

Restoring Agency to Informal Diplomats in Narratives of the Vietnam War

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Abstract

The history of the diplomacy of the Vietnam War perennially suffers from two lapses. First, scholarly literature almost completely ignores informal diplomacy between North Vietnam and the wider world. Scholars have neglected to grant political and diplomatic agency to ordinary citizens of North Vietnam and the West who regularly interacted to pressure U.S. presidents to end the war in Vietnam. Secondly, the accounts are largely written from Western or U.S. perspective. Most histories prioritize Western diplomacy, while denying proper voice to North Vietnamese. In these ways, North Vietnamese people and diplomats are written out of their own story, consigned to the margins as mere spectators in grand narratives of the diplomacy of the war.

By launching an innovative diplomatic strategy, the North Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh began conducting informal diplomacy during the First Indochina War against France (1946–1954) – several years before scholars began recognizing informal diplomacy as a valid, valuable, and useful activity in the sphere of foreign affairs. Ho Chi Minh sent members of North Vietnamese mass organizations to France and China in 1948, believing they would build relations with people abroad because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam) did not possess a full-fledged foreign service.

After founding a “diplomatic front” (*mat tran ngoai giao*) during the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War (from the late 1950s to 1975), the front began implementing “people’s diplomacy” (*ngoai giao nhan dan*), aimed at winning global support and sympathy for Vietnamese independence. Explaining these concepts to DRV diplomats in January 1964, Ho Chi Minh argued that foreign affairs were:

not only an area of concern for embassies and consulates-general ... but also for such organized activities as foreign trade, culture, youth, women, and trade union agencies, all of which are equally responsible for diplomacy.¹

While excluding career diplomats from informal diplomacy, Ho Chi Minh urged DRV officials from other government departments to intermingle with foreign peace activists, setting policy framework for the operation of informal diplomacy. The diplomatic front gained ready-made allies among overseas antiwar activists because they too opposed U.S. intervention. Ho Chi Minh emphasized that diplomacy practiced by mass organizations and individuals was just as important as government diplomacy. Historical evidence demonstrates the substantial role of North Vietnam’s diplomatic front whose membership encompassed writers, cartoonists, photographers, workers, farmers, women, students, artistic performers, filmmakers, architects, medical doctors and nurses, engineers, academics, lawyers, and sportspersons. Not only did North Vietnamese travel abroad to meet antiwar activists, they also invited them to the DRV

to see the human face of Vietnamese who were being demonized by U.S. officials. They showed foreign activists evidence of the effects of U.S. bombardment on Vietnamese civilians.

North Vietnamese people's diplomacy – a component of the strategy of informal diplomacy – remained under DRV government control: the authorities utilized people's groups to supplement traditional state-to-state diplomacy with communist and non-communist countries. Hanoi implemented people's diplomacy in non-communist countries because it was more effective than state diplomacy in gaining support of people who were otherwise averse to communism. Informal diplomacy enabled overseas peace activists to understand the nature of Vietnamese communism, which combined nationalism, anti-colonialism, and internationalism.²

The Hanoi leadership officially adopted the diplomatic front strategy in 1967, realizing that it could not defeat the United States militarily, and that diplomacy offered a higher probability of ending the war. North Vietnamese continued conducting informal/people's diplomacy into the early 1970s because the United States prolonged the war even after the two sides began exploratory peace talks in Paris in 1968.

The Evolving Idea of Informal Diplomacy

Informal diplomacy has a rich history ever since early contacts between white settlers and aboriginals in North America and Australia often resulted in signing of treaties and informal pacts.³ Conducted by non-combatants, non-state actors, and ordinary citizens, informal diplomacy is of great importance within the history of the Vietnam War because it shows how North Vietnam's diplomatic front participated in creating an "international civil society" that coalesced to oppose U.S. intervention. International relations scholar Richard Falk argues that civil society not only exercised considerable agency during the American Revolution when Americans established overseas links with Europeans to fight the British Empire but they also organized international popular demonstrations against U.S. intervention in Vietnam.⁴ The diplomatic front attempted to unite the world's peoples into a single global society that shared common opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam.⁵ U.S. officials tried to thwart DRV informal diplomacy, which in their view jeopardized Washington's ability to influence the DRV.⁶ As North Vietnamese made influential linkages with peace activists abroad, they succeeded in publicizing U.S. use of chemical weapons in Vietnam, and questioning the legitimacy of U.S. intervention.

Ho Chi Minh created the people's diplomacy model several years before scholars developed the ideas of track two diplomacy and soft power. William D. Davidson, a psychiatrist, and Joseph V. Montville, a U.S. State Department foreign service officer, coined track one and track two diplomacy in an article in 1981.⁷ Track one diplomacy refers to formal negotiations conducted by diplomats, and track two diplomacy involves conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners and theorists. Davidson and Montville argue that national political leaders have tended to drift to war because of misperceptions and lost opportunities for peace. At such fleeting moments, "a second diplomatic track can therefore make its contribution as a supplement to the understandable shortcomings of official relations, especially in times of tension." Track two diplomacy is "unofficial, non-structured interaction;" it is "always open minded, often altruistic;" and "strategically optimistic." Some years later, Harvard scholar Joseph Nye devised the term soft power.⁸ Countries exercise soft power by deploying their people and cultures as informal diplomats to attain diplomatic aims. Soft power aims to coopt rather than coerce in pursuit of desired diplomatic and political outcomes.

For instance, during the early years of the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger, then professor of government at Harvard and consultant to the U.S. State Department, embarked on his first venture into Vietnam peace-making at the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs in

September 1966.⁹ Kissinger used these occasions to develop contacts with French interlocutors who would carry State Department messages to President Ho Chi Minh.

In an encouraging sign, scholars have broadened characterization of diplomacy beyond the activities of “men in striped pants” to include international businesses and nongovernmental organizations, as well as women who were ignored in the literature.¹⁰ Influential works on intersections of informal diplomacy with trade and business include books by Ridgeway, Cardozo, Rogowski, and others.¹¹ The field has widened with inclusion of women in roles of informal and formal diplomats at crucial historical moments in the works of Forslund, Hughes, Fenzi, Enloe, and Wood.¹² While most of these texts focus on women in diplomatic positions in the West, Forslund explores the informal diplomacy of President Richard Nixon with South Vietnam through a Chinese–American activist named Anna Chennault. North Vietnamese informal diplomacy, however, is beyond the scope of Forslund’s study.

The Literature on Formal Diplomacy

There are several excellent studies of DRV formal diplomacy, but the country’s informal diplomacy has remained underexplored. Most historical accounts rely on non-Vietnamese documents, and only a handful of scholars have used Vietnamese materials.

First U.S. scholars to examine formal North Vietnamese diplomacy, Allan Goodman and Gareth Porter, had limited access to archival material in the 1970s.¹³ David Elliott and William Duiker revised older histories in the 1990s, paving the way for newer scholars.¹⁴ The opening of Chinese archives enabled Qiang Zhai and Chen Jian to further explore the Vietnam War, but they did so through narrow Chinese lens, not a Vietnamese one.¹⁵ Ilya Gaiduk’s work, likewise, relies almost entirely on Soviet documents.¹⁶

Before Vietnamese archives were opened to outsiders following *doi moi* (renovation) reforms in 1989, an earlier generation of scholars such as Carlyle Thayer, Ralph Smith, Duiker, and William Turley had worked with Vietnamese language sources.¹⁷ Historians pioneering use of Vietnamese language sources include David Marr, Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Peter Zinoman, Shawn McHale, Jeffrey Race, and Elliott.¹⁸ Scholars are indebted to Mark Bradley, Robert Brigham, Pierre Asselin, Matthew Masur, and Edward Miller for clarifying what materials Vietnamese archives contain.¹⁹

Arguably the most comprehensive account of DRV formal diplomacy, Asselin’s *A Bitter Peace*, explains that North Vietnamese diplomats proved such astute negotiators that the outcome of the war was decided at negotiating tables, not on battlefields.²⁰ Lien-Hang T. Nguyen demonstrates that U.S.–DRV peace negotiations never really had a chance, and Ang Cheng Guan challenges the assumption that Hanoi’s leaders were controlled by Moscow and Beijing.²¹ In 1999, Brigham published a path-breaking study explaining how the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) conducted diplomacy in order to gain international respectability.²² In another important study employing Vietnamese sources, Bradley shows that “an imagined America” occupied a central place in Vietnamese political discourse because the Vietnamese leadership saw in America the noble qualities that could be used to rebuild Vietnamese society.²³ Scholars such as Christopher Goscha, Patricia Pelley, Kim N.B. Ninh, and Miller have deepened scholarly understanding of the Vietnamese Revolution. In addition, Masur and Jessica Chapman have employed South Vietnamese documents.²⁴

Where are the Ordinary “People” in Vietnam War Diplomacy?

Scholarly literature on informal diplomacy conducted by North Vietnam is scarce. Recently, however, younger scholars have entered the field. The only full-length study of DRV informal diplomacy is *People’s Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Front of North Vietnam during the War against the*

United States, 1965–1972.²⁵ It restores political and diplomatic agency to North Vietnamese by exploring interactions between ordinary Vietnamese, mass organizations in communist and non-communist countries, and antiwar movements abroad, and evaluates their contribution to the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. Historian Asselin comments:

People's Diplomacy of North Vietnam is a *tour de force*, but it is concerned less with Hanoi's strategic thinking than the initiatives the party and state undertook to meet the aims of the diplomatic struggle as well as the effects of those initiatives in both Western and Eastern bloc countries.²⁶

In a similar vein, historian Lien-Hang T. Nguyen is working on a new book, *Women Warriors: Gender, People's Diplomacy, and Peace in the Vietnam War Era*, which is expected to focus on informal diplomacy conducted by North Vietnamese women.

The failure of most accounts to discuss North Vietnamese people's diplomacy reflects a tendency among Western scholars to rely almost exclusively on U.S. and Western sources. There is no reason to continue ignoring this concept because it has appeared regularly in documents of *Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam* (Vietnam Workers' Party), as well as in the writings of Vietnamese historians and diplomats, and in the journals *Nghien Cuu Lich Su* (Historical Research) and *Nghien Cuu Quoc Te* (International Studies).²⁷

There is also a gap in the literature on the Vietnamese side as Vietnamese historians have dealt transiently with informal diplomacy, being preoccupied with official diplomacy. Former North Vietnamese diplomat Luu Doan Huynh, however, acknowledges the support the U.S. antiwar movement extended to the Vietnamese Revolution. Huynh praises American Quakers for sending medical supplies to Vietnam, applauding American priests and businessmen for participating in a "spontaneous movement" that expressed "feelings coming from the heart."²⁸

Evaluating North Vietnamese Informal Diplomacy

The triumph of DRV informal diplomacy can be gauged in the fruitful outcomes of meetings between Westerners and ordinary North Vietnamese: Western peace activists travelling to North Vietnam returned home to write newspaper articles, books, and memoirs—a few made documentary films—expressing compassion for their plight and criticizing the United States for employing military force against civilians.²⁹ Some American travellers advised U.S. State Department officials to start peace talks with North Vietnam, and others delivered messages of peace from President Ho Chi Minh to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson.

These texts are stellar contributions to the canon of informal diplomacy for two reasons. First, they improve understanding of informal diplomacy that North Vietnamese conducted in order to publicize abroad the U.S. bombardment of innocent civilians. In doing so, these accounts sympathize with North Vietnamese. Secondly, these texts have a memoir-like tone because American travellers were more concerned with recording their personal North Vietnam experiences, thereby imparting a valuable angle that is missing in academic studies of diplomacy.

Informal diplomacy conducted by Westerners had identical aims as the foreign affairs of their DRV counterparts: both intended to pressure the U.S. government to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, and enter unconditional peace talks with Hanoi. The historical literature, however, has ignored the diverse ways DRV informal diplomacy impacted President Johnson. LBJ was deeply disturbed that North Vietnamese propaganda and informal diplomacy was giving the United States a bad image overseas. On 15 June 1965, LBJ complained to Birch Bayh, Democratic senator from Indiana, that the Vietnamese revolutionaries "are winning the propaganda war against us." The president added: "and they are also winning the other war against us

because they are winning the propaganda one.” Johnson continued: “They have Harold Wilson on the ropes and they have the Prime Minister of Canada [Lester Pearson] dodging and ducking.”³⁰ British Prime Minister Wilson had made it clear that his country would not directly support the United States in Vietnam, and he had criticized Johnson’s Vietnam policy, particularly his decision to start regular bombardment of North Vietnam in January 1965.³¹

North Vietnamese exercised vigorous diplomatic agency in building contacts with foreign peace activists. For instance, the DRV government established a system of hospitality following the trip to the DRV by Yale University historian Staughton Lynd and Students for a Democratic Society leader Tom Hayden in December 1965. Foreign visitors were classified into two levels based on their capability to influence public opinion abroad, and their importance to the needs of Hanoi’s wartime diplomacy. Nobel Prize winners, well-known university professors, famous writers, and filmmakers were considered A-level guests, while rank-and-file antiwar activists were B-level guests.³² A-level guests had meetings with Ho Chi Minh and senior leaders in addition to receiving lavish hotel accommodations, while B-level guests met junior leaders and were offered modest hospitality.

The following examples demonstrate that North Vietnamese grasped every opportunity to influence public opinion abroad. They regularly travelled overseas to build support among foreigners. The Vietnam Women’s Union was active in writing a series of open letters to American women, many of whom were protesting the U.S. war in Vietnam.³³ Moreover, the London representatives of the North Vietnamese weekly journal, *Cuu Quoc* (National Salvation), sent press statements regarding U.S. bombing of Vietnamese civilians and commentaries on the war to British and European antiwar organizations, which published them in their newsletters. In addition, using funds provided by the Soviet Union, the so-called DRV Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists organized a seminar in Stockholm on 2–3 June 1972 to broadcast the intensification of the war. A four-member DRV delegation travelled to Sweden, carrying films, photographs, and printed materials that documented the U.S. bombardment of North Vietnamese civilians.³⁴ In the same month, the DRV committee paid expenses for two Swedish television journalists to visit Vietnam to collect evidence of “Nixon’s war crimes.”³⁵ The DRV committee sent two victims of U.S. bombardment to participate in an antiwar conference in Paris in June 1972. Committee member Mai Lam accompanied the two female victims, 28-year-old Hoang Thi Hoan and 14-year-old Bui Thi Bich, both of whom had sustained serious injuries in U.S. bombardment of Haiphong on 15 April 1972. On the recommendation of the committee, the DRV government paid for the trip because they considered it important that the victims give public testimony in France.³⁶ In addition, members of DRV associations of tradesmen and professionals travelled to communist and non-communist countries in order to forge links with their counterparts abroad. DRV associations for writers, poets, film directors, photographers, workers, lawyers, doctors, nurses, farmers, and trade unionists travelled overseas frequently.

The DRV’s efforts bore fruit. The presence of North Vietnamese victims of U.S. bombing at large antiwar protests in Europe generated much sympathy and helped portray the U.S. government as an aggressor. According to the American historian Harriet Hyman Alonso, the regular visits of American antiwar women’s groups to North Vietnam, and their interactions with North Vietnamese women, “had indeed affected U.S. government policy in Vietnam and contributed to the termination of the war.”³⁷ While this claim is perhaps an exaggeration, the “contribution” may indeed have had a small effect on the U.S. government. Nonetheless, when American women’s groups returned home from the DRV, they worked hard to influence the American people by writing newspaper articles and organizing town hall meetings. The missions demonstrated to the American people that the Vietnamese were human, and that they were losing husbands and sons in the war, just like the American women.³⁸

The image of the United States was severely damaged abroad by the vast propaganda campaign conducted under the auspices of the dual strategies of the diplomatic front and people's diplomacy, combined with the support of antiwar activists overseas, which cast North Vietnam as a victim of imperialism. Nourished by informal diplomacy, these global linkages made it difficult for the United States to prolong the war. Without informal diplomacy, U.S. leaders would have been less restrained, and they might have tried to lengthen the war until U.S. power prevailed.

Portraying themselves as nationalists, the North Vietnamese downplayed communism in their encounters with foreign peace activists. Having seen the human face of the "enemy," the antiwar activists returned home determined to continue to demand a halt to the U.S. bombardment and withdrawal of U.S. troops. Informal diplomacy with the antiwar movements succeeded in presenting the human side of the North Vietnamese in order to extract maximum sympathy and propaganda.

The single-most important piece of evidence demonstrating DRV commitment to informal diplomacy was North Vietnam's relationship with Bertrand Russell, the British philosopher, mathematician, and peace activist. The two opponents of colonialism, Russell and President Ho, collaborated to liberate the Vietnamese people from U.S. hegemony in the 1960s. Under an anti-colonial and antiwar rubric, North Vietnamese mass organizations coordinated plans with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) to organize the International War Crimes Tribunal (IWCT) in Europe to investigate U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, such as the use of chemical weapons and practices prohibited by international conventions.

The North Vietnamese people have been neglected in scholarly accounts of the Russell tribunal whose members included the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, French novelist Simone de Beauvoir, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee leader Stokely Carmichael, and others. The historical literature has not given sufficient agency to ordinary North Vietnamese as actors within the global antiwar movement. It has not credited them for playing a valuable role in the creation of the IWCT. An array of North Vietnamese voices of resistance has remained silent in the literature. Biographers of Russell have not probed Russell's requests for financial assistance from Ho Chi Minh.³⁹ The biographers and scholars of the Vietnam War have not properly explored Russell's relationship with Ho, and have fleetingly dealt with Russell's involvement in the war and Ho's financial support for Russell's foundation. Ronald Clark devotes only one sentence to the topic, and Ray Monk disregards Russell's voluminous correspondence with Ho, including financial assistance.⁴⁰ A major study of the IWCT by Arthur and Judith Klinghoffer avoids discussing funding issues and does not explore Russell's relationship with Ho and other DRV leaders.⁴¹ Taken together, these omissions have hidden from public view the DRV's important assistance to Russell's efforts to draw attention to U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

A brief survey of North Vietnamese informal diplomacy in Europe and its impact on the LBJ administration will help explain the importance of informal diplomacy. The North Vietnamese played a significant, though largely unacknowledged, role in the creation of the war crimes tribunal. In February 1966, prior to the establishment of the tribunal, BRPF officials held talks in Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to determine the nature of the tribunal and to persuade North Vietnamese to provide evidence regarding U.S. use of chemical weapons, and to grant access and hospitality to tribunal investigating teams. People's organizations in Hanoi agreed not only to give visiting investigators access, but also to accompany them in their travels throughout North Vietnam to witness the effects of U.S. bombardment.

The IWCT urgently needed funds so it could continue its ambitious campaign to oppose nuclear war and thwart the hegemonic ambitions of the great powers in colonized countries. North Vietnam played a crucial role in support of the BRPF because Ho was a major foreign contributor of funds to the running of the foundation. North Vietnamese funds helped Russell publish the foundation's journal and newsletter, and they paid for IWCT investigators' visits to

North Vietnam. In total, Ho contributed 50,000 NF (equivalent to US\$10,200), and more than double that amount on financing the visits of IWCT investigators, which makes the DRV a significant contributor to the foundation and the tribunal.⁴² Russell also asked North Vietnamese journalists living in London to make financial contributions to his foundation. They passed on the requests to the government in Hanoi.

Evidence showing the impact of the tribunal on the Johnson administration is contained in a noteworthy volume of Congressional documents compiled by William Conrad Gibbons. Entitled *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968*, the collection is published by Princeton University Press. Despite what some scholars have said about the ineffectiveness of the tribunal, the Gibbons' collection shows that the tribunal had considerable impact on the U.S. government.⁴³ Historical literature on the tribunal has been limited to discussing its proceedings and has ignored the Johnson administration's worries about the influence the tribunal could have in Europe and America.⁴⁴ The literature has also overlooked the LBJ administration's proposal to draw attention away from the IWCT by holding its own "counter seminar" in Europe.⁴⁵ Officials from the U.S. State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States Information Agency (USIA) launched a campaign overseas to discredit BRPF staff, and persuaded several Third World leaders to withdraw their support to the tribunal. Beginning in July 1966, the U.S. government organized an extensive intelligence and diplomatic programme to discredit Russell, the tribunal and its staff, and to persuade tribunal officials to withdraw from the proceedings. The disinformation campaign was conducted by an inter-agency group headed by Undersecretary of State George Ball, and composed of officials from the CIA, State Department, USIA, and Department of Defense.⁴⁶

Most works on the diplomacy of the Vietnam War have not given sufficient credit to the Vietnamese revolutionaries for their success in building bridges to an international peace movement that hemmed in Washington and exposed the gratuitous violence of U.S. intervention. A couple of historians have made a beginning in exploring DRV informal diplomacy, producing optimism that younger scholars will find a rich trove of Vietnamese documents to employ in their new studies.

Short Biography

Harish C. Mehta specializes in American foreign relations and Southeast Asia. Fluent in Vietnamese, he conducts research in Vietnamese and U.S. archives. Author of three books on Cambodian politics and media, his articles on Vietnamese diplomacy have appeared in *Diplomatic History*, *Peace and Change*, and *The Historian*. He has taught history at McMaster University, University of Toronto, and Trent University.

Notes

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¹ Speech by President Ho Chi Minh, 14 Jan. 1964, at a conference at the DRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hanoi. Quoted in Nguyen, *Ho Chi Minh Thought on Diplomacy*, 133.

² Goscha, *Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution*, 281.

³ Berman and Johnson, 'The Growing Role of Unofficial Diplomacy', 32–33; Wood, 'Commanding Beauty', 505–531; and Ansari, 'Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy', 41–52. Also see Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New*; and Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*.

⁴ Falk, 'The Changing Role of Global Civil Society', 69–71; and Kaldor, 'The Idea of Global Civil Society', 103–113.

- ⁵ Scholte, 'The Globalization of World Politics', 15.
- ⁶ Berman and Johnson, 'The Growing Role of Unofficial Diplomacy', 32–33.
- ⁷ Davidson *et al.*, 'Foreign Policy According to Freud', 145–157.
- ⁸ See Nye, *Bound to Lead*; and Nye, *Soft Power*.
- ⁹ Hershberg, 'A Half-Hearted Overture', 292–297.
- ¹⁰ Forslund, *Anna Chennault*, 163.
- ¹¹ See Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace*; Cardozo, *Diplomats in International Cooperation*; and Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions*. Also see Young, *The Intermediaries*; Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*; Plischke, *Modern Diplomacy*; Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy*; Newsom, *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union*; Mattox, *The Twilight of American Diplomacy*; Freidin and Bailey, *The Experts*; and Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*.
- ¹² See Forslund, *Anna Chennault*; Hughes, *Wives of Public Men*; Fenzi, *Married to the Foreign Service*; Wood, 'Commanding Beauty'; Wood, 'A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico'; and Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*.
- ¹³ See Goodman, *The Lost Peace*; and Porter, *A Peace Denied*.
- ¹⁴ Elliott, 'Hanoi's Strategy in the Second Indochina War', 71; and Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*.
- ¹⁵ See Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars*; and Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*.
- ¹⁶ See Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*.
- ¹⁷ See Thayer, *War by Other Means*; Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War*; Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*; Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh*; and Turley, *The Second Indochina War*. Also see, Brigham, 'The Archives of Vietnam and the Vietnam Wars'.
- ¹⁸ Anderson, *et al.*, 'Interchange: Legacies of the Vietnam War': 452–90.
- ¹⁹ See Bradley and Brigham, 'Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship in the Cold War Period: Two Reports'. Also see Asselin, 'New Evidence from Vietnam'; Asselin, 'Update on Vietnam's 'New Evidence''; and Masur and Miller, 'Saigon Revisited: Researching South Vietnam's Republican Era (1954–1975)'.
- ²⁰ Asselin, *A Bitter Peace*, xiii.
- ²¹ Nguyen, 'Between the Storms'; Nguyen, 'The Sino-Vietnamese Split and the Indochina War', 12–32; Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*; and Ang, *The Vietnam War from the Other Side*, 1.
- ²² Brigham, *Guerrilla Diplomacy*, x.
- ²³ Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America*, ix.
- ²⁴ Masur, *Hearts and Minds*; and Chapman, 'Staging Democracy', 671–703.
- ²⁵ See, Mehta, 'People's Diplomacy'.
- ²⁶ Asselin, 'We Don't Want a Munich', 547–581.
- ²⁷ See Nguyen, *Ho Chi Minh Thought on Diplomacy*; Luu, *Fifty Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy*; Luong, *Nhien Cuu Lich Su*, 49–57; Luong, *Nhien Cuu Lich Su*, 49–57; and Khac, *Nhien Cuu Lich Su*, 11–25.
- ²⁸ Luu, 'The American War in Vietnamese Memory', 245.
- ²⁹ See the following texts: Bernard Fall's works include, *The Viet-Minh Regime*; *Street Without Joy*; *The Two Vietnams*; *Vietnam Witness*; *Hell in a Very Small Place*; *Last Reflections on a War*; and *Anatomy of a Crisis*. Also see Goscha, 'Sorry About That...' Bernard Fall, the Vietnam War and the Impact of a French Intellectual in the U.S., 363, 369–370, 376–381; Fall, *Bernard Fall: Memories of a Soldier-Scholar*, 175; Fall, 'Ho Chi Minh – A Profile', v, xi; Buck, *et al.*, *Vietnam: Eyewitness Report*, 1–19; Lynd and Hayden, *The Other Side*, 7. See the works of Wilfred Burchett: *Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War*; *North of the Seventeenth Parallel*; *The Furtive War*; *Vietnam North*; *Vietnam Will Win*; *Grasshoppers and Elephants*; and *At the Barricades*. See Kissinger, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 23 Dec. 1971; Joris Ivens' interview with President Ho, 'Departure from Hanoi', 2 July 1965; Thompson, '17e parallele le Vietnam En Guerre'; Dellinger, *From Yale to Jail*, 247–248; and Dellinger, *Revolutionary Nonviolence*, xxvi; Feinberg, *Hanoi Diary*, 205; McEldowney, *Hanoi Journal*, 58; Sontag, *Trip to Hanoi*, 76–77; Chomsky, 'A Special Supplement: In North Vietnam'; Wald, *To Re-possess America*, 12; Hopkinson, 'Roger Pic: French photojournalist famed for his portraits and documentaries on anti-colonial struggles'; and 'Glimpse of the Viet Cong'. See Thu, Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 29.1.1972, so 30/UBDT, ho so xet duyot doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, 8806, trang 1, Phong Phu Thu Tuong (PPTT, Office of the Prime Minister), Trung Tam Luu Tru Quoc Gia 3 (TTLTQG3), National Archives Center Number 3, Hanoi. [Letter, Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to Prime Minister's Office, 29.1.1972, no. 30/UBDT, Examine entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam in 1972, 8806, page 1]. Also see Thu, Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 9.12.1972, ho so xet duyot doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, 8806, trang 31–32, PPTT, TTLTQG3. [Letter, Committee to Investigate

the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to Prime Minister's Office, 9.12.1972, 8806, pp 31–32, Examine entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam in 1972].

³⁰ Telcon, President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Birch Bayh, 15 June 1965, 1:20 p.m., Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, WH Series, June 1965, Box 7, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.

³¹ Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam*, 71, 75.

³² Thu tu Uy ban Dieu tra toi ac chien tranh cua De quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 14.1.1970, thu so 07/MV, Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 8493, v/v xet duyet doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra toi ac chien tranh cua De quoc My o Viet Nam, Uy ban Viet Nam doan ket voi nhan dan My nam 1970, trang 29, PPTT, TTLTQG3. [Letter, Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to the Prime Minister's Office, 14.1.1970, letter no. 07/MV, Prime Minister's Office, 8493, about examining the entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam, Vietnamese Committee for Cooperation with the American People in 1970, page 29].

³³ 'People of the World Condemn U.S. Air Attacks,' 13 Feb. 1965, Vietnam News Agency, CIA, RG 263, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, 2/1/65-2/26/65, Far East, Box 2, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Maryland.

³⁴ Thu, Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 16.5.1972, so 149/UBDT, ho so xet duyet doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, 8806, trang 8–9, PPTT, TTLTQG3. [Letter, Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to the Prime Minister's Office, 16.5.1972, No. 149/UBDT, Examine entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam in 1972, 8806, pp. 8–9].

³⁵ Thu, Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 30.5.1972, so 177/UBDT, ho so xet duyet doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, 8806, trang 10, PPTT, TTLTQG3. [Letter, Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to the Prime Minister's Office, 30.5.1972, No. 177/UBDT, Examine entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam in 1972, 8806, p. 10].

³⁶ Thu, Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, den Phong Phu Thu Tuong, 3.6.1972, so 129/UBDT, ho so xet duyet doan ra, doan vao cho Uy ban Dieu tra loi ac chien tranh cua de quoc My o Viet Nam, 8806, trang 11, PPTT, TTLTQG3. [Letter, Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam to Prime Minister's Office, 3.6.1972, no. 129/UBDT, Examine entry and exit of the Committee to Investigate the War Crimes of U.S. Imperialists in Vietnam in 1972, 8806, page 11].

³⁷ Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue*, 220.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 216.

³⁹ See Monk, *Bertrand Russell, 1921–70: The Ghost of Madness*; Moorehead, *Bertrand Russell: A Life*; Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell*; Clark, *Bertrand Russell and His World*; Horowitz, *Radical Son: A Journey Through Our Time*; Gottschalk, *Bertrand Russell: A Life*; Ryan, *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*; Ali, *Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties*; and Feinberg and Kasrils, *Bertrand Russell's America, Volume II, 1945–1970: A Documented Account*.

⁴⁰ Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell*, 605. Also see, Feinberg and Kasrils, *Bertrand Russell's America*.

⁴¹ Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 111.

⁴² Letter, Russell to Ho, 3 Mar. 1965, Bertrand Russell Archive (BRA), 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61, Russell Archive, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada; Telegram, Ho to Russell, 2 Aug. 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (Dec. 1966), Box 10.5; and Letter, Russell to Ho, 12 Aug. 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (Dec. 1966), Box 10.5. For exchange rates, see International Monetary Statistics, International Monetary Fund, www.imfstatistics.org/imf Accessed on 5 Nov. 2008. One US dollar was worth 4.902 French New Francs in 1965, and 4.914 French New Francs in 1966.

⁴³ Hunt, *David Dellinger: The Life and Times of a Nonviolent Revolutionary*, 167. Also see, Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals*, 120; and Hershberger, *Traveling to Vietnam*, 92.

⁴⁴ For exceptions, see *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968*.

⁴⁵ Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals*, 115.

⁴⁶ For more on the U.S. government's efforts to create propaganda, particularly the foreign initiatives of USIA, see Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*; Dizard, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*; Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War*; Bogart, *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda*; Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961*; Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*; and Whitton, *Propaganda and the Cold War: A Princeton University Symposium*.

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