

NORTH VIETNAM'S INFORMAL DIPLOMACY
WITH BERTRAND RUSSELL: PEACE ACTIVISM
AND THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL

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This article offers a new interpretation of the combined peace activism of the British philosopher-activist Bertrand Russell and the North Vietnamese. Three new perspectives are offered on their global activism, which had a significant—but grossly understated—impact on the U.S. government. First, the article writes ordinary Vietnamese people into the diplomacy of the Vietnam War, which has largely been written from the perspective of powerful world leaders. Second, it shows that the North Vietnamese performed an important, though unacknowledged, role in the creation of the Russell war crimes tribunal that put the United States on trial in 1967. Finally, the article presents evidence of the Russell tribunal's considerable impact on the U.S. government. It shows that the Lyndon Johnson administration made plans to respond to the tribunal by holding its own "counter seminar." The administration also launched a propaganda campaign to discredit Russell tribunal staff.

The North Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh forged a transnational alliance with the British philosopher, mathematician, and peace activist Bertrand Russell in the crucible of war. To construct a global diplomatic front in opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam in the 1960s, two opponents of colonialism, Russell and President Ho of North Vietnam (also known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or the DRV), joined arms across the oceans to liberate the Vietnamese people from U.S. hegemony: They espoused a shared vision of a world free from imperialism. Their relationship came to represent a site of resistance to the effort undertaken by the administrations of both U.S. presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to maintain a non-Communist regime in South Vietnam.

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In a contiguous move, North Vietnamese mass organizations coordinated plans with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) to organize the International War Crimes Tribunal (IWCT) in 1966 in Europe and Japan, which investigated U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, principally the use of chemical weapons and excessive military force prohibited by international conventions. They hoped that the evidence generated by the tribunal would help the American antiwar movement persuade the U.S. government to stop bombarding the North Vietnamese and withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam. The North Vietnamese succeeded in globalizing their struggle to reunify the two halves of Vietnam and in developing transnational links with antiwar movements abroad. Together with Russell and the antiwar movement, the North Vietnamese carved out political and diplomatic space wherein they conducted an international campaign to publicize their cause and in the process became key contestants to destabilize an already beleaguered White House that was beginning to reel from the cacophony of protests that echoed in the U.S. national media and in avenues across American cities and in the nation's farmlands (Figure 1).

The history of Russell's war crimes tribunal and the Russell–Ho Chi Minh relationship (as well as Russell's links with the people of North Vietnam) are significant because they help deepen scholarly understanding not just of the antiwar movement in the United States but also of the wider antiwar activism that existed overseas. The Russell tribunal was significant for a number of compelling reasons that are both local and global.

The tribunal succeeded in its goal of impacting the image of the U.S. government through worldwide press publicity of U.S. war crimes. To gain press coverage, the tribunal capitalized on the intellectual stature of the tribunal's presidents, such as Russell and the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as the French feminist writer Simone de Beauvoir, who served as a tribunal member, and several other major figures in literature, science, politics, law, and theater, some of whom were Nobel Prize winners. Press coverage was mixed, though. The tribunal received more coverage in Europe and Asia than in the United States. French and Italian media reports were positive, while the British press was negative.¹

The fact that the Russell tribunal was held one year before the American antiwar movement really took off within the United States is further testimony of the pathbreaking work performed by the duo of Russell and Ho Chi Minh. Scholars have shown that Americans




Figure 1. Bertrand and Edith Russell demonstrating against the war outside the House of Commons in London on June 30, 1965.

who opposed the war in Vietnam were encouraged by the support they received from overseas, especially because Bertrand Russell was assembling his Vietnam tribunal as the antiwar movement was growing in the United States.²

The Russell tribunal had a much wider global impact than the legal challenges mounted by Americans against their government. This is because the Russell tribunal actually put the U.S. government on trial for war crimes, whereas the American lawsuits were much narrower in scope and were brought by conscientious objectors who were resisting military draft. U.S. trials challenging the draft raised issues of conscience of the objector, not of war crimes of the U.S. government.³

Russell's IWCT mattered because the United Nations had proved to be powerless and ineffectual in restraining the United States in Vietnam. The Russell tribunal was therefore the sole vehicle to attempt to put U.S. leaders on trial for their actions in Vietnam. The role of the United Nations in Vietnam was "both marginal and intermittent."⁴ The UN secretary-general stated in his annual report for 1971–1972 that the United Nations appeared to have no relevance to the events in Vietnam even though the UN was created to safeguard global peace and security. The extremely limited availability of the means to punish perpetrators for war crimes, particularly in the time frame of the Vietnam War, signposts the important contribution of the Russell tribunal.⁵

The IWCT draws its importance from the fact that it gathered a vast body of original evidence painstakingly assembled by doctors, scientists, and academics. In contrast, U.S. compilations of the conduct of the war by the U.S. military, such as a study by Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam published in January 1968, used second-hand sources such as journalists' reports. These press reports lack the authenticity and rigor that are emblematic of the scientific and medical evidence compiled by the Russell tribunal.⁶

The IWCT went beyond its mandate: It broke several important stories of the Vietnam War. It was the first to report that the United States was using a special kind of bomb, described as a guava bomb by the Vietnamese and as a cluster bomb unit by U.S. forces, which was a spectacularly vicious weapon that violated the rules of war. Its distinctive feature was that its purpose appeared to be maiming victims rather than killing them.⁷

The Russell tribunal reintroduced international citizens' tribunals after a gap of two decades. The IWCT was the first international forum to pass judgment on the war policies of a major world power after the International Military Tribunals, which were held at Nuremberg and Tokyo at the end of the Second World War.⁸ While Nuremberg was *ex post facto* and could not change the course of history, the Russell tribunal could have potentially altered U.S. government actions and stopped the war.⁹ The core difference between the Russell tribunal and the Nuremberg trials was that citizens and popular support were the driving force behind the former, and the latter was supported by state power. The common link between them was the universally experienced sense of outrage.¹⁰ Scholars have argued that it did not matter that the Russell tribunal was an unofficial body; what mattered was that charges were actually brought against the U.S. government

and that the charges were well substantiated.¹¹ Moreover, not only is there consistency in the witnesses' testimonies at the Russell proceedings, the testimonies also possess "high credibility value" as a result of the close and detailed questioning of witnesses by members of the tribunal.¹² The long-term repercussion of the Russell tribunal's success was that it generated a vast catalog of the excesses of U.S. warfare in Vietnam that was available to antiwar activists. The tribunal played a central role in associating the phrase "war crimes" with U.S. military operations in Vietnam.

An indicator of the IWCT's success is that its influence went far beyond its investigation of U.S. war crimes in Vietnam. The Russell Foundation organized a series of tribunals to investigate human rights violations across the globe. The Second Russell Tribunal, in 1973–1975, found governments in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia guilty of systematic violations of human rights. The Third Russell Tribunal in 1978–1979 examined civil rights' violations in West Germany, especially the concern that West Germans were being denied the right to jobs in the civil service because of their political convictions at a time when West German government loyalty checks smacked of McCarthyism in the United States. The Fourth Russell Tribunal in 1980 investigated complaints by American Indians of human rights' violations.¹³

REVISIONING RUSSELL'S SOLIDARITY WITH NORTH VIETNAM

This article presents three principal arguments concerning the informal diplomacy between Russell and the North Vietnamese. First, North Vietnamese played an important, though largely unacknowledged, role in the creation of the war crimes tribunal. In February 1966, prior to the establishment of the tribunal, BRPF officials held talks in Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh and DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to determine the nature of the tribunal and to persuade the North Vietnamese to provide evidence regarding the U.S. use of chemical weapons and to grant access and hospitality to tribunal investigating teams. Not only did North Vietnamese funds help Russell publish the foundation's journal and newsletter, Hanoi generously extended local hospitality to teams of IWCT investigators visiting Vietnam to gather evidence about the effects of chemical weapons used by the United States.

Second, this study restores ordinary Vietnamese people to the diplomacy of the war, which has largely been written from the

perspective of powerful world leaders. The multiplicity of North Vietnamese voices of resistance has not received proper hearing. The historical literature has failed to properly acknowledge the North Vietnamese role in the creation and operation of the IWCT.¹⁴ The London representatives of the Hanoi-based *Cuu Quoc* (National Salvation) weekly journal participated in discussions with BRPF officials to organize the structure of an investigative commission that would send medical doctors and scholars to North Vietnam to gather evidence of war crimes.¹⁵ Because Russell had infrequent contact with Ho, North Vietnamese newsmen based in London—as well as the people’s organizations of the DRV and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF)—performed an important function in coordinating antiwar events with Russell Foundation staff. All of Ho’s communications with Russell occurred through the post, which took almost a month. Because letters and telegrams were lost so often, Russell suspected that the British postal authorities were intercepting them.¹⁶

Finally, despite what some scholars have said about the ineffectiveness of the tribunal, it had considerable impact on the U.S. government.¹⁷ Previous historical accounts of the tribunal have been limited to discussing the tribunal’s proceedings and have ignored the worries of the Johnson administration about the influence the tribunal could have in Europe and America.¹⁸ They have also overlooked the administration’s proposal to draw attention away from the IWCT by holding its own “counter seminar.”¹⁹

RUSSELL’S ALLIANCE WITH HO CHI MINH

Although Russell was already ninety-one years of age when he first corresponded with Ho Chi Minh in 1963, he still conducted vigorous international diplomacy with foreign heads of government in Asia, Africa, eastern and western Europe, and Latin America aimed at building an international movement against U.S. intervention in Vietnam. And although they never met, Russell and Ho established warm personal relations. Every year, both men cabled birthday greetings to each other, and Ho unfailingly sent Russell a birthday gift, usually an item of Vietnamese handicraft.²⁰ Russell did not visit Vietnam during the Vietnam War years, although in 1920 he had passed through the French colonial city of Saigon, which he described as a “nightmarish place” populated by Europeans who were “enormously rich & very ill.”

Ho Chi Minh and Russell did become strong allies, but the relationship got off to a rocky start when Russell criticized the DRV's attempt to curtail press freedom. Russell expressed sympathy for the Vietnamese struggle, but he requested that Ho release the North Vietnamese journalists and writers of the journal *Nhan Van* who had been imprisoned since 1956 for having demanded the right to publish without prior restraint and for criticizing the government's mishandling of land reforms and poverty.²¹ Russell was apparently willing to overlook DRV censorship (Ho never did reply to his plea to release the writers), because he campaigned against the U.S. intervention in Vietnam at a time when few dared speak out against the war.

Although many of Russell's young friends and collaborators in Europe and the United States were left-leaning activists, Russell did not accept that class struggle was the only way to achieve social change. A non-Communist, Russell only supported the DRV government because the North Vietnamese revolutionaries were engaged in a nationalistic struggle for Vietnam's very survival. The DRV, he believed, enjoyed the overwhelming support of its people and had implemented certain elements of participatory democracy. Like many antiwar activists, Russell maintained that an authoritarian strain had developed within the DRV because of the pressures and exigencies of the war.²² By 1966, as North Vietnam faced heavy U.S. bombardment, Russell began to uphold the Communist viewpoint in his speeches.²³

In September 1963, Russell announced the creation of two foundations for peace: the BRPF and the Atlantic Peace Foundation.²⁴ Soon after the formation of the two foundations, Russell began looking for funding. In January 1964, he wrote to Tran Viet Dung, the London representative of the Hanoi weekly *Cuu Quoc*, requesting money to help run the foundations and asking Dung to suggest the names of others who might support the foundations financially.²⁵ In November 1964, Russell asked Ho to become a financial sponsor of the BRPF, explaining that the funds would help the foundation to influence public opinion in the West, particularly in the United States.²⁶ Ho argued that it would be inappropriate to have his name advertised on the foundation's letterhead as an official sponsor because the DRV's Communism could become a liability in the foundation's work in the West. Russell replied that he recognized these dangers, and he assured Ho that he would defend the DRV's right to struggle against U.S. intervention publicly against any criticism.

Russell admitted that the fear of Communism in the United States was irrational and dangerous, but that made it all the more important to challenge those misconceptions openly.²⁷

Ho still declined to become an official sponsor of the foundation, but at the very least Russell managed to secure Ho's financial support.²⁸ In total, Ho contributed 50,000 new francs (equivalent to US\$10,200) to the BRPF and the IWCT and more than double that amount on financing the visits of the IWCT's investigators to Vietnam, which made the DRV a significant contributor to the foundation and the tribunal.²⁹ In comparison, Pakistan's President Ayub Khan contributed a total of 7,750 British pounds (equivalent to US\$21,700 at prevailing exchange rates in 1964–66) to help Russell run the foundation's peace activism and to publish its journal, *The Spokesman*.³⁰

Russell's prominent intellectual stature drew many world leaders to his side, some of whom lent their name and others who contributed funds. In the mid-1960s, sponsors appearing on the BRPF's letterhead included the Duke of Bedford, Nobel Prize winners Max Born, Linus Pauling, Albert Schweitzer, and Lord Boyd Orr, Spanish cellist Pablo Casals, Queen Elizabeth of Belgium, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, Pakistani President Ayub Khan, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian President Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, British actress Vanessa Redgrave, and Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Russell first broached the idea of a tribunal, not with the DRV as one might expect, but with the NLF because the South Vietnamese revolutionaries were the principal combatants in the struggle to liberate their homeland. In July and September 1965, members of the NLF central committee Ma Thi Chu and Dinh Ba Thi, and South Vietnamese journalist Pham Van Chuong, met several times with Russell's representative Ralph Schoenman, a leftist American who was educated at Princeton University and the London School of Economics.³¹ At these meetings, Schoenman conveyed Russell's idea of a war crimes tribunal, and the NLF agreed to cooperate and assist in the tribunal.

The DRV enthusiastically welcomed the plan to form a tribunal. In February 1966, Schoenman met with Ho and Dong in Hanoi. They agreed that the foundation would create the IWCT and that the DRV would make available evidence in its possession, including exhibits of weapons used against the people of Vietnam. Witnesses and victims

would also testify before the tribunal. Ho agreed to host investigating teams and furnish the necessary facilities in North Vietnam.³² At the end of his stay in Hanoi in March, Schoenman wrote to Prime Minister Dong, informing him that the war crimes tribunal would cost 50,000 British pounds, which was needed to pay for transport and accommodation for witnesses, office supplies, and publicity.³³

In July 1966, Russell informed Ho that the IWCT would hold hearings in Paris the following year to put the United States on trial for the war crimes it had committed in Vietnam.³⁴ Prominent personalities who had agreed to serve on the tribunal included Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, former Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas, Italian social activist Danilo Dolci (the “Gandhi of Sicily”), Italian Communist Lelio Basso, German playwright Peter Weiss, British historian Isaac Deutscher, and the American antiwar activist David Dellinger. Stokely Carmichael pledged to hold a meeting of the national council of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a major organization of the American civil rights movement, to support the tribunal.³⁵

Although Ho and Russell worked well together most of the time, friction developed between the BRPF and the DRV over the structure of the tribunal’s investigative teams. In October 1966, Russell complained to Ho about an attempt by DRV representatives to select the members of an international commission to coordinate the dispatch of investigating teams to North Vietnam.³⁶ Russell especially resented how the DRV diplomat Mai Van Bo and the *Cuu Quoc* London representative Nguyen Van Sao tried to dominate discussions with BRPF officials. DRV interference risked undermining the tribunal’s credibility.³⁷ Russell argued that to convince Western opinion that the United States had committed war crimes in Vietnam the tribunal “must be exact and unimpeachable” and the “broad base required [by the tribunal] cannot be a mask for external control.” Ho intervened personally in October to resolve these disputes by inviting Schoenman to visit Hanoi in November before the opening meetings of the tribunal. Consequently, Ho and Russell worked together to gain favorable publicity for the tribunal.

RUSSELL’S FRATERNAL LINKS WITH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Russell maintained close and regular contact not just with members of North Vietnam’s diplomatic front but also with the NLF to coordinate policies and antiwar events. Russell believed that the NLF

was a non-Communist, neutralist, and popular front that supported the terms of the Geneva Agreements.³⁸ As part of this effort, Russell took it upon himself to defend the NLF's policy to militarily confront the United States and the government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

When the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemical weapons to destroy vegetation and food crops in South Vietnam in 1961, the DRV people's organizations requested Russell to bring these attacks to the attention of Britain and the Soviet Union, the co-chairs of the Geneva Conference.³⁹ Nguyen Xien, an engineer who chaired the Hanoi-based Committee of Struggle Against U.S. Imperialists and Henchmen's Persecution of Intellectuals in South Vietnam, asked Russell to urge the governments of Britain and the Soviet Union to prevail upon the Kennedy administration and the South Vietnamese regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem to "stop at once the chemical war" and "all acts of repression and murder in South Vietnam."⁴⁰ Russell replied that he was "appalled" at the information Xien had sent him because it revealed the "barbarism of the war now being conducted by the U.S. and its creature government of South Vietnam" (Figures 2 and 3).⁴¹

Dr. Le Dinh Tham, who headed the Vietnam Peace Committee, informed Russell about the kind of warfare being waged by the United States and the Diem regime. Tham said that U.S. and Diem forces were making "continual raids to herd people into concentration camps dubbed Strategic Hamlets" and that they "used inhuman tortures of a medieval type" such as "beheading," "disboweling," and "plucking out the liver." They had dropped napalm bombs on villages and sprayed poisonous chemicals on large and densely populated areas. Tham argued that although the United States claimed these products "were common chemicals to kill weeds," in reality they destroyed crops and vegetation and killed cattle and people. He added that U.S. and Diem forces "mixed poison with water while carrying out raids" and that the United States was using Vietnam as a "testing ground for their special war."⁴² Russell told Tham that it was a "difficult task to gain publicity for opposition to American policy, but nonetheless we are keeping up the effort."⁴³ Russell also corresponded with Professor Truong Cong Quyen, vice-dean of the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacology in Hanoi, and sent him BRPF publications in support of Vietnam. Russell told Quyen: "I am appalled by the conduct of war by the United States in Vietnam, and am raising my voice against it wherever possible."⁴⁴



Figures 2 and 3. Before and after the U.S. bombardment: The Thanh Bo Tuberculosis Hospital in North Vietnam in July 1965.

Russell requested Nguyen Xien, who concurrently served as vice president of the Vietnam Association for the Popularization of Science and Technology, to keep him informed about the latest developments in both halves of Vietnam. In response, Xien wrote that the coup that had removed Diem from power on November 1, 1963, had “brought no change” in South Vietnam because the military *junta* that replaced

him was continuing the “Diemist policy of enslavement to the USA, and of war against the South Vietnamese people.” Xien reported that the following day, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces bombed civilians in the south, and on November 3, they sprayed toxic chemicals in Cai Lai district and My Tho province of South Vietnam. Owing to military violence against civilians, Xien requested Russell to “grant greater attention to the question of South Vietnam.”⁴⁵ Russell assured Xien that he would “take this matter up in every way available to us” because the war being waged in Vietnam was “atrocious” and “all pressure ought to be brought to bear to halt it.” Russell requested Xien to acknowledge receipt of his letter because he did not want the letter “interfered with by the British postal authorities.”⁴⁶

To maintain a close working relationship with the North Vietnamese, Russell thought it necessary to inform DRV people’s organizations about his antiwar activities in the United States. In March 1964, Russell told Nguyen Xien that he had contacted student organizations at more than 200 U.S. universities that had begun a campaign against the war in Vietnam.⁴⁷ Stanford University students requested Russell to send a taped message that was heard by about 1,000 students at a rally at Stanford in March. Russell warned the students that World War III could begin if the United States extended its intervention in North Vietnam.⁴⁸ The Stanford Peace Caucus sent Russell’s statement to 225 American colleges and twenty-five newspapers, wire services, and radio stations.⁴⁹

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation officials gave the North Vietnamese advance notice of antiwar events. In January 1965, Schoenman alerted *Cuu Quoc* weekly’s London representative Nguyen Van Sao that Russell was soon expected to deliver a public speech in London in which he would make “a serious and dramatic condemnation of U.S. policy.” Schoenman urged Sao to treat the matter “confidentially” because the speech had not yet been announced publicly.⁵⁰ The North Vietnamese were moved by Russell’s sincerity. In January 1965, Hoang Quoc Viet, the chairman of the Vietnam Solidarity Bureau, who was organizing an international solidarity conference in Hanoi, told Russell that he admired him because he unceasingly supported the Vietnamese revolutionaries despite his “old age.”⁵¹ Although Russell could not travel to Vietnam because of his age, BRPF officials Schoenman and Christopher Farley did visit to attend antiwar events, deliver requests for financial assistance, and gather evidence of war crimes.⁵²

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation officials helped a major Hanoi book distributor, Xunhasaba, find booksellers in London that would stock DRV patriotic literature such as *Facing the Skyhawks*, *Letters from South Vietnam*, *Special War and National Liberation War in Vietnam*, *Indomitable South Vietnam*, *On the Problem of War and Peace*, and *My Visit to the Liberated Areas of South Vietnam*.⁵³ Xunhasaba requested Russell to send some of his books, such as *Negotiations or Withdrawal: Which Way to Peace in Vietnam*, *Post-script: To the Conscience of Mankind*, and *Civilization at the Bar*, so that they could be translated and published in Vietnam.⁵⁴

To combat Western skepticism over the use of poisonous gases, Russell asked Nguyen Xien to send more details about the nature of the chemicals that U.S. warplanes were spraying over Vietnamese forests and fields.⁵⁵ Russell believed that precise information would help expose the claim of the U.S. government that the gases it was using in Vietnam were non-toxic and that the U.S. bombardment was only directed at military installations. Xien provided the information, which IWCT investigators incorporated into their reports (Figure 4).

Although Russell fully supported the DRV, he did not want to be seen as a Communist puppet. For example, he declined to sign a letter that Nguyen Xien's Committee of Struggle proposed to circulate among intellectuals all over the world, protesting U.S. war atrocities and the intervention in Vietnam.⁵⁶ Russell explained that while he sympathized with the petition, he preferred to act independently because it allowed him to reach a wider audience in the West that might be turned off by his association with a Communist-initiated campaign.

When President Johnson committed the United States to a major war in Vietnam in late July 1965, the Vietnam Peace Committee contacted Russell, voicing deep concern that the dispatch of "another 50,000 troops" to Vietnam was aimed at intensifying the war.⁵⁷ And when the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam increased to more than 200,000, the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace informed the BRPF that U.S. and allied troops were conducting a policy of "burning all, killing all, and destroying all." The committee urged the BRPF to raise its voice against U.S. and allied aggression in Vietnam.⁵⁸

Russell and his colleagues often used their connections with the Vietnam Peace Committee in Hanoi to organize the visits of Western journalists and writers to North Vietnam. For example, Russell helped



Figure 4. Napalm bomb damage to the people of Vietnam.

arrange an interview between the Australian writer Christopher Koch and Ho Chi Minh, which appeared in *Playboy* magazine.⁵⁹ Russell also helped the *New York Times* journalist Harrison Salisbury gain permission to visit North Vietnam even though he had been critical of Russell in his columns.⁶⁰ The BRPF was careful, however, not to recommend Western journalists who worked for publications openly hostile to the DRV. Christopher Farley told Nguyen Van Sao of the *Cuu Quoc* weekly that the *Economist* had approached the foundation with a request to be permitted to travel to North Vietnam. Farley warned Sao: “We do not in any way recommend the *Economist* and are not trying to encourage you to permit that journal to go to your country.”⁶¹

JOHNSON'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE IWCT

Russell frequently wrote to President Johnson, urging the United States to end its interventions in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Russell's letters irritated the Johnson administration in part because Russell did not restrict his complaints to the sole issue of Vietnam. In a letter to LBJ in December 1963, Russell urged the United States to improve relations with Cuba. He informed Johnson about the formation of his two peace foundations and asked the president to support them.⁶² Johnson's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, brushed Russell off with the comment that surely he would have seen from the president's public statements the strength and depth of his commitment to building peace.⁶³ To deny Russell publicity, the U.S. State Department advised the White House not to respond to Russell's cables and letters addressed to President Johnson. Although he rarely received a reply, Russell continued writing to the White House.

The effort to deny Russell publicity was only partially successful, because the war crimes tribunal proved to be an irresistible topic for the mainstream media. On August 3, 1966, newspapers announced that a tribunal headed by Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre would try President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as "war criminals" for their policies toward Vietnam.⁶⁴ The judges would make their decision based on the testimony of hundreds of witnesses and complete scientific data on chemicals used in U.S. military operations.⁶⁵

On August 25, Russell wrote a long and strongly worded letter to Johnson, arguing for the validity and credibility of the war crimes tribunal.⁶⁶ By McNamara's own admission, he pointed out that the United States had dropped more bombs on Vietnam than in Korea and the Second World War. Russell charged that the United States had used chemical weapons, poison gas, napalm, phosphorus, and fragmentation bombs against hospitals, schools, villages, and sanatoria. He remonstrated that the North Vietnamese had not bombed one school or village in the United States or occupied any part of the United States. Consequently, solemn proceedings were needed to weigh evidence of crimes committed by the United States against the Vietnamese people.

Russell invited President Johnson to appear before the tribunal in his own defense to answer the evidence and eyewitness testimony concerning the atrocities carried out on Johnson's instructions. Should

Johnson be unwilling to appear personally, Russell requested him to appoint persons who would defend the actions of the U.S. government. Russell maintained that the tribunal drew legitimacy not only from its public mandate and the eminence and international character of its members but also from its solemn antecedent in the Nuremberg trials. Not surprisingly, the Johnson administration ignored these demands as it considered the tribunal a farce on par with the Soviet “show trials” of 1936.

Nonetheless, U.S. officials worried about the trial’s impact.⁶⁷ Beginning in July 1966, the U.S. government organized an extensive intelligence and diplomatic program to discredit Russell, the tribunal, and its staff and to persuade tribunal officials to withdraw from the proceedings. The disinformation campaign, conducted by an interagency group headed by Undersecretary of State George Ball, was composed of officials from the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, United States Information Agency, and Department of Defense. The government also explored legal avenues but decided that defamation action should not be attempted because any suit against those involved in the “mock trial would itself result in very unfavorable publicity” for the United States at home and abroad.⁶⁸

In early August 1966, George Ball met with McNamara’s assistant Adam Yarmolinsky to discuss what to do about the tribunal. Yarmolinsky, who agreed that the tribunal “could hurt us a good deal in Europe and Asia,” suggested that a private U.S. lawyer defend the Johnson administration. Ball, however, did not want to dignify the tribunal with official U.S. participation. He recommended that the U.S. government promote a “competing trial” through the International Committee of Jurists at the Hague. U.S. Embassy officials in Stockholm began exploring a plan to conduct a rival trial. Meanwhile, the interagency group directed the CIA to prepare dossiers on various persons involved in the trial, as well as members and staff of the Russell Foundation.⁶⁹

In late August, Ball told President Johnson that the interagency group was “quietly exploring” with British and French government officials what legal steps could be taken to “forestall this spectacle.” He added that the interagency group also planned to “stimulate press articles criticizing the ‘trials’ and detailing the unsavory and leftwing background of the organizers and judges.”⁷⁰

The State Department instructed U.S. ambassadors in Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia to warn the leaders of each country that “his name is being misused to circulate

pro-Communist, anti-American propaganda.” The ambassadors were also directed to explain that the Russell Foundation “has been captured by a group of extreme left wingers of the pro-Chicom [Chinese Communist] stripe,” including “American citizens who are using the ninety-four-year old Russell’s name, perhaps without his full comprehension.”⁷¹ Ball told Johnson that he would speak to the British Home Secretary about this issue. Ball also promised to ask U.S. Supreme Court Justice Abraham Fortas to press his friend, the cellist Pablo Casals, into withdrawing from the tribunal. Although Casals did not participate in the tribunal, it remains unclear whether he withdrew because of U.S. government pressure.

The announcement of the creation of the IWCT alerted defenders of President Johnson’s Vietnam policies. Morris I. Leibman, a senior partner in the Chicago law firm Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Baird, and Minow, who also served as a civilian aide-at-large to the Secretary of the Army, offered to defend the administration.⁷² Dan B. Jacobs, a speechwriter to the Democratic candidate for governor of New York, feared that the Russell trial would become “a propaganda circus” that could have a negative impact in Europe, particularly among intellectuals. Jacobs and CIA official Cord Meyer proposed setting up a “small private project” to present the other side of the story. Under this plan, a small non-governmental project would be established to bring politicians from South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand and a few dissidents from North Vietnam to present the war from their perspective. The Russell tribunal, they argued, would be reluctant to refuse them the right to testify. If they were denied entrance to the proceedings, they could stand outside in the corridors talking to television reporters or they could hold daily press conferences.⁷³ The National Security Council rejected this proposal as ineffective. NSC official Donald W. Ropa told Walt Whitman Rostow, who was the national security adviser to President Johnson, in December 1966 that bringing politicians from South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to testify at the Russell tribunal would not be sufficient to counter the damaging impact of the IWCT. The plan to provide alternative witnesses would be ineffective, in Ropa’s view, because the tribunal would be stacked with Russell’s supporters. Instead, Ropa proposed that a seminar be held in the same city where the tribunal would be located, to bring together prominent Vietnamese officials who supported the U.S. objectives in Vietnam. This seminar could “hopefully blunt the tribunal’s propaganda edge.”⁷⁴ Ropa urged Rostow to request the CIA to develop a broader

range of options using the expertise of the 303 Committee, a special interagency body created in 1964 to oversee covert operations. Most of the documents pertaining to the countermeasures against the IWCT have not yet been declassified, so the details on this project are unclear. The circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that the plan was somewhat successful.

In November 1966, three African presidents and a monarch who had been the sponsors of the BRPF resigned from the war crimes trial: Senegal's Leopold Senghor, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. Russell complained that these leaders had withdrawn because of "intolerable pressure" from the United States.⁷⁵ Russell claimed that one of the African leaders who had resigned had sent him a photocopy of a letter that Russell had dispatched to President Johnson at the White House, inviting him to appear before the tribunal, thereby establishing a connection between LBJ and the African leader. Russell argued that this was "a piece of clumsiness which even the Central Intelligence Agency must have deplored."⁷⁶ At this time, Russell considered the CIA "a vast international agency of subversion."⁷⁷

Other signs point to White House interference in the establishment of the tribunal. The government of Pakistan, headed by Ayub Khan, publicly condemned the war crimes tribunal, and the Indian President Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan disassociated himself from the campaign.⁷⁸ The Sicilian social reformer Danilo Dolci also withdrew as one of twelve judges on the tribunal in November 1966, saying he would be busy with his work at home.⁷⁹

U.S. efforts to undermine the tribunal included attempts to influence the press. In August 1966, a State Department official approached a *New York Times* reporter to suggest running a story on Ralph Schoenman, an American citizen who served as an assistant to Bertrand Russell, in the hope of discrediting the Russell Foundation's staff. Schoenman's activism annoyed U.S. officials because he openly espoused anti-U.S. and pro-Communist views. Schoenman's activities were regularly reported in the American press; British authorities frequently arrested him for unlawful assembly, and the United States placed travel restrictions on him following his visit to China in July 1963 to discuss Russell's plans to mediate the Sino-Indian border dispute.⁸⁰ In a colorful piece, the *New York Times* alleged that Schoenman harbored a "deeply neurotic hatred of his native land" and charged that his "controversial style may be classified as the Extreme

Hysterical.”⁸¹ Alleging that Russell had fallen under the influence of Schoenman, the article argued that Russell must be held responsible for his words and deeds because Russell did believe Schoenman’s views and was not just “a mindless puppet.”⁸²

Judging by the regular appearance of newspaper stories criticizing Russell, the Johnson administration’s character assassination campaign appears to have partially succeeded. A *New York Times Magazine* article by British journalist Bernard Levin, which severely criticized Russell, also appears suspicious. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach sent President Johnson a copy of the article with the gleeful comment that the administration had provided the background.⁸³ In his article, Levin criticized Russell for having “turned into a full-time purveyor of political garbage indistinguishable from the routine products of the Soviet machine.” Russell had allegedly “sunk to defending—not just denying or minimizing, but actively defending—the atrocities of the Viet Cong in Vietnam.”⁸⁴

Washington’s hand also appeared in the difficulties that Russell experienced in trying to find a location for the tribunal. The tribunal sessions could not be held in Paris, as originally planned, because the French government denied permission. President Charles de Gaulle told Sartre that the tribunal would not be allowed to meet in Paris because justice could only be dispensed by the state, and the IWCT intended to usurp that authority by issuing a verdict. Although de Gaulle did not mention it, it was clear that he did not wish to risk further deterioration of Franco-U.S. relations by offering Paris as a pulpit to the tribunal.⁸⁵ Next, Russell approached the British government about his plan to hold the tribunal in London and to provide visas to North Vietnamese witnesses. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, unwilling to cause offense to Washington, told Russell that not only would the one-sided character of the tribunal make peacemaking efforts in Vietnam more difficult, it was also not in the national interest to hold the tribunal in London.⁸⁶

The trial organizers finally turned to Stockholm, even though the Swedish government had indicated it was likely to refuse.⁸⁷ U.S. Embassy diplomats in Stockholm had warned Swedish officials that the tribunal would have an adverse effect on U.S.–Sweden relations and serve to harden Hanoi’s position toward negotiations.⁸⁸ Despite these pressures, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander agreed to allow the tribunal to be held in Stockholm after its organizers promised that the mock trial would be restricted to presenting the facts about U.S.

activities in Vietnam and would neither assume the character of a courtroom nor accuse any private person of a crime.⁸⁹

The head of the tribunal, Jean-Paul Sartre, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in May 1967 to remind him that Russell had not received a reply to his invitation to President Johnson and other U.S. officials to attend the hearings. Sartre invited Rusk, or his designated representatives, to testify because it would help the tribunal in arriving at the truth about the charges of war crimes in Vietnam.⁹⁰ Rusk rejected these invitations with the sarcastic comment that he had no intention of “playing games with a ninety-four year old Briton.” Sartre shot back that Rusk’s effort to “ridicule a great old man” did no honor to the United States.⁹¹

To counter the negative publicity generated by the Russell tribunal, the Swedish Free Asia Committee, a non-government organization, tried to organize a rival hearing on behalf of the United States in Stockholm on May 10 that would include the testimony of ten to fifteen defectors from North Vietnam.⁹² The U.S. Embassy in Stockholm aborted the plan, however, because it believed that the Russell tribunal was already floundering and being ignored by the press. Any attempt to hold a counter tribunal risked drawing more attention to the anti-war tribunal. Also, U.S. officials did not believe that the Free Asia Committee had the ability to carry off the stunt in time.

As the war crimes tribunal got under way, the State Department directed all U.S. diplomatic missions to portray the IWCT as a Communist front (Figure 5). U.S. officials were also instructed to point out that many heads of state had severed their connection with the tribunal. In any case, the United States was not using any experimental weapons, including poison gas forbidden by international law.⁹³ Defoliating chemicals sprayed in Vietnam, the State Department claimed, were the same as conventional, commercially available herbicides and had no harmful effects on humans or animals. Napalm had been used sparingly in North Vietnam, and U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam were carefully restricted to military targets. Moreover, there had been no genocide by U.S. or other “free world” forces as the United States had not tried to exterminate the Vietnamese population or destroy the Communist regime in Hanoi.

The Johnson administration’s propaganda campaign was fairly successful in the United States where many daily newspapers questioned the one-sidedness of the IWCT and the integrity of the witnesses. *Time* magazine, for example, alleged that the tribunal



Left to right, J. P. Sartre, Vladimir Dedijer, and Lawrence Daly.

Figure 5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Vladimir Dedijer, and Lawrence Daly at the Stockholm session of the International War Crimes Tribunal. All images are by the courtesy of the Bertrand Russell Archive.

members were not impartial because Russell had handpicked them.⁹⁴ While it is true that invitations to serve on the tribunal were sent out either by Russell or by the BRPF, tribunal members were fiercely independent and many had serious differences in opinion with key BRPF officials. They were not puppets Russell could manipulate. Moreover, Schoenman argued that “the demand for impartiality or objectivity in the sense of *tabula rasa* does not exist.... The only impartiality which has any meaning in an inquiry or a trial is to be found in the evidence: how massive it is, how verifiable, and how accessible to others.”⁹⁵

In his statement at the tribunal’s session in Stockholm, Russell insisted that the tribunal would function impeccably, its investigations would be thorough, and its evidence undeniable. U.S. civil rights attorney Stanley Faulkner told the tribunal that the United States Army had breached its own Law of Land Warfare, issued by the U.S. War Department in 1956, which defined war crimes and the culpability of individuals who participated in them. Faulkner claimed that the U.S. military was also in breach of the Hague Convention of 1907, which forbade the use of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.⁹⁶

Journalists such as Wilfred Burchett, Bernard Couret, and Tariq Ali and medical doctors such as Abraham Behar, John Takman, Axel Hojer, Jean Michel Krivine, and Francis Kahn explained how aerial bombardment and chemical weapons had damaged the Vietnamese population. Investigators who testified at the tribunal consisted of surgeons, biochemists, radiologists, agronomists, lawyers, sociologists, physicists, and historians. Their medical, scientific, and historical findings filled many trunks and filing cabinets and consisted of hundreds of thousands of feet of film showing the bombings and the use of chemical weapons, whose properties were revealed in meticulous detail.⁹⁷

Tribunal President Sartre announced the verdict of the Stockholm Tribunal on May 10, 1967. After the Stockholm session of the tribunal, two other IWCT sessions were held in the same year: The Japanese branch of the BRPF conducted hearings in Tokyo in August, and a final session was held in Denmark in November. The Stockholm verdict found that the United States had resorted to force in international relations that had been prohibited by various international agreements such as the Pact of Paris of 1928, the United Nations Charter, the Statute of Nuremberg, and the United Nations resolution of 1960. The United States had plunged Vietnam into a state of war by bringing foreign troops and weapons into Vietnam and setting up military bases there in violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 that had called for internationally supervised general elections in Vietnam in 1956. Second, the United States was found to have conducted deliberate, systematic, and large-scale bombardment of civilian populations and areas. The United States had repeatedly violated the sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Third, the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea were found to be accomplices of the United States in the aggression against Vietnam in violation of international law. The Tokyo tribunal found the Japanese government and Japanese business corporations guilty of acting as accomplices of the United States.⁹⁸ The Denmark session found Thailand and the Philippines guilty of complicity in the aggression committed by the United States by sending Thai and Filipino troops to Vietnam and providing military base facilities to U.S. forces (Figure 6).

THE RUSSELL ROAD TO RESISTANCE

Guided by the steady hand of an aging Bertrand Russell, the IWCT fashioned a new avenue to challenge the imperialist policies of




Figure 6. Ho Chi Minh welcomes the International War Crimes Tribunal in this telegram to Russell.

a superpower by giving marginalized people their voice in an international forum and uniting them with antiwar activists in the West. The IWCT's contribution is significant from a number of angles: Not surprisingly, the IWCT had a powerful impact on global public opinion, and its proceedings boosted the antiwar movement in the United States. The tribunal took shape at a historical moment when even the United Nations was powerless to restrain the United States in Vietnam. Its proceedings were sober, fair-minded, and reflected the opinions of the vast majority of people opposed to war crimes. Russell's vision of creating a global tribunal was fulfilled when, after his death

in 1970, the IWCT spawned a whole range of tribunals that interrogated human rights abuses across the world.

As Russell's efforts to convince the Johnson administration to withdraw from Vietnam fell on deaf ears, the tribunal became an important vehicle to publicize the damage the United States had inflicted on Vietnamese society. Russell and Ho hoped that the tribunal would restrain President Johnson and lead the U.S. government toward peace talks with North Vietnam. The immediate impact of the IWCT was that it damaged the image of the U.S. government abroad. Fearing adverse publicity, the Johnson administration attempted to thwart the IWCT, but these efforts mostly failed.

The IWCT would not have seen the light of day without the support of the government and people of North Vietnam, who actively guided and financed the activities of both the IWCT and the BRPF. However, the North Vietnamese did not exercise any influence over the tribunal, and their only attempt to control the tribunal ended in failure. After the successful reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the victorious northern Communists honored Russell's contribution by naming a street after the British philosopher. Bertrand Russell Street in Tan Phu Ward of District 7 in Ho Chi Minh City provides evidence, in asphalt, of the high esteem with which he is held in Vietnam and serves to memorialize his global antiwar activism.

NOTES

1. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 132.

2. See Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 67; Leo Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 193.

3. John F. and Rosemary S. Bannan, *Law, Morality, and Vietnam: The Peace Militants and the Courts* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1974), 23.

4. Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, 164.

5. *Ibid.*, 193.

6. See *In the Name of America: The Conduct of the War in Vietnam by the Armed Forces of the United States as Shown by Published Reports* (Annandale, Virginia: Turnpike, 1968).

7. Carl Oglesby, *Ravens in the Storm: A Personal History of the 1960s Antiwar Movement* (New York: Scribner, 2008), 137–138.

8. Richard A. Falk, “International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A Response to Professor Moore,” in *The Vietnam War and International Law*, ed. Richard A. Falk (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 451.

9. Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, *International Citizens’ Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 4.

10. Bertrand Russell, “Speech to the First Meeting of the Members of the War Crimes Tribunal, London, 13 November 1966,” in *Prevent the Crime of Silence: Reports from the Sessions of the International War Crimes Tribunal Founded by Bertrand Russell*, ed. Peter Limquenco and Peter Weiss (London, Stockholm, Roskilde: Allen Lane/Penguin), 57.

11. See Lawrence J. LeBlanc, *The United States and the Genocide Convention* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991), 25; Richard A. Falk, *The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 44–45.

12. Anthony A. D’Amato, Harvey L. Gould, and Larry W. Woods, “War Crimes and Vietnam: The Nuremberg Defense and the Military Service Register,” in *The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context*, ed. Richard A. Falk (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 426.

13. Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, 191–193; Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, *International Citizens’ Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 165–166.

14. Russell’s biographers and scholars of the Vietnam War have not devoted much attention to Russell’s relationship with Ho, and have cursorily dealt with Russell’s involvement in the Vietnam War and Ho’s financial support for Russell’s foundation. See Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell, 1921–70: The Ghost of Madness* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000); Caroline Moorehead, *Bertrand Russell: A Life* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992); Ronald W. Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (London: Jonathan Cape and Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975); Ronald W. Clark, *Bertrand Russell and His World* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1981); David Horowitz, *Radical Son: A Journey Through Our Time* (New York: The Free Press, 1997); Herbert Gottschalk, *Bertrand Russell: A Life* (London: Unwin, 1965); Alan Ryan, *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1988); Tariq Ali, *Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties* (London: Collins, 1987); and Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils, *Bertrand Russell’s America, Volume II, 1945–1970: A Documented Account* (Boston, Massachusetts: South End, 1983).

15. Examples include *Vietnam Studies*, *Vietnam Pictorial*, and *Vietnam Courier*. Letter, Vietnam Peace Committee to Bertrand Russell, 8 December 1966, Bertrand Russell Archive (hereafter BRA II), 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese, (December 1966), Box 10.5, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada.

16. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 8 January 1964, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.

17. Andrew E. Hunt, *David Dellinger: The Life and Times of a Nonviolent Revolutionary* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 167. Also see Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 120; and Mary Hershberger, *Traveling to Vietnam: American Peace Activists and the War* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 92. The Klinghoffers reveal that some Americans viewed the tribunal as "immature, superficial and antagonistic." Hershberger argues that the one-sidedness of the tribunal made many American activists uneasy.

18. For exceptions, see *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968*, United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).

19. Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 115.

20. Letter, Russell to Ho, 5 June 1965, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

21. Letter, Russell to Ho, 17 August 1963, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

22. Edward F. Sherman, "Bertrand Russell and the Peace Movement: Liberal Consistency or Radical Change," in *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*, ed. George Nakhnikian (London: Duckworth, 1974), 257.

23. Monk, *Bertrand Russell, 1921–70: The Ghost of Madness*, 468, 481.

24. Statement by Bertrand Russell at Television Interview and Press Conference on Launching of Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and Atlantic Peace Foundation, 29 September 1963, Peace (Bertrand Russell), Box 3, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.

25. Letter, Russell to Tran Viet Dung, 3 January 1964, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

26. Letter, Russell to Ho, November 1964, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61; and Letter, Russell to Ho,

30 December 1964, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

27. Letter, Russell to Ho, 12 January 1965, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

28. Letter, Russell to Ho, 8 February 1965, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

29. Letter, Russell to Ho, 3 March 1965, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61; Telegram, Ho to Russell, 2 August 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5; and Letter, Russell to Ho, 12 August 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5. For exchange rates, see International Monetary Statistics, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/>; accessed on 5 November 2008. One U.S. dollar was worth 4.902 French new francs in 1965, and 4.914 French new francs in 1966.

30. See Pacific Exchange Rate Service, University of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business, <http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc./GBPpages.pdf> Accessed on 19 August 2009. One British pound was worth 2.80 U.S. dollars from 1964 to 1966. Also see Letter, Bertrand Russell to President Ayub Khan, 14 August 1964; Letter Ralph Schoenman to High Commissioner of Pakistan in London, 27 October 1964, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Box 1.59; and Letter, A. Hilaly to Bertrand Russell, 3 March 1966, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Box 1.59.

31. Summary Report of Series of Meetings, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

32. Summary Report of Meeting between Ho, Pham Van Dong and Russell's representatives, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

33. Letter, Ralph Schoenman to Pham Van Dong, 3 March 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

34. Moorehead, *Bertrand Russell: A Life*, 529.

35. Letter, Russell to Ho, 20 July 1966, BRA, 650, Heads of State, Vietnam (Democratic Republic), File 71, Box 1.61.

36. Letter, Russell to Ho, 20 October 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

37. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Van Sao, 25 October 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

38. Ryan, *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*, 176.

39. Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 144–145.

40. Letter, Nguyen Xien to Russell, 16 April 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 6.
41. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 30 May 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
42. Letter, Le Dinh Tham to Russell, 26 April 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
43. Letter, Russell to Le Dinh Tham, 29 May 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
44. Letter, Russell to Truong Cong Quyen, 6 June 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
45. Letter, Nguyen Xien to Russell, 16 December 1963, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
46. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 8 January 1964, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
47. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 19 March 1964, BRA II, 640, World Affairs, Box 1.55.
48. "Threat of World War III Voiced to Stanford Group," 10 March 1964, *Palo Alto Times*.
49. Letter, Cheryl Arnold and Richard Such to Russell, 13 March 1964, BRA II, 320, World Affairs, Vietnam Correspondence (9 February 1965), File 178, Box 9.55.
50. Letter, Ralph Schoenman to Nguyen Van Sao, 10 January 1965, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.
51. Letter, Hoang Quoc Viet to Russell, 21 January 1965, BRA II, 376, IWCT, General Correspondence with Vietnamese, Box 10.7.
52. Letter, Nguyen Duy Trinh to Russell, 15 February 1965, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.
53. Letter, Nguyen Huu Dinh and Ngo Duc Mau to Russell, 22 March 1965, BRA II, 376, IWCT, General Correspondence with Vietnamese, Box 10.8; and Letter, Christopher Farley to Ngo Duc Mau, 8 April 1965, BRA II, 376, IWCT, General Correspondence with Vietnamese, Box 10.8.
54. Letter, Xunhasaba to Russell, 5 December 1966, BRA II, 376, IWCT, General Correspondence with Vietnamese, Box 10.8.
55. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 30 April 1965, BRA II, 320, World Affairs, Vietnam Correspondence (9 February 1965), File 179, Box 9.55.
56. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Xien, 30 June 1964, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.
57. Letter, Vietnam Peace Committee to Russell, 6 August 1965, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

58. Circular, Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace, 29 March 1966, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (December 1966), Box 10.5.

59. Letter, Russell to Nguyen Duy Tinh, 14 February 1967, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (March 1967), Box 10.6.

60. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1944–1969*, 241.

61. Letter, Christopher Farley to Nguyen Van Sao, 3 February 1967, BRA II, 375, Working Correspondence with Vietnamese (March 1967), Box 10.6.

62. Letter, Russell to Johnson, 21 December 1963, Peace (Bertrand Russell), Box 3, LBJ Library.

63. Letter, McGeorge Bundy to Russell, 8 January 1964, Peace (Bertrand Russell), Box 3, LBJ Library.

64. "Sartre on Panel Named to 'Try' U.S. Leaders," 3 August 1966, *New York Times*.

65. The tribunal included Russell as Honorary President, Sartre as Executive President, and historian Vladimir Dedijer as Chairman of Sessions. After dropouts and new additions, the tribunal members included: political scientist Wolfgang Abendroth, writer Gunther Anders, Turkish parliamentarian Mehmet Ali Aybar, American novelist James Baldwin, Italian parliamentarian Lelio Basso, feminist writer Simone de Beauvoir, former Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas, SNCC chairman Stokely Carmichael, General Secretary of the Scottish National Union of Mineworkers Lawrence Daly, American activist and editor of *Liberation* David Dellinger, historian Isaac Deutscher, lawyer Haika Grossman, Philippine poet laureate Amado Hernandez, chairperson of the Cuban Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam Melba Hernandez, Pakistani Supreme Court lawyer Mahmud Ali Kasuri, author Sara Lidman, vice-chairman of the Japanese Civil Liberties Union Kinju Morikawa, former Students for a Democratic Society President Carl Oglesby, physics professor Shoichi Sakata, French mathematician Laurent Schwartz, and playwright Peter Weiss.

66. Letter, Russell to Johnson, 25 August 1966, White House Central File, Name File, Russell, Bertrand, Box R 339, LBJ Library.

67. *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968*, 433.

68. *Ibid.*, 433.

69. Telcon, Ball and Yarmolinsky, Ball Telcons, 5 August 1966, LBJ Library.

70. *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–January 1968*, 434.

71. *Ibid.*, 434.

72. Letter, Morris I. Leibman to Walt W. Rostow, 16 August 1966, White House Central File, Name File, Russell, Bertrand, Box R 339, LBJ Library.

73. Letter, Dan B. Jacobs to William Connell, 19 November 1966, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library; and Memo, William Connell to Rostow, 2 December 1966, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

74. Memo, D.W. Ropa to Rostow, 12 December 1966, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

75. Memo, State Department to Johnson, 17 February 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

76. Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1944–1969*, 245.

77. "A Communication," February 1966, *Frontier*, BRA II, 320, Box 9.50.

78. Memo, State Department to Johnson, 17 February 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

79. "Dolci Resigns as War Crimes 'Judge'," 16 November 1966, *Daily Mail*.

80. "U.S. Curbs Russell's Aide," 24 July 1964, *New York Times*; "U.S. Aide of Russell Arrested," 1 February 1965, *New York Times*; and "Russell Aide Detained at Airport by French," 12 January 1967, *New York Times*.

81. 19 February 1967, *New York Times*.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Memo, Katzenbach to Johnson, 17 February 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, LBJ Library.

84. Bernard Levin, "Bertrand Russell: Prosecutor, Judge and Jury," 19 February 1967, *New York Times Magazine*.

85. Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, *International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights*, 121.

86. *Ibid.*

87. "Swedish Note to Russell," 12 December 1966, Agence France-Presse.

88. Cable, American Embassy Stockholm to Secretary of State, 25 April 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

89. Sam Hall, 27 April 1967, Reuters; and "Swedish Official View as to Russell's 'Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal'," Royal Swedish Government statement, 26 April 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

90. Letter, Sartre to Rusk, 3 May 1967, *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, ed. John Duffet (New York: O'Hare, 1968), 25–26.

91. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Concerning Dean Rusk," *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, 36.

92. Cable, American Embassy Stockholm to Secretary of State, 5 May 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

93. Cable, State Department and USIA to various U.S. Government agencies, 8 May 1967, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, The Bertrand Russell "Trial," Box 191, LBJ Library.

94. "Trial's End," 19 May 1967, *Time*.

95. *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, 8.

96. "International Law and the Military Draft: Testimony by Stanley Faulkner," *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal*, 91.

97. *Ibid.*, 10.

98. "Findings of the Tokyo Tribunal," BRA II, 376, IWCT, General Correspondence with Vietnamese.