheme, arrive at similar results. This process enhances the credibility and trustworthiness of the findings by minimizing subjective biases. Furthermore, the researcher complemented his qualitative findings with statistical analysis using Excel, providing additional context where applicable.[24]

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework of the Study

Source: the author created the chart with the help of focus groups.

Conducting Research with Integrity:

Ethical considerations were paramount throughout the research process. Data collection, particularly from public sources, prioritized ethical protocols to safeguard privacy and confidentiality while gleaning insights.[25] This involved respecting ethical standards when accessing information from national and regional newspapers, academic resources, official websites, and social media accounts of the JAFHS and the KNF.[26] Furthermore, the engagement with focus groups bolstered ethical standards by seeking diverse perspectives while respecting participant autonomy and ensuring confidentiality.

2.2 Conceptual Framework of the Study

The conceptual framework analyzes and interprets the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF in the specified region, as follows:

  • Central Concept: Collaboration Dynamics.

This serves as the core focus of the framework, emphasizing the nature and extent of the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF. It comprises two main variables:

    • Independent Variables: Types and Levels of Collaboration.
    • Sub-variables: Tactical Collaboration, Ideological Collaboration, Operational Collaboration.

The abovementioned variables aim to categorize and understand the various dimensions of collaboration, distinguishing between aspects such as tactics, ideologies, and operational strategies.

In addition, the dependent variable (below) explores the broader consequences of the collaboration on regional security, delving into specific areas like the potential for terrorism, insurgency, and the emergence of separatist movements.

    • Dependent Variable: Regional Security Implications.
    • Sub-variables: Terrorism, Insurgency, Separatist Movements.
  • Mediating Factors:

The factors influencing or shaping the relationship between collaboration dynamics and regional security implications are as follows:

    • Geographical Factors: Influence of Chittagong Hill Tracts Terrain.
    • Operational Factors: Strategies Employed in Joint Operations.
    • Sociopolitical Factors: Support Base and Community Dynamics.

These factors, considered as mediators, impact how the collaboration dynamics unfold and subsequently affect regional security.

  • Moderating Factors:

The factors exerting a moderating influence on the strength or direction of the relationship between collaboration dynamics and regional security implications are as follows:

    • Government Response: Crackdowns, Counter-terrorism Measures.
    • International Relations: Cross-border Cooperation, Diplomatic Engagements.

Government response and international relations play a role in shaping the outcomes of the collaboration, either intensifying or mitigating security implications.

  • Outcome:
    • Variable: Regional Stability.
    • Sub-variables: Security Threats, Cross-border Mobility, Refugee Crisis.

The ultimate outcome variable is regional stability, with sub-variables representing the tangible consequences such as security threats, cross-border mobility of militants, and the emergence of a refugee crisis.

This conceptual framework provides a structured and organized approach to analyze the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF, offering a systematic exploration of its various dimensions and the subsequent impact on the regions.

2.3 Theoretical Framework of the Study

The present study explores the political and network theories of terrorism within the context of the two militant groups, the JAFHS and the KNF. Let’s discuss each theory in detail:

Political Theory of Terrorism: The political theory of terrorism posits that acts of terrorism are driven by political motives and aim to achieve specific political objectives.[27] In the case of the JAFHS and the KNF, their engagement in armed training reciprocity suggests that they are pursuing political goals through violence. The JAFHS, driven by Islamist ideology, aims to establish an Islamic state or enforce specific Islamic laws primarily in the subcontinent, with a focus on Bangladesh. In contrast, the KNF, a separatist group striving for regional autonomy or independence for the Kuki-Chin ethnic people, advocates for a separate administrative system for several areas in Bangladesh such as Baghaichari, Juraichari, Borkol, Bilaichari, Rwangchari, Ruma, Thanchi, Lama, and Alikdam in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, under the banner of the Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC).[28]

The political theory of terrorism helps explain how terrorist groups employ violence to garner attention, instill fear, and pressure governments or other entities to address their grievances or demands. Both the JAFHS and the KNF resort to violent tactics to amplify their causes and challenge the state’s authority in their respective regions.

Network Theory of Terrorism: The network theory of terrorism focuses on the organizational and operational aspects of terrorist groups.[29] It examines how these groups are structured, how they interact, and how they form alliances or engage in cooperation with other groups. The study’s emphasis on “armed training reciprocity” between the JAFHS and the KNF exemplifies the networked nature of their relationship. The network theory suggests that terrorist organizations may form alliances, share resources, and engage in cooperation to strengthen their capabilities. In the case of the JAFHS and the KNF, the exchange of armed training indicates mutual support and a strategic collaboration to enhance their operational capacity and tactics. Such networked relationship allows them to pool resources, share knowledge, and conduct joint military operations, which poses significant challenges for counterterrorism efforts.

Overall, this diagnostic study provides valuable insights into the political and network theories of terrorism by analyzing the activities and interactions of two militant groups. An understanding of the underlying political motivations and the dynamics of their networked relationship is essential to develop effective counterterrorism strategies and address the root causes that fuel such violent extremism.

2.4 Findings of the Study

The Extent and Source of Connections Between the JAFHS and the KNF

In March 2020, at a residential hotel in Cox’s Bazar, Shamin Mahfuz, the chief of the JAFHS, and Nathan Bom, the chief of the KNF, finalized a significant agreement. The five-point agreement encompassed clauses addressing service charges, the maintenance of ties in hilly regions, establishment of training camps, dispute resolution mechanisms, and even provisions for female recruitment. The agreement laid out the terms of cooperation between the JAFHS and the KNF, marking a significant milestone in their relationship. The alliance addressed the needs of both groups.[30] The following factors will help readers understand the issues clearly.[31]

  • The JAFHS’ history and motivation:  Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) is a new militant group in Bangladesh formed in 2017 by former members of banned organizations. They have trained in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Rohingya camps, and have links to Al-Qaeda. One of their goals is to stage a large-scale attack to free imprisoned militant leaders.[32] Considering the JAFHS’ motivation, it is crucial to delve into the underlying factors driving the group’s actions and alliances. These are as follows:
    1. The JAFHS needed a safe haven and training ground in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The strategic location of the CHT, a remote and hilly region bordering Myanmar and India, played a pivotal role in providing the JAFHS with a sanctuary from Bangladeshi security forces, shielding them from easy tracking or raids. The geographical isolation, coupled with the historically complex political landscape of the CHT and the limited presence of government security forces in certain areas, afforded the JAFHS the opportunity to operate with a reduced level of fear of immediate intervention. Moreover, the hilly terrain and existing infrastructure controlled by the KNF offered the JAFHS a suitable environment for training its recruits in combat tactics, bomb-making, and other militant activities, further consolidating their foothold in the region.[33]
    2. The JAFHS offered the KNF financial support worth Bangladesh Taka 300,000 per month and covered their food expenses in exchange for shelter and training. Providing financial aid to the KNF served a dual purpose for the JAFHS: First, it helped strengthen their relationship with the KNF, fostering cooperation and collaboration between the two organizations. Secondly, it contributed to the advancement of the JAFHS’ objectives by indirectly supporting the training and operational capabilities of a partner group working towards shared goals. By covering food expenses for KNF members, the JAFHS not only fostered a sense of dependence but also solidified the alliance. The financial incentive likely played a crucial role in convincing the KNF to offer shelter and training to the JAFHS, equipping its members with skills for more effective militant activities. Moreover, beyond financial support, the agreement may have involved the exchange of resources. The JAFHS could have offered access to weapons or expertise in return for the training and shelter provided by the KNF, highlighting the potential for shared resources to further cement their collaboration.[34]
  • The KNF’s history and motivation: The Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) is a recently emerged group fighting for an independent state called the “Kuki-Chin Territorial State” in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. They claim deprivation by the government compared to other ethnicities and seek to fulfill a historical desire for a Christian buffer state in the region. The KNF receives training and weapons from insurgent groups in neighboring Myanmar and India.[35] It is essential to understand the KNF’s motivation, as demonstrated below, to collaborate with the JAFHS and the dynamics of their relationship:
    1. The KNF sought to bolster its manpower and military capabilities to counter the rival Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS). The JSS is a political organization representing the indigenous Jumma people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. It advocates for the rights and autonomy of the indigenous groups. The KNF should be concerned about the JSS because it poses a challenge to the KNF’s objectives and territorial influence in the region. On the one hand, the KNF’s goals include asserting control over certain territories, protecting the interests of the Marma community, and advancing their political agenda. On the other hand, the JSS aims to secure the rights and autonomy of indigenous communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and opposes the dominance of armed groups like the KNF. The KNF aimed to mitigate its manpower shortages arising from defections, casualties, or recruitment challenges by filling its ranks with JAFHS recruits. The influx of more than 55 recruits in mid-2023 bolstered the KNF’s manpower, potentially enabling expanded operations or enhanced defense against rivals like the JSS.
    2. Moreover, JAFHS members, particularly those with combat experience, likely brought valuable military expertise to the KNF, such as knowledge in training methods, combat tactics and weaponry, thereby elevating the KNF’s fighting capabilities. The KNF’s collaboration with the larger JAFHS gave the former a strategic advantage in its conflict with the JSS, potentially deterring it or prompting tactical adjustments.[36]
  • Factors facilitating the alliance: An exploration of the factors facilitating the alliance between the JAFHS and the KNF provides insights into the circumstances that brought the two groups together and the conditions under which their collaboration thrived. The shared history of the JAFHS and KNF leaders from their Dhaka University days, likely in the late 1990s and early 2000s, played a crucial role in forging the initial connection between them. The leaders referred to here are Shamin Mahfuz from the JAFHS and Nathan Bom from KNF. The university connection provided a springboard for communication and trust-building, fostered by shared experiences and potentially a broader network of mutual acquaintances. The network facilitated the initial discussions and negotiations that ultimately led to the formation of the alliance.[37]

Religious References—Justification and Strategic Framing: An examination of the religious references used by the JAFHS and the KNF sheds light on how they employed religious narratives to rationalize their collaboration and shape perceptions of their alliance. The comparison drawn by JAFHS leaders between their situation and the historical event of the Prophet’s followers seeking refuge in Abyssinia provided a compelling narrative for the KNF, despite being a Christian group. The reference likely resonated with the KNF’s sense of religious tolerance, fostering a sense of shared values despite religious differences. Moreover, by invoking an historical example, JAFHS leaders aimed to legitimize their request for shelter from the KNF, strategically justifying an otherwise unconventional alliance between a Muslim extremist group and a Christian separatist group.[38]

  • Operational Collaboration: An analysis of the operational collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF reveals the practical aspects of their alliance, including joint activities, coordination efforts, and the exchange of resources.[39]
    • Training Under KNF Supervision and Adopting Bom (Bawn) Names: Training under KNF supervision and adopting Bom (Bawm) names refers to the practice where individuals undergoing training or joining the KNF adopt a new name with “Bawn” or “Bom” as a suffix. These names serve as a form of identification within the KNF and signify allegiance to the organization. The adoption of these names is often part of an indoctrination process and reflects the individual’s commitment to the KNF’s cause and values. The training provided by the KNF to JAFHS members suggests a transfer of knowledge and expertise covering areas such as combat tactics, guerrilla warfare, weapons handling, or bomb-making, thereby significantly enhancing the JAFHS’ operational capabilities. Additionally, the joint training sessions likely fostered a sense of camaraderie and shared experience between JAFHS and KNF members, potentially improving coordination and cooperation during future operations. Moreover, the adoption of Bawn (Bom) names by JAFHS members during training with the KNF could signify various possibilities, including a means to blend in with the KNF during training or indicating a deeper level of integration between the two groups.[40]
    • JAFHS Purchasing Arms from the KNF: The KNF received Bangladesh Taka 1.7 million from the new militant group JAFHS to purchase weapons.[41] The weapons purchased by the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) were first delivered in the last eight to nine months of 2023. However, it is unclear if the purchases are ongoing. Muntasir Ahmed, the finance affairs coordinator of the JAFHS, provided Bangladesh Taka 1.7 million to KNF for this purpose. Additionally, he sent Taka 5 million to different locations through banking and mobile banking channels.[42]
    • JAFHS members making their own uniforms implies several possibilities. The absence of pre-made uniforms among JAFHS members might indicate a deliberate choice to maintain operational secrecy rather than a lack of access to professional tailors. This suggests that the JAFHS is striving for self-sufficiency in uniform creation, possibly signaling a shift towards reducing dependency on the KNF for basic operational requirements and aiming for greater autonomy. Moreover, the ability to make their own uniforms highlights the JAFHS’ capacity for improvization and adaptation to their environment by using readily available resources, reflecting their resilience and ingenuity in the face of challenges.[43] The alliance between a militant group, the JAFHS, and a separatist group, the KNF, highlights the complex web of relationships and motivations that can lead to partnership between seemingly disparate actors. Strategic needs, historical references, and personal connections all played a role in this case.

4. Organizational Structure of the KNF

Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF)

The ethnic armed group, the Kuki-Chin National Front, has existed in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts since its founding in 2008 under the non-governmental organization, the Kuki-Chin National Development Organization (KNDO), with the goal of advancing cultural preservation, economic growth, and the defense of the rights of the underprivileged and backward Kuki-Chin communities in the CHT. The organization changed over time, becoming a separatist group that wanted the Kuki-Chin ethnic community to have autonomy and self-governance.[44]

Emergence and Objectives: The KNDO, which later became the Kuki National Front, emerged in 2008 to address socio-economic issues faced by the Kuki-Chin communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Initially, it used peaceful means, advocating for economic development, cultural preservation, and land protection. However, the KNF’s demands escalated due to perceived discriminatory treatment by the government and larger communities like the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (Santu), Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (Reformist), United Peoples Democratic Front (Proseet), United Peoples Democratic Front (Democratic), and the dominant Bengali population. They now seek a separate autonomous region called the “Kuki-Chin Territorial State.”

The KNF’s activities gained attention in 2022 when Indian Border Security Force arrested some of its members in Mizoram in October of that year. A recovered letter with the seal of the KNF’s president and chief of staff (unfortunately, their names are not publicly available) provided crucial evidence of their operations. This led to the exposure and increased scrutiny of the group’s activities by law enforcement agencies.[45]

Territory and Leadership: The Kuki National Front (KNF) claims ancestral territory encompassing a significant portion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. This includes areas like Baghaichari, Juraichari, Borkol, Bilaichari, Rwangchari, Ruma, Thanchi, Lama, and Alikdam. The group’s leadership is primarily composed of members from the Kuki-Chin ethnic group. Nathan Bom, an educated individual with a background in the arts, serves as the current president. Nathan, a former Dhaka University student, made headlines as reportedly the first member of the Bawm (Bom) community to run as an independent candidate in the 2018 Bangladesh general election.[46] Nathan has gone into hiding due to continuous operations by law enforcement organizations in the highlands.[47]

Members and Training: The KNF has both armed and unarmed members, totaling around 3,000 to 4,000. In 2016-17, the group established an armed wing known as the Kuki-Chin National Volunteers (KNV) and sought military training from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin Province in Myanmar, and Kuki National Army (KNA) in Manipur in India. Hundreds of active members received training, primarily in Kachin Province and in Manipur. After completing infantry commando training, these armed individuals returned to the CHT. The KNF armed fighters underwent three months of training, starting with one month of theoretical and physical training in Mizoram. The remaining two months were spent training with Myanmar separatist groups to gain practical combat experience against the Myanmar Army. In the first batch, more than 100 Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA) members were sent to Manipur, India, for training, which occurred in the end of 2017. Later, another 100 members were sent to Manipur, as well as to the Karenni and Kachin states of Myanmar for guerrilla training which took place in 2018. They returned to the CHT after completing their training in 2019.

Currently, the organization’s armed wing, known as the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), consists of around 4,000 members in the CHT and Mizoram, and they possess lethal automatic weapons. To evade security forces, many KNF members disguise themselves in plainclothes, residing in their localities while being prepared to retreat to their hideouts swiftly. They also actively showcase their strength and activities by frequently uploading pictures and videos of their armed training on social media.[48]

Funding and Tactics: The funding and tactics of the KNF are essential aspects of an understanding of the group’s operations and capabilities.

Funding: The KNF funds its activities primarily through extortion and the collection of ‘protection fees’ from civilians in the areas where it operates.[49] The KNF has been known to collect money from various sources by using the names of underprivileged communities under the guise of the non-governmental organization, the KNDO. The funding strategy allows them to accumulate resources to further their objectives. Additionally, the KNF obtained weapons from the KIA and KNA in neighboring India and Myanmar. These weapons were sold at high prices to members of the JAFHS. In exchange for the weapons, the KNF received monthly payments of Taka 300,000 to 400,000 from the said militant group since 2021. These financial transactions facilitated the KNF’s capacity to sustain its activities and operations. Furthermore, the KNF chief, Nathan Bom, and a key member of the JAFHS, Shamim Mahfuz, were students of Dhaka University and were known to be acquainted. Shamim introduced Jama’atul Ansar’s Amir, Anisur Mahmud, to Nathan. Anisur Mahmud is a prominent figure within Jama’atul Ansar, playing a significant role in the organization’s leadership or operations. This introduction led to the establishment of a financial relationship, whereby the KNF received funding from the militant organization for the training and accommodation of their members.[50]

Supporters and Sympathizers: The KNF has garnered support from the Kuki-Chin ethnic group in the CHT, as they are the primary beneficiaries of the organization’s efforts. Moreover, they have sympathizers in other Kuki-Chin communities residing in neighboring India and Myanmar. However, it is essential to note that their separatist activities have raised concerns for regional and national security.[51]

Connection with Other Ethnic Armed Groups: The KNF has developed relations with other rebel groups like the Kuki in Manipur state and the National Defence Force (NDF) of Chin Hills of Myanmar.[52] These connections have likely facilitated military training and potential cooperation in their pursuit of autonomy.[53]

5. Organizational Structure of the JAFHS

Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) is a relatively new militant organization that has emerged in Bangladesh whose formation can be traced to 2017. It became more prominent in 2019 when it adopted its current name. The group was created by bringing together leaders and members from several Islamist militant organizations, including Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Ansar al-Islam (AAI), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B). The leaders of the three groups, who had been arrested years prior, plotted the formation of the JAFHS while incarcerated.[54]

Emergence and Objectives:  Founded in Bangladesh as a new militant group named Jama’at-ul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in 2017, the group formally adopted the name in 2019, setting the stage for its rise in stature and popularity. The name Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya translates as Jama’atul Ansar in East India, indicating the group’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda’s Indian subcontinental agenda, and implying that the JAFHS aligns itself with the global jihadist ideology propagated by Al-Qaeda. The main objective of the JAFHS is to carry out armed attacks and establish a radical Islamic state within Bangladesh. The group operates on extremist ideologies and aims to destabilize the country’s governance and social order through acts of violence and terror. JAFHS seeks to challenge the authority of the government and create fear among the general population to further its extremist agenda.[55]

Territory and Leadership: The JAFHS operates primarily within the territory of Bangladesh. The group is known to be active in various parts of the country, with a focus on remote and hard-to-reach areas, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The hilly region provides the group with hiding spots and safe havens to carry out their activities away from the prying eyes of law enforcement. Based on available information, the JAFHS leadership might function with a defined, potentially hierarchical structure, suggesting that roles within the group are assigned with specific authorities and duties. The leadership plays a crucial role in coordinating the activities and operations of the organization.[56] However, due to the secretive and clandestine nature of militant groups, specific details about the leadership structure are not publicly disclosed as it could be constantly changing. The leadership structure of the JAFHS includes the following key positions: 

  • Amir (Leader): Anisur Rahman, who goes by name Mahmud, serves as the leader of the JAFHS. Rahman’s extremist ideological background has played a key role in shaping the group’s radical agenda. Known for his charming leadership and skillful strategic planning, he has effectively galvanized many new members to support the JAFHS’s mission. Rahman’s perspective is shaped by a strict reading of sacred scriptures which he employs to rationalize aggressive behavior towards individuals he views as adversaries of his beliefs. He leads by prioritizing the creation of a rigid socio-political system according to his aggressive vision, and he is dedicated to broadening the organization’s power and capability throughout the area.
  • Since the JAFHS’ founding in 2019, Shamin Mahfuz, a 47-year-old planner and former commander of Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, has been seen as a crucial figure. The well-educated Shamin alias Mending Murang, was expelled from a prestigious cadet college for his affiliation with the Bangladesh Islami Chhatrashibir (Islamic Chhatra Student Federation). This organization is considered the student wing of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, a political party advocating for an Islamic state in Bangladesh. Despite his expulsion, Shamin excelled academically. He earned a degree from Dhaka University, a highly respected institution, and achieved academic honors (made the honor roll) in both his Secondary School Certificate and Higher Secondary Certificate exams.[57] Within the extremist group, he is addressed as “Sir” due to his knowledge and experience.
  • Shamin, along with a journalist named Mithu whose real name is Mainul Hasan Roxy, sought guidance from Maulana Abu Sayeed, also known as Dr. Abu Zafar.[58] Sayeed was the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad Al-Islami (Huji), a banned terrorist organization. He was sentenced to death for his involvement in a grenade attack that occurred on August 21, 2004. Mainul Hasan Roxy was taken into custody in 2021 for engaging in militant actions in the highlands.  According to rumors, the three planned the new group in order to evade the net of restrictions and surveillance and to appear under a new nom de guerre.[59]

Figure 3. Organizational  Structure of the JAFHS

Chart created by the author.

Shura Committee: The Shura Committee is a consultative council within the organization, comprising of influential and experienced members. Each member of the Shura Committee oversees a specific aspect of the group’s operations. The identified Shura Committee members in the JAFHS are Mosharraf Hossain Rakib, Zakaria Hossain, and Ahadul Islam Majumdar Sifat alias Mamid.

Operatives and Foot Soldiers: In the organizational structure, operatives and foot soldiers carry out the day-to-day activities. These individuals are involved in recruitment, training, fundraising, and executing the group’s plans, which may include acts of violence and terrorism.[60]

Figure 4: Operational areas of the JAFHS [61]

Recruitment and Training: Training and recruitment play crucial roles in the operations of the JAFHS that are primarily conducted in remote and inaccessible areas within the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. The new recruits are trained in pastures, “khamar” (farmlands), and mountains. In 2023, law-enforcement agencies recovered the group’s organizational guidelines entitled “Syllabus (Training and Invitational Activities)” during an operation at a militant training center in the hills. It contains detailed information on membership of the organization, training and “dawati“ (appealing to join them) activities, and what to do before leaving home in the name of “Hijrat” (“Migration for religious struggles,” which refers to the act of migrating or emigrating for the sake of religious beliefs).[62] Officials involved in the anti-terrorist operation and investigation say that the guidelines of the JAFHS were created on the model of the rules of the banned militant organization, Ansar al-Islam. The approach of both organizations to maintain secrecy is nearly identical. Both militant groups adhere to the ideology of Al-Qaeda. According to the retrieved “Syllabus,” these militant groups recruit individuals under a process they describe as to “instigate” which refers to persuading or motivating them to join. In the second phase, the organization monitors these individuals for one year.  In the third phase, the person is mentally prepared by discussing religious rules and ideology  of the organization. In the fourth phase, the member is given basic initiation into militancy.[63] In the fifth phase, the new member is given an idea of the structure and working principles of the organization. Finally, the sixth phase is armed training. After passing the six phases, the person is inducted into the “dawati “(the recruitment branch) or the Askari (military) branch of the organization. Between 2018 and 2019, homeless youths underwent five types of training, including firearms handling and bomb-making in the remote hills of Bandarban under the pretext of “Hijrat” (religious migration). After completing the training, they devised plans for sabotage and armed attacks. It is known that more than 50 militants from various parts of the country have undergone training in several KNF training camps located in the remote areas of Patuakhali, Bhola, Bandarban, and Rangamati districts of Bangladesh.[64]

Initially, the members of the JAFHS targeted the youth of different parts of Bangladesh. The majority of the recruits were hired from the divisions of Chittagong, Sylhet, Dhaka, Baishal, Khulna, and Mymensingh. Thereafter, the militant group encouraged them to embrace extremism by showing them different types of videos and misinterpreting religious issues.[65] Young people were brainwashed in various ways to encourage them to sever ties with their families, supposedly to prepare for armed attacks. The young recruits were separated from their loved ones, and sent to remote rural areas in southern Bangladesh such as Patuakhali and Bhola districts situated along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. There, the youths were kept in various safe houses and were put through physical exercises and military training. Apart from this, as a strategy to stay hidden, they were given technical training in various jobs such as masons, painters, and electricians. After these training sessions in the grasslands, they were sent to the mountains for armed training. The recruits were trained in using weapons, making bombs, carrying out extortion attacks, and surviving in difficult settings. They also received weeks or months of instruction in a variety of physical and theoretical subjects. During the aforementioned period, the JAFHS youths were trained and lodged in the hills under the care of members of the KNF, in exchange for payment.

Between October 2022 and July 30, 2023, a total of 82 individuals associated with the JAFHS were apprehended during raids conducted in various parts of the country, including the mountainous regions of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.[66] Additionally, the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC) managed to arrest about ten more individuals; among them was the founder of JAFHS, Shamin Mahfuz. Despite these arrests, CTTC officials have disclosed that approximately twelve to fifteen individuals linked to JAFHS are still at large. Out of these, about ten are reported as missing, after they underwent training in the mountains under the guidance of two training commanders.[67]

Figure 5. Recruitment Cycle of the JAFHS

Chart created by the author.

Funding and tactics: The JAFHS sources its funds from various channels. One of its members, Habibullah, who had graduated from a local madrasah and managed a farm, contributed to fundraising efforts by engaging with various madrasahs and collecting donations for the organization’s operations.[68] Additionally, the JAFHS conducts organizational activities by receiving financial contributions from individuals and organizations with the purpose of developing madrasahs and mosques, and to support converted Muslims. Notably, two of the financiers that contributed to the operations of the emerging terrorist organization, the JAFHS, are the banned Afghanistan-based militant outfit Ansar al-Islam, and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh.[69]

In 2018, the JAFHS had devised a plan to establish a naval unit as a fallback strategy for its members in case law enforcement became vigilant.[70] If their members faced increased surveillance on land, they intended to seek refuge in the naval unit, utilizing the river islands (chars) accessible by crossing the large rivers between Patuakhali and Bhola, the two districts located in southern Bangladesh, with Patuakhali situated to the west of Bhola.[71] The responsibility for this plan was assigned to Kazi Saraz Uddin, also known as Siraz, who joined the JAFHS from the Bangladesh chapter of the Pakistan-based militant group Huji. Law enforcement agencies revealed that the terrorist organization, Ansar al-Islam, was a financier behind the naval unit that intended to target rivers between Patuakhali and Bhola and to settle on river islands if needed.

The plan to create the naval unit was, however, shelved as the JAFHS found a suitable place in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with the assistance of the KNF for military training. The JAFHS leaders chose the CHT as a refuge after careful operational planning. The initial training took place in Patuakhali, and if law enforcement vigilance increased, they planned to retreat to the mountainous areas of the CHT. Even though some important JAFHS people such as skilled bomb-makers have been caught, the CTTC is still searching for a few more of them. It is clear that the group is not sleeping and still poses a major problem for the security forces. The tactics of the JAFHS involve multiple strategies:

  • Funding Source: Afghanistan-based Ansar al-Islam funded the JAFHS to strengthen its network and expand their influence in the region. They likely expected to gain allegiance, support, and collaboration from the JAFHS in their extremist activities in return for the financial support provided. Their funding facilitated their operations, including the establishment of the naval unit.
  • Recruitment of vulnerable youth: The JAFHS targeted susceptible young individuals from different regions of the country. Through extremist videos and misinterpretations of religious teachings, they radicalized and encouraged them to leave their families in the name of “Hijrat” (migration) and to join their ranks.
  • Media presence and propaganda: The JAFHS actively maintains a media presence through social media platforms to propagate their insurgent agenda and disseminate disinformation. This tactic allows them to recruit and influence individuals not only within Bangladesh but also across borders where the Kuki-Chin and Mizo communities reside. These tactics reveal the calculated approach of the JAFHS in their effort to establish a presence, attract funding, and train their members to further their extremist agenda.

6. Mutually Beneficial Ties Threaten the Region

In this study, most of the focus groups members believe that the mutually beneficial ties between the KNF and the JAFHS have become a significant threat to the region due to their combined efforts in promoting insurgency and militancy. The cooperation between the two groups has facilitated the sharing of resources, training, and expertise, allowing them to strengthen their capabilities and expand their influence across borders.

Enhanced Training and Expertise: The collaboration between the KNF and the JAFHS has led to an enhancement in training and expertise, making both groups more capable and dangerous as militant organizations. The KNF, being an established separatist outfit, possesses valuable knowledge in guerrilla warfare, insurgency tactics, and in navigating the challenging terrain of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Table 1. Training and Expertise Collaboration: KNF and JAFHS

Aspect

Description

Objective

Enhancement of training and expertise to strengthen militant capabilities

KNF’s Expertise

Valuable knowledge in guerrilla warfare, insurgency tactics, and navigating challenging terrain in the CHT

KNF’s Contributions to JAFHS

Elevated skills in firearms proficiency, bomb-making, armed attack strategies, and survival techniques

Operational Advantages for JAFHS

Competence in both traditional guerrilla warfare and modern militant tactics

Cooperation Benefits

Transfer of knowledge in intelligence gathering, counter-surveillance, and effective communication

Ideological Indoctrination

Sharing extremist narratives and ideologies through social media platforms

Recruitment Strategy

Attraction and radicalization of vulnerable individuals, expanding the pool of potential recruits

Outcome for JAFHS

Transformation from a relatively unknown entity into a well-organized and formidable militant organization

Combined Threat Level

Significantly increased threat to regional security and stability

Response Needed

Coordinated efforts from respective countries to effectively address the emerging challenge

 Source: Table created by the author with the help of focus groups.

The KNF has significantly elevated the militant skills and operational capabilities of the JAFHS by sharing their expertise with JAFHS members, who were initially perceived as a nascent organization. The training provided by the KNF to the JAFHS includes a range of critical skills, such as firearms proficiency, bomb-making, armed attack strategies, and survival techniques in hostile environments. The combination of training in both traditional guerrilla warfare and modern militant tactics gives the JAFHS an advantage in conducting covert operations and engaging in armed attacks. Additionally, the close cooperation between the KNF and the JAFHS allows for the transfer of knowledge in intelligence gathering, counter-surveillance techniques, and effective communication methods to evade law enforcement agencies. As a result, the JAFHS has become more adept at avoiding detection, making it challenging for security forces to track and neutralize their activities.

The sharing of expertise extends to ideological indoctrination, where both groups propagate their extremist narratives and ideologies through social media platforms. This enables them to attract and radicalize vulnerable individuals, expanding their pool of potential recruits and sympathizers. The enhanced training and expertise gained through their collaboration has transformed the JAFHS from a relatively unknown entity into a well-organized and formidable militant organization. As a result, the combined threat posed by the KNF and the JAFHS has become a significant concern for regional security and stability, requiring coordinated efforts from the respective countries to address the emerging challenge effectively.

Cross-Border Mobility: The cross-border mobility of the JAFHS and its collaboration with the KNF has added a new dimension to the security challenges in the region. Both organizations operate in areas that span multiple countries, including Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the bordering regions.[72] The porous and remote nature of the borders in the CHT allows for easy movement of militants and facilitates their ability to evade law enforcement. JAFHS members, with the support of the KNF, have been able to cross borders seamlessly, seeking refuge and conducting operations in different countries when facing increased scrutiny in one area.

The transnational cooperation between the JAFHS and the KNF not only poses a threat to Bangladesh’s internal security but also affects regional stability. The mobility of these militant groups across borders allows them to exploit the vulnerabilities in each country’s security apparatus and coordinate their activities effectively. Furthermore, the cross-border nature of their operations facilitates the exchange of resources, training, and expertise. The JAFHS benefits from the KNF’s knowledge of the local terrain and guerrilla warfare tactics, while the KNF gains access to the JAFHS’ international connections and resources.[73] Their collaboration has created a challenging security situation where the actions of one group can have repercussions in neighboring countries.

KNA Operations

Violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region of Bangladesh has surged since March 2023, with over 10 incidents involving the Kuki-Chin National Army reported from March to June 2023.[74] The epicenter of the violence is Bandarban district, partly fueled by the KNA’s operations advocating for an autonomous state for the Kuki-Chin people within Bangladesh. The KNA allegedly detonated improvized explosive devices (IEDs) in June 2023, resulting in the reported deaths of two military personnel in Bandarban. The Bangladesh government started an operation against the KNA in order to cut off its ties with the JAFHS. The crackdown has led to a surge in Kuki-Chin refugees seeking sanctuary in India.

Table 2. Attacks Launched by the KNF

Date

Place

Target

Casualties/Effects

March 11, 2022

Thanchi, Bandarban

Laborers, contractors, retired army officers

4 laborers killed, 16 kidnapped (later released)

June 7, 2022

Bagalek, Ruma Upazila, Bandarban

Construction workers

2 workers remain captive; 6 released

June 21, 2022

Saijam Para village, Rainkhyong valley, Bilaichari upazila, Rangamati

Villagers (Tripura community)

3 killed, 4 injured (including 2 children)

June 21, 2022

Baratali Union, Bilachhari Upazila, Rangamati

Jumma Land Army (JLA) members

4 killed (Bichai Chandra Tripura, Subhas Chandra Tripura, Bir Kumar Tripura, Dhanram Tripura)

April 6, 2023

Jurbharang Para, Paindu Union, Ruma upazila, CHT

Villagers (Bawm community)

8 executed, 22 kidnapped

May 23, 2023

Chaikshangpara, Bongku Para to Dhopanichara road, Ruma-Thanchi border area

Laborers

1 killed (MD Rashed), 1 injured (Dulal)

February 18, 2024

Thanchi, Bandarban

Dumper truck (road construction project)

No casualties reported

April 13, 2024

Barshipara Brickfield, near Bazar Para Army Camp, Ruma Upazila

Guards, business owners

2 guards abducted (Bachir Ahmed and Abu Hanif)

April 23, 2024

Fazlpara, Headmanpara, and Bangalipara areas, Thanchi

Thanchi police station

No casualties, 500 families displaced and returned

May 12, 2024

Thanchi, Bandarban

Sonali Bank branch

No casualties reported

May 13, 2024

Thanchi, Bandarban

Sonali Bank branch

No casualties reported

May 18, 2024

Ruma, Bandarban

Sonali Bank branch

Bank manager abducted, cash and weapons looted

Source: Table created by the author based on data.

JAFHS Operations

As Bangladeshi law enforcement forces intervened early, there have been no documented terrorist actions by the JAFHS since the establishment of a detention facility or prison in 2019 where members of the JAFHS were detained. Out of 53 members of the militant group, 49 members have been arrested so far. All the arrested members are currently facing legal proceedings. [75]

Operations against the KNA

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, unrest erupted in Bandarban and Rangamati following an operation by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) against the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA) in May 2023. The operation targeted the rural areas of Cheikhiang, Phainumpara, Sunsawngpara, and neighboring villages. The KNA, which enjoys support primarily among the Kuki-Chin communities, especially the Bawm (Bom) people residing in these areas, faced a significant crackdown.[76]

In these areas, displaced refugees, who fled their homes due to the violent clashes and military operations against the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), have sought refuge near Simnasora and Bandukbanga villages in Mizoram’s Chawngte subdivision. These villages are situated close to the India-Bangladesh-Myanmar trijunction. Local residents have generously housed them in a primary school and church. The Mizoram-based Zo Reunification Organisation (ZoRo) strongly criticized the Bangladeshi operation, condemning the atrocities inflicted on civilians. The armed faction involved—the Kuki-Chin National Army aims to safeguard the interests of the Kuki-Chin community. Referred to as the “Bawm Party,” the group gained prominence in April 2023 after a fatal shooting in Bilaichhari, Rangamati.[77] Two months later, on June 21, 2023 the KNF, via social media, claimed responsibility for the killing of three members of another faction. Reports suggest potential alliances between the outfit and rebel groups in India’s northeast and Myanmar. This interconnected web of activities highlights the complex security challenges in the region, demanding a comprehensive and collaborative approach from the concerned nations.

Operations against the JAFHS

The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) launched a counterterrorism operation against the JAFHS in October 2022, following the disappearance of several youths from Comilla. Investigations revealed the group’s activities and recruitment efforts, leading to its official ban on August 10, 2023 by the Bangladesh government. RAB operations throughout the country and the Chittagong Hill Tracts resulted in the capture of 82 JAFHS members, including its leader Anisur Rahman Mahmud by July 2023. The raids also apprehended 17 collaborators from the KNF, who allegedly provided training and hideouts in the hills. While some JAFHS members likely splintered back to previous militant groups, the RAB’s swift intervention significantly disrupted the organization and continues to target its remaining leadership. The hunt for key figures like Karshey and Simrat, bomb-making experts believed to be hiding in the mountains, remains ongoing.[78]

Table 3. Security Challenge Matrix: JAFHS and KNF Collaboration

Challenge

Impact

Cross-border mobility

Adds a new dimension to security challenges

Porous borders in CHT

Facilitates easy movement and evading law enforcement

Transnational cooperation

Poses threat to internal security and affects regional stability

Exchange of resources and expertise

Enhances training and operational capabilities

Guerrilla warfare tactics

Allows seamless cross-border operations with support from KNF

Coordination in armed attacks

Exploits vulnerabilities in each country’s security apparatus

Social media propagation

Attracts and radicalizes vulnerable individuals, expanding recruit pool

Complex security situation

Repercussions across borders due to actions of one group

Crackdown in CHT

Unrest erupts, displacing refugees to Mizoram, drawing strong criticism from ZoRo

KNF operations

Targeted by CTTC, leading to refugees seeking shelter in Mizoram

KNF’s autonomous state goal

Aims to safeguard interests of Kuki-Chin community, known as the “Bawm Party”

Alliances and social media claims

Potential connections with rebel groups in India’s Northeast and Myanmar

Comprehensive approach

Demands collaborative efforts from concerned nations to address complex security challenges

Source: Table created by the author with the help of focus groups.

Fragile Borders, Transnational Threats: The KNF and Regional Security in the Hill Tracts

Furthermore, the presence of an armed group in remote border regions, such as the KNF, poses a significant threat to both regional and national security. The 318-kilometer border shared by Mizoram and Bangladesh on the Indian side is vulnerable to the activities of numerous separatist organizations in remote areas of Mizoram and rebel groups in the Chin state of Myanmar, including the Arakan Army, Chin Defense Force, and Chin National Army. The interconnected nature of the Hill Tracts across all three nations amplifies the potential for instability, especially considering the KNF’s connections and collaboration with these groups. The likelihood of the KNF extending its operations to areas with the Kuki-Chin and Mizo communities in India and Myanmar is high, with the potential for transformation into a transnational organization.

The KNF’s threat to the region, with potential ties to arms and drug trafficking, underscores the urgency for India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar to take proactive measures to curb the KNF’s expansion. The affiliation of the KNF with militant groups raises concerns about its extremist actions along the trilateral border, posing risks to internal and regional security, peace, and stability. It is essential for governments to prevent armed conflicts by controlling organizations like the KNF, facilitating opportunities for ethnic extremists to surrender, and ensuring the rights of Chin-Kuki-Mizo ethnic groups.

The historical attempts by foreign powers to instigate turmoil in the hill tracts zone emphasize the critical need for geopolitical harmony between Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar.[79] As a shift in the balance of power unfolds, governments must remain vigilant to foster lasting peace in the hills, allowing tribal groups to gain their rights and contribute to Bangladesh’s development. The shift in balance of power refers to changes in the political dynamics, influence, and control within the region, which could impact the stability and peace in the hills. This could include changes in leadership, alliances, or external influences that alter the existing power structure.

Transnational Terror Networks

The ties between the KNF and the JAFHS could potentially provide them access to broader transnational terror networks. Their association with Ansar al-Islam Bangladesh indicates their willingness to cooperate with global extremist ideologies. Ansar al-Islam is a terrorist organization primarily based in Afghanistan. It has been associated with extremist activities and has links to global jihadist networks, including Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The group espouses a radical interpretation of Islam and has been involved in various acts of violence, including terrorist attacks and insurgent activities.  Shafi Md Mostofa, an adjunct lecturer at the University of New England in Australia and an associate professor of world religions and culture at the University of Dhaka, claims that there are multiple signs pointing to the JAFHS’ affiliation with Al-Qaeda.[80] The meaning of its name, “Jama’atul Ansar in East India,” is indicative of Al-Qaeda’s plans for the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, one of the seven terrorists detained on October 6, 2022, revealed to the media that he received films featuring Al-Qaeda ideologue Jashimuddin Rahmani who has been imprisoned since 2016.

Following the dissolution of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, the interim government of Bangladesh released Jashimuddin Rahmani from Kashimpur High Security Central Prison in Gazipur on August 26, 2024.[81] Subsequently, on August 28, 2024, the interim government lifted the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami party.[82] The lifting of the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami has allowed the party to re-enter the political arena, potentially emboldening its supporters and affiliates. This shift could lead to a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the country, and it opens up the possibility of the JAFHS receiving support from international terrorist groups, posing a more significant security challenge to the region and beyond.[83]

7. Discussion

The origin and nature of the links between the JAFHS and the KNF bears similarity with alliances and networks among militant and insurgent groups in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South Asia, Rhodesia, Sahel region, and Latin America. As shown in the studies cited in this article, the JAFHS and the KNF have established a mutual relationship to promote insurgency and militancy in the region. The alliance between the JAFHS, a relatively new militant organization, and the KNF, an established separatist outfit, has facilitated the sharing of resources, training, and expertise, making both groups more capable and dangerous as militant organizations. The collaboration has allowed the JAFHS to gain valuable knowledge in guerrilla warfare, insurgency tactics, and operations in challenging terrains like the Chittagong Hill Tracts through the expertise provided by KNF. This similarity with the international studies on global terrorism emphasizes the importance of understanding the dynamics of alliances and cooperative relationships among armed groups, as it is a key factor in countering the threat posed by these groups.

The JAFHS’ organizational structure resembles the alliance cohesion in Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and the fusion of terrorist and criminal organizations, as shown in the works of scholars like Al Qurtuby, Burchall Henningsen, and Farah. It is managed by a hierarchical structure under the leader (Amir) and a consultative council (Shura Committee) that allows for efficient coordination and decision-making within the group, aiding their ability to conduct armed attacks and insurgency effectively.

The mutually beneficial ties between the JAFHS and the KNF have become a threat to the region, as shown in studies that highlight the dangers of cooperation and symbiosis between terrorist and criminal groups. The studies exploring the relationship between transnational organized crime (TOC) and terrorism are demonstrated in the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF which has provided the former a safe haven in the remote and inaccessible areas of the CHT, allowing them to evade law enforcement and conduct their activities discreetly. The sharing of expertise and resources between the two groups has enhanced their training and operational capabilities, making them more adept at avoiding detection and posing a significant challenge to regional security and stability.

The similarity emphasizes the need for comprehensive and coordinated efforts by regional countries to counter the threat posed by the alliance between the JAFHS and the KNF, in line with the approaches suggested in the studies on alliances and networks among militant groups. Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar must work closely together and share intelligence in order to combat the regional threat. A thorough and well-coordinated strategy is needed to stop extremist groups from moving across borders, to take down their networks, and maintain peace and stability in the area.

In analyzing the cooperation between the JAFHS and the KNF, the participants of focus groups opined that we can explore alternative explanations beyond the assumption of mutual benefits. One possibility is that these groups have overlapping interests or shared goals, such as the establishment of a radical Islamic state. Their collaboration may stem from their shared extremist beliefs rather than purely pragmatic gains. Additionally, the alliance might not be as cohesive as it appears, and there could be an underlying power struggle between the two groups. Each may seek dominance and control over the other, making the collaboration a temporary alignment with simmering tensions beneath the surface. External influences could also be at play, with other terrorist organizations actively encouraging or facilitating the cooperation.

It should be noted that since the data collection method was restricted to national and local newspapers, books, magazines, diplomatic websites, official KNF websites, and KNF’s official Facebook and Telegram pages, the data may not represent all language users and could be biased towards specific groups or demographics.

8. Conclusion

The failure of the Bangladesh government to address ethnic issues and the demands of groups like the JAFHS and the KNF in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region is a complex issue rooted in historical grievances, political complexities, and socio-economic disparities. The obstacles to addressing these challenges include opposition from political parties, internal divisions within ethnic minority communities, criminal activities by armed groups like the KNF, and the lack of meaningful stakeholder participation in peace initiatives.

In conclusion, it is evident that the collaboration between the JAFHS and the KNF poses a serious security threat not only to Bangladesh but also to regional stability. The exchange of resources, knowledge, and skills between these groups has transformed the JAFHS into a potent militant organization with cross-border capability. To effectively counter the threat, close collaboration and intelligence-sharing among Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar is essential. Lasting stability and security can be achieved in the region by addressing the root causes of ethnic grievances, promoting inclusive governance, and implementing peace agreements.

Acknowledgement

With heartfelt appreciation to all the participants who have played a vital role in shaping my research journey.

Note on the Author

Md. Nasir Uddin holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Rajshahi in Bangladesh. His expertise encompasses anthropology, security and strategic studies, critical criminology, religion, peace, and conflict. In addition to formal education, he has pursued further learning through online courses from institutions like Open University, Leiden University, University of Maryland, Harvard University, and the University of London. Beyond acquiring knowledge, he actively contributes to scholarly discourse by serving as an editorial board member and peer reviewer for journals such as Conflict Studies Journal, Journal of Comparative Asian Development (JCAD), International Journal of Public Sociology and Sociotherapy (IJPSS), and International Journal of Cyber Behavior, Psychology, and Learning. For potential collaborations, feel free to reach out via LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/md-nasir-uddin-phd-272564b6/ 

END NOTES

[1] Golam Rasul, Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Chittagong Hill Tracts–Challenges and Opportunities, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312084935_A

[2] Navin A. Bapat and Kanisha D. Bond, “Alliances between Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2012): 793–824.

[3] Milos Popovic, “Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors,” International Interactions 44, no. 4 (July 4, 2018): 749–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2017.1414812

[4] Douglas Farah, “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances,” PRISM 2, no. 3 (2011): 15–32.

[5] Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Peacebuilding in Indonesia: Christian–Muslim Alliances in Ambon Island,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 349–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2013.785091

[6] Emily Kalah Gade et al., “Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 9 (October 1, 2019): 2071–2097, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719826234

[7] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Rand Corporation, 2001).

[8] Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/255/monograph/book/57650. Also see, Gade et al., “Networks of Cooperation.”

[9] Staniland, Networks of Rebellion.

[10] Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War,” The American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013): 418–32.

[11] Celina B. Realuyo, “The Terror-Crime Nexus: Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators,” PRISM 5, no. 1 (2014): 116–31.

[12] Alex P. Schmid, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later” (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29431

[13] Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 129–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025

[14] Colin P. Clarke, “Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Trafficking, Smuggling, and Use for Criminality by Terrorists and Insurgents: A Brief Historical Overview” (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2020), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25258

[15] Md. Nasir Uddin, “The Structures of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in South Asia, and Their Propaganda in India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar,” Rising Asia Journal 2, no. 3 (Autumn, September-December 2022), https://www.rajraf.org/article/the-structures-of-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-in-south-asia-and-their-propaganda-in-india-bangladesh-and-myanmar/1074

[16] Daniel Byman, “Terrorism, Insurgency, and Proto-Insurgency,” in Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, 1st ed., RAND Counterinsurgency Study Ñ Paper 3 (RAND Corporation, 2007), 3–6, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op178osd.8

[17] Robert J. Bunker, “Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2015).

[18] Anna Bailey et al., “The System Made Me Do It: Strategies of Survival,” in Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 2, ed. Alena Ledeneva, Understanding Social and Cultural Complexity (University College London Press, 2018), 7–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt20krxgs.9

[19] Realuyo, “The Terror-Crime Nexus.”

[20] Saimum Parvez, “‘The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal’: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and Their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh,” Perspectives on Terrorism, October 2019, https://pt.icct.nl/article/khilafahs-soldiers-bengal-analysing-islamic-state-jihadists-and-their-violence

[21] Md. Nazrul Islam and Md. Saidul Islam, “Data Collection and Analysis,” in Islam and Democracy in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh, ed. Md. Nazrul Islam and Md. Saidul Islam (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 49, 65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42909-6_3

[22] Benjamin F. Crabtree and William L. Miller, eds., Doing Qualitative Research, Second edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999).

[23] Md. Nasir Uddin, “The Female Involvement in Terrorist Outfits in Bangladesh: A Qualitative Study,” Counter Terrorism Journal 1, no. 1 (January 2021): 113–35. Also see, Md. Nasir Uddin and Md. Musfikur Rahman, “Catalyst of Religious Extremism in Rohingya Refugee Camps: A Qualitative Analysis,” chapter, Handbook of Research on Applied Social Psychology in Multiculturalism (IGI Global, June 21, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6960-3.ch015

[24] Shafi Mostofa and Natalie J Doyle, “Profiles of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh,” Perspective on Terrorism 13, no. 5 (2019): 18.

[25] Murray L. Wax, ed., Federal Regulations: Ethical Issues and Social Research, 1st edition (New York: Routledge, 2019).

[26] Melissa Freeman, Modes of Thinking for Qualitative Data Analysis, 1st edition (New York: Routledge, 2016).

[27] Murat Haner and Melissa M. Sloan, ed., Theories of Terrorism: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003026303

[28] Partha Shankar Saha, “Rise of KNF: Why Does KNF Oppose CHT Peace Accord and JSS?” Prothomalo, April 14, 2024, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/homcngwpke

[29] Murat Haner and Melissa M. Sloan, ed., Theories of Terrorism: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003026303

[30] Mohammad Jamil Khan, “‘The Unholy Agreement,’” The Daily Star, June 26, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/the-unholy-agreement-3355821

[31] Riyadh Talukder, “KNF: Where Does It Get Its Funding and What Is Its Endgame?,” Dhaka Tribune, February 22, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2023/02/22/knf-where-does-it-get-its-funding-and-what-is-its-endgame. Also see, Tipu Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF,” Prothomalo, January 29, 2023, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime-and-law/3dd0madbsy; and Mehedi Hassan Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?,” Parbattanews: English Version (blog), June 3, 2023, https://en.parbattanews.com/what-led-to-the-rise-of-knf/

[32] FAIR Team, “Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya: Inside Bangladesh’s New Islamist Militant Group,” FAIR (blog), January 25, 2023, https://fairbd.net/jamatul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-inside-bangladeshs-new-islamist-militant-group/

[33] Palash.

[34] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[35] Palash.

[36] Palash.

[37] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[38] “Who Is Militant Group Founder Shamin Mahfuz?,” Dhaka Tribune, June 24, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/314230/who-is-militant-group-founder-shamin-mahfuz

[39] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?” Also see, Tipu Sultan, “Fear of Militant Involvement: Where Are the ‘missing’ Youths?,” Prothomalo, September 25, 2022, https://en.prothomalo.com

[40] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.” Also see, Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?”

[41] Staff Correspondent, “Jama’atul Ansar Gave KNF Tk 17 Lakh to Buy Arms,” The Daily Star, November 5, 2022, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/jamaatul-ansar-gave-knf-tk-17-lakh-buy-arms-3160756

[42] Staff Correspondent, “Jama’atul Ansar Gave KNF Tk 17 Lakh to Buy Arms,” The Daily Star.

[43] Palash. Also see, Shariful Islam, “‘Biggest Militant Threat’ Country Has Ever Faced, The Daily Star,” January 31, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/biggest-militant-threat-country-has-ever-faced-3234716

[44] Talukder, “KNF: Where Does It Get Its Funding and What Is Its Endgame?” Also see, Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[45] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?”

[46] S. Basu Das Bandarban, “Bawm Man First of His Community to Run for General Election,” Dhaka Tribune, November 23, 2018, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/161600/bawm-man-first-of-his-community-to-run-for-general

[47] Palash.

[48] Palash.

[49] Talukder, “KNF: Where Does It Get Its Funding and What Is Its Endgame?”

[50] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?” Also see, Talukder, “RAB”; and Sultan, “Fear of Militant Involvement: Where Are the ‘Missing’ Youths?”

[51] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?”

[52]  Shariful Islam and Mong Sing Hai Marma, “KNF Gets Arms, Support from Other Side of Border,” The Daily Star, April 7, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/knf-gets-arms-support-other-side-border-3583666

[53] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?”

[54] Animesh Roul, “Jamaatul Ansar: A Terrorism Threat in Bangladesh Before the 2024 Elections?,” Jamestown, June 26, 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/jamaatul-ansar-a-terrorism-threat-in-bangladesh-before-the-2024-elections/; also see, Uday, “A New Terrorist Group Emerges in Bangladesh,” July 8, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/a-new-terrorist-group-emerges-in ; and FAIR Team, “Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya: Inside Bangladesh’s New Islamist Militant Group,” FAIR (blog), January 25, 2023, https://fairbd.net/jamatul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-inside-bangladeshs-new-islamist-militant-group/

[55] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[56] Talukder, “KNF: Where Does It Get Its Funding and What Is Its Endgame?”

[57] “Who Is Militant Group Founder Shamin Mahfuz?,” Dhaka Tribune, June 24, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/314230/who-is-militant-group-founder-shamin-mahfuz

[58] Security Risks Research, “Bangladesh: Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS) Contained,” Security Risks Asia, July 25, 2023, https://www.security-risks.com/post/bangladesh-jama-atul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-jafhs-contained

[59] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[60] হাসানআহমদুল, “জামাতুল আনসারের ‘সিলেবাস’, ধাপে ধাপে উগ্রবাদী দীক্ষা,” (Hassan Ahmed, “‘Curriculum’ of Jamaatul Ansar, step by step radical training”)  Prothomalo, February 2, 2023, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/3b1j5y65ri

[61] Uday, “A New Terrorist Group Emerges in Bangladesh,” Militant Wire, November 8, 2022, https://www.militantwire.com/p/a-new-terrorist-group-emerges-in

[62] হাসান (Hassan Ahmed, “‘Curriculum’ of Jamaatul Ansar, step by step radical training”).

[63] আমিননুরুল, “নতুন জঙ্গি সংগঠন জামায়াতুল আনসার গড়ে তুলেছেন যাঁরা” (Amin Nurul , “Those who have formed the new militant organization are from Jamaatul Ansar”), Prothomalo, October 22, 2022, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime/jr991oot14

[64] হাসানআহমদুল, “জামাতুল আনসারের ‘সিলেবাস’, ধাপে ধাপে উগ্রবাদী দীক্ষা” (“Hassan Ahmed, “‘Curriculum’ of Jamaatul Ansar, step by step radical training”).

[65] Ibid.

[66] Sultan, “The Way Jamaatul Ansar Joined KNF.”

[67] হাসান, “জামাতুল আনসারের ‘সিলেবাস’, ধাপে ধাপে উগ্রবাদী দীক্ষা”(Hassan Ahmed, “‘Curriculum’ of Jamaatul Ansar, step by step radical training”).

[68] Talukder, “KNF: Where Does It Get Its Funding and What Is Its Endgame?”

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Talukder, “RAB.”

[72] Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “Kuki-Chin Refugees From Bangladesh Take Shelter in Mizoram,” The Diplomat,” November 22, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/kuki-chin-refugees-from-bangladesh-take-shelter-in-mizoram/

[73] Mir Mosharref Hossain Pakbir, “Kuki-Chin National Army: A Fierce Regional Threat in Sight,” The Daily Observer, May 23, 2023, https://www.observerbd.com/news.php?id=420588

[74] Sharmili Mahjabeen, “Kuki-Chin Resurgence in Chittagong Hill Tracts: A New Threat to Regional Security,” Organiser, June 16, 2023, https://organiser.org/2023/06/16/177369/bharat/kuki-chin-resurgence-in-chittagong-hill-tracts-a-new-threat-to-regional-security/

[75] TBS Report, “‘Chief Recruiter’ of Militant Outfit Jamatul Ansar Held with 2 Other Members: DB,” The Business Standard, May 14, 2024, https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/crime/3-more-members-jamatul-ansar-fil-hindal-sharqiya-held-dhaka-db-850936.

[76] Mehedi Hassan Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?” Parbattanews, English Version (blog), June 3, 2023, https://en.parbattanews.com/what-led-to-the-rise-of-knf/

[77] Sharmili Mahjabeen, “Kuki-Chin Resurgence in Chittagong Hill Tracts: A New Threat to Regional Security,” Organiser, June 16, 2023, https://organiser.org/2023/06/16/177369/bharat/kuki-chin-resurgence-in-chittagong-hill-tracts-a-new-threat-to-regional-security/

[78] “Bangladesh Bans Militant Group Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya,” Newsportal, Dhaka Tribune, August 10, 2023, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/322164/bangladesh-bans-militant-group-jama-atul-ansar-fil

[79] Shafi Md Mostofa, “New Islamist Militant Outfit Emerges in Bangladesh,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/new-islamist-militant-outfit-emerges-in-bangladesh/

[80] Ibid.

[81] bdnews24.com, “Ansarullah Chief Mufti Jasim, Jailed over Murder of Blogger Rajib, Freed on Bail,” Blogger murder: Ansarullah chief Mufti Jasim freed on bail, August 26, 2024, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/91c571254fe7.

[82] V. O. A. Bangla, “Bangladesh Interim Government Reverses Ban on Jamaat-e-Islami Party,” Voice of America, August 29, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/bangladesh-interim-government-reverses-ban-on-jamaat-e-islami-party/7764530.html.

[83] Palash, “What Led to the Rise of KNF?”